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This thesis investigates the role of blockholders in the governance of Saudi 
public listed companies. Saudi Arabia presents a unique setting, where religious, 
cultural and social factors, that are similar to those of other Arab and Islamic 
nations, play an important role in the day to day lives of the society. Similar to 
other developing countries, Saudi Arabia is characterized by a wide presence of 
blockholders in addition to a weak legal setting, in such context minority 
shareholders become prone to expropriation by controlling blockholders. 
 
In order to examine the level of influence blockholders have on corporate 
governance, three empirical chapters, chapters 3, 4 and 5, focus on key 
governance mechanisms that concern minority shareholders, namely the board 
of directors, dividends and audit quality, respectively. Using appropriate 
regression models, each study examines the influence of the different 
blockholder types present in the Saudi market, namely family, royal family, 
government, corporate, managerial and multiple blockholders, while controlling 
for various factors that are known to have an impact on the governance 
measures in question. The studies examine data from 117 non-financial listed 
companies in Saudi Arabia from 2008-2013, with a final sample (N) of 619 firm 
year observations. 
 
Overall, the results show that minority shareholder rights are fairly protected 
under blockholder control in Saudi public listed companies. The initial results, in 
chapter 3, indicate that blockholders reduce board independence and maintain 
control over board representation, which enables them to expropriate minority 
shareholders. The exclusion of outside independent directors might reflect the 
dominance of the Arabian culture in Saudi Arabia, which is characterized by high 
power distance and strong levels of secrecy in business dealings. However, 
further analyses, in chapters 4 and 5, reveal that blockholders actually act in the 
best interest of all shareholders and curb managerial self serving behavior by 
positively influencing the corporate governance of the firm, through improved 
dividend payout policy, which reduces the levels of free cash flow available for 
appropriation, as well as improving the firms’ audit quality, by appointing Big 
Four auditors and independent and expert audit committee members.  
 
Collectively, these results reflect the possible role that Islamic teachings play 
in shaping the behavior of blockholders within the Saudi capital market, where 
fair treatment and just dealing represent core Islamic values, in which minority 
shareholders are not found to be expropriated. The Islamic ethical system 
promotes the protection of the rights of the various stakeholders and urges 
humans to act as stewards entrusted in achieving continuity and societal welfare. 
 
The results of the thesis are of interest to academics, practitioners and policy 
makers in developing countries in general, and the Middle East and Saudi Arabia 
in particular. Local and international investors become more aware of the 
environment of the Saudi market when prompted to make investment decisions. 
Policy makers also recognize the relationship between blockholders, corporate 
governance and minority shareholders in the Saudi market.  
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In contrast to the classical view of corporate governance, which is based on the 
premise of dispersed ownership structures (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), recent studies show that the presence of blockholders1 is far 
more common in most countries around the world (Denis & McConnell, 2003; La 
Porta et al., 1999; Holderness, 2010). Due to their strong position of high voting 
power, blockholders are assumed to have great influence over the governance 
and ultimate performance of corporations (Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006). 
 
Given their dominant position and tied wealth, blockholders are expected to 
help firms by engaging in managerial monitoring that leads to better 
performance outcomes (Connelly et al., 2010) However, as blockholders 
normally hold uncontestable voting power, they might also expropriate firm’s 
resources at the expense of minority shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008). The 
interests of blockholders, whether economical or political, might greatly differ 
from that of minority shareholders. Consequently, minority shareholders rely on 
different means of governance to protect their invested wealth, especially in a 
less developed country such as Saudi Arabia (Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; 
Djankov et al., 2008; Dyck & Zingales, 2004).  
                                                        
 
1 Blockholders, also known as large/controlling shareholders, are dominant 
shareholders of public listed companies. While there is no universally accepted 
threshold that defines a blockholder, studies have mostly used the minimum 
disclosure requirement of significant ownership, such as 3% or 5%, to identify a 
blockholder (Edmans, 2014; Holderness, 2007). 
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This thesis studies the role of blockholders in the governance of Saudi public 
listed companies. This introductory chapter will provide a brief background to 
the main topics of the thesis, namely corporate governance and the role of 
blockholders. The motivation behind the chosen study and research context will 
follow. Finally, the research questions investigated, the research philosophy 
employed and the contribution to knowledge the thesis aims to offer will be 
presented. 
 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 Corporate Governance Defined 
Corporate governance deals with the control systems associated with firms 
characterized by a separation in their ownership and control rights, e.g. public 
listed companies (Denis & McConnell, 2003). In such form of incorporation, the 
rights of ownership and control remain separated (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Shareholders, being the rightful owners, delegate the control rights to 
professional managers, who in turn run the day to day operations of the firm.  
 
Corporate governance has attracted a great deal of interest in the past twenty 
years from both academics and practitioners alike (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 
2003; Brown et al., 2011). This is generally attributed to the significance of 
public listed companies in today’s economy, as the invention of public listed 
companies “has provided vast employment, fuelled huge economic growth and 
created untold wealth” (Tricker, 1993, p.2). Furthermore, major corporate 
 3 
scandals, from the likes of ENRON, WorldCom and Lehman Brothers, fostered 
additional interest to better govern corporations (Brown et al., 2011). 
 
One of the earliest definitions of corporate governance is that provided in the 
Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992). The Cadbury report presented a set of 
guidelines and recommendations for listed companies in the UK, and is generally 
considered as the foundation of the development of corporate governance codes 
around the world (Zattoni & Judge, 2012).  
 
Cadbury (1992, p.14) defines corporate governance as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”. However, there is no single agreed upon 
definition for corporate governance amongst scholars nor professionals, despite 
the fact that the topic attracted great interest from academics and regulators for 
more than two decades (Brown et al., 2011). This is generally attributed to the 
fact that corporate governance has been approached from a wide range of 
disciplinary perspectives, ranging from economics, management and finance to 
politics, law and sociology (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, most definitions, in one way or another, encompass the role of 
different governance mechanisms in safeguarding the interests of principals 
through value creation (Huse, 2007). The main difference in defining corporate 
governance lies in who is regarded as the principal. The financial literature, of 
shareholder primacy, and the socially responsible ethical literature, of 
stakeholder eminence, are the two major standpoints which represent the 
opposite ends of the spectrum (Gillan, 2006; Huse, 2007).  
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The economics and finance view regards principals as solely shareholders, and 
that the objective of organizations is shareholder wealth maximization. In this 
view, the role of the various governance mechanisms is to protect the interests of 
shareholders from managerial misconduct. Based on this narrow perspective 
Shleifer & Vishny (1997, p.737) states that “Corporate governance deals with the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment”. Grounded in agency theory, the objective of 
corporate governance, in this case, is to align managerial interests with that of 
shareholders in order to maximize shareholder value. 
 
The stakeholder perspective, on the other hand, encompasses the various, 
internal and external, continuities to the organization in aim of achieving value 
creation to all related parties. Huse (2007, p.15) defines corporate governance as 
“the interaction between various internal and external actors and the board 
members in directing a firm for value creation”, without clearly defining who the 
value is created for. Similarly, Solomon (2010, p.14) defines corporate 
governance as “the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to 
companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all 
their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their 
business activity”.  
 
Even though corporate governance has numerous definitions, they generally 
encompass the basic assumptions of value creation and wealth preservation 
(Huse, 2007). There is, therefore, no right or wrong definition of corporate 
governance, it basically depends on one’s view of the world (Gillan, 2006).  
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1.1.2 Blockholders and the Principal-Agent Problem 
Agency theory, being the most applied theory in the corporate governance 
literature (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007), explains the relationship between 
the shareholders [principals] and managers [agents] (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Under the assumption that both parties are utility 
maximizers, in addition to the information asymmetry that exists between them, 
chances of agents acting in an opportunistic manner increases. Creating an 
environment where “important decision agents do not bear a substantial share 
of the wealth effects of their decisions” (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 301). As such, 
this agency theory was the first theoretical framework to adequately explain the 
existence and development of public corporations, given its unique separation of 
ownership and control arrangement (Daily et al., 2003). 
 
Small-dispersed shareholders are generally expected to be diversified through 
small ownership stakes in numerous firms. Such an ownership structure causes 
free-rider problems (Grossman & Hart, 1980). Small shareholders are expected 
to suffer from shareholder apathy, due to their insufficient power and economic 
incentives to monitor the management, and therefore tend to rely on free-riding 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Denis & McConnell, 2003).  
 
By contrast, large shareholders possess greater power to intervene in case 
managers diverge from the shareholder maximization goal (Becker, Cronqvist, & 
Fahlenbrach, 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
Additionally, shareholders with high cash flow rights tied to the firm have 
greater incentives to monitor the management in order to protect their wealth 
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(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), especially in countries with weak legal shareholder 
protection (La Porta et al., 1998).  
 
This monitoring by blockholders results in shared benefits of control by all 
other shareholders against managerial self-serving behavior, in the form of 
excessive perquisites, appointment of nonqualified individuals or any other form 
of appropriation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Becker et al., 2011; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Blockholders, therefore, are expected to improve firm value by aligning 
the interests of managers with that of shareholders, as well as reducing the cost 
of monitoring of management via other mechanisms (Wang & Shailer, 2015; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
1.1.3 Blockholders and the Principal-Principal Problem 
As opposed to the shared benefits of control, the private benefits of control 
occur when blockholders abuse their power and expropriate the firm’s resources 
(Chang, 2003; Djankov et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010; Barclay & Holderness, 
1989). Consequently, blockholders reduce firm value by engaging in 
expropriating behavior at the expense of minority shareholders (Huyghebaert & 
Wang, 2012).  
 
There are various forms expropriation, such as direct or indirect extraction of 
physical resources, tunneling, misallocation of key organizational positions to 
family or group related personnel, or to follow strategic decisions that advance 
personal goals and political agendas at the expense of firm performance (Chang, 
2003; Djankov et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010; Barclay & Holderness, 1989; Denis 
& McConnell, 2003; Young et al., 2008; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012). 
 7 
 
These private benefits of control generates a new type of agency problem 
between the controlling and minority shareholders, instead of the basic agency 
problem between the management and shareholders (Young et al., 2008). This 
so called principal-principal agency problem is prevalent in countries 
characterized with the presence of controlling shareholders as well as a weak 
legal framework (La Porta et al., 1999). 
 
The Law and Finance literature argues that the strength of a country’s legal 
system, in terms of shareholder protection, is what ultimately shapes its 
ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999). In a weak 
regulatory environment, concentrated ownership can serve as a substitute 
mechanism to protect one’s investment from managerial misconduct.  
 
However, a weak regulatory environment exacerbates the problem of minority 
shareholder expropriation by blockholders, as blockholders face less pressure 
from legal punishment for their actions (Adams & Ferreira, 2008). Therefore, 
while in dispersed ownership structures the main agency problem is seen as 
bieng between shareholders and managers [P-A], in a weak legal system with 
concentrated ownership, the problem shifts between controlling and minority 
shareholders [P-P] (Young et al., 2008). 
 
In contrast to the classical view of corporate governance, which is based on the 
premise of dispersed ownership structures (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), it has been found that blockholders are present in most 
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countries around the world (Denis & McConnell, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Holderness, 2010). Given their dominant position, blockholders are expected to 
help firms by engaging in managerial monitoring that leads to better 
performance outcomes (Connelly et al., 2010). Studies show that firms with 
family blockholders had better performance than firms with dispersed 
ownership, especially when a member of the family serves as the CEO (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, as blockholders normally hold 
uncontestable voting power, they might also expropriate firm’s resources at the 
expense of minority shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008).  
 
Blockholders, therefore, are assumed to have great influence over the 
governance and ultimate performance of corporations (Daily, Dalton, & 
Rajagopalan, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006). 
While, theoretically, owning a majority ownership of more than 50% enables the 
blockholder to control the outcome of elections, there is no minimum expected 
level for the blockholder to be able to exert influence over corporate decision 
making in practice (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Edmans & Holderness, 2016).  
 
There is no generally accepted definition of blockholders, however, the 
literature mostly considers blockholders based on the minimum disclosure 
requirement of the market in question, such as 5% in the US and 3% in the UK 
(Edmans, 2014; Lasfer, 2006; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Short & Keasey, 1999). 
Other studies have considered higher ownership levels, such as 10% or 20% in 
identifying a controlling blockholder (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; 
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Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; La Porta et al., 1999), however, there is no 
theoretical foundation for any of these thresholds (Edmans & Holderness, 2016).  
 
In order to maintain consistency with most prior literature (Edmans, 2014; 
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009; Holderness, 2003), this thesis will consider the 
minimum disclosure requirement of the Saudi market, which is 5%, as the 
minimum level for the different types of blockholders (CMA, 2010), however, 
different cut-off points will also be investigated in each empirical chapter, in 
order to identify the level of ownership required to maintain control in Saudi 
PLCs.   
1.1.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Corporate governance mechanisms have evolved over time, due to the rise of 
public listed companies and as a consequence of several corporate scandals and 
failures that hit different parts of the world. These mechanisms aim at alleviating 
the agency problems inherent in corporations characterized by a separation of 
ownership and control (Denis & McConnell, 2003).  
 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be either internal or external to the 
organization. Internal governance mechanisms include the board of directors, 
debt financing, dividends, compensation contracts and blockholder monitoring. 
External governance mechanisms include the takeover market and legal 
shareholder protection (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Durisin & Puzone, 2009). 
The development of, and interaction between, these various mechanisms are the 
primary focus of corporate governance research (Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
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1.1.5 The Board, Dividend Policy and Audit Quality 
External governance mechanisms, such as the take over market, are generally 
inactive in less developed countries, due to the weak legal system in such 
contexts (Mishra, 2011). In emerging and developing countries, laws and 
regulations regarding the governance of corporations are either absent entirely 
or cannot be effectively enforced (Yoshikawa et al., 2014). As a result, internal 
governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors, become significant in 
assuring shareholders’ interests in the context of developing countries (Douma 
et al., 2006; Munisi et al., 2014).  
 
Likewise, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) argue that external governance 
mechanisms fail to control principal-principal agency problems, and that “other 
internally determined governance mechanisms (i.e., dividends, debt and board 
structure) may prove more significant in controlling Agency Problem II [P-P]” 
(Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009, p.864). Furthermore, the level of audit quality, both 
internal and external audits, reflect the credibility of accounting information 
minority shareholders obtain under controlling ownership structures and 
increase confidence in these reports (Lin & Liu, 2009). Therefore, audit quality is 
expected to reduce the information asymmetry between controlling insiders and 
minority shareholders by providing credible checks to the financial reports of 
the company, thus, further alleviating P-A and P-P agency problems (Cohen et al., 
2002; Fan & Wong, 2005; Lin & Liu, 2009). 
 
This thesis will investigate the relationship between key governance 
mechanisms that are expected to alleviate both P-A and P-P agency problems 
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and blockholder ownership in Saudi Arabia in order to reflect the level of 
protection minority shareholders experience under blockholder presence. The 
three governance mechanisms analyzed are: the structure of the board of 
directors; dividend policy and audit quality. The choice of these mechanisms is 
motivated by several factors.  
 
Firstly, the board of directors is regarded as the most significant governance 
mechanism (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). Similarly, Fama (1980, p.294) views 
the board of directors as the “ultimate internal monitor”. The board of directors 
has the power to hire, fire, and compensate top executives (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Furthermore, Anderson and Reeb (2004) argue that in closely controlled 
firms minority shareholders heavily rely on the board of directors to mitigate 
blockholder expropriation, where board effectiveness is reflected in its level of 
independence.  
 
Secondly, dividend is considered as a mechanism that reduces the free cash 
flow available for expropriation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Paying 
out by the firm in the form of dividends reduces the cash available for 
managerial or blockholder discretion (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Jensen, 1986; 
La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). 
Moreover, dividend payment is a financial commitment that places the 
management under external scrutiny when needing to raise external funding 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Easterbrook, 1984).  
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Thirdly, improving audit quality, externally in the form of appointing a Big 
Four auditor, and internally by improving the level of expertise and 
independence of the audit committee, decreases the ability of the blockholder to 
extract private benefits of control due to the increased level of monitoring (Fan & 
Wong, 2005). Large audit firms, normally represented by the globally renown 
‘Big Four’ (KPMG, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte), have 
high level of expertise and are arguably more concerned about their reputation, 
therefore, making them more inclined to provide quality auditing services and 
detect any material misrepresentation in the financial reports (Khan et al., 2015; 
Fan & Wong, 2005; Lin & Liu, 2009). 
 
As such, the board of directors, dividends and the audit quality can all be 
considered as mechanisms to control for both P-A and P-P agency problems 
(Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Given the central role of the board, dividend and the 
audit quality in the protection of minority shareholders, this study will 
investigate the respective role of these governance mechanisms under the 
presence of different types of blockholders in the context of Saudi public listed 
companies. 
 
1.2 Research Context and Motivation 
Saudi Arabia will be the focus country of this study. There are several 
motivations behind choosing Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is an 
emerging/developing country that plays an important role in the global 
economy. It is the largest producer of crude oil and has the largest proven oil 
reserves in the world (CIA, 2014). Additionally, Saudi Arabia showed high 
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economic and political stability in a time of global economic crises and regional 
turmoil such as the credit crunch and the Arab Spring (Viñals & Ahmed, 2012; 
Jones, 2013).  
 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia presents a unique setting, where religious, cultural 
and social factors, that are similar to those of other Arab and Islamic nations, 
play an important role in the day to day lives of the society. Islam is the only legal 
religion in Saudi Arabia, and Islamic law, referred to as Sharia, serves as its 
constitution (CIA, 2014). This context varies considerably from other studies on 
ownership structure and governance mechanisms in the literature, and therefore 
should offer additional insights. 
 
The Saudi stock market, Tadawul, is the largest and most liquid in the Middle 
East and North Africa region (Tadawul, 2014; Koldertsova, 2010). Tadawul holds 
167 firms from 15 sectors with a total market capitalization of over 500 Billion 
USD as of October 2014 (ZAWYA, 2014). Furthermore, the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority announced its plans to open the stock market for foreign investors in 
2015 (CMA, 2014). As new foreign investors gain access to the market, it is 
important for them to understand the dynamics and key players of the market, 
and how the Saudi context may differ from other contexts that might be in their 
investment portfolios.  
 
Blockholders are widely present in the Saudi stock market, where government 
and family blockholders control more than two thirds of the companies listed in 
Tadawul (Di Benedetta & Berg, 2009; Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012). It is 
therefore expected that blockholders play an important role in the Saudi market, 
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which offers a unique opportunity to study blockholder influence on the 
governance of public listed companies. However, little is known about the 
corporate governance system in Saudi Arabia, as the area have attracted much 
less interest than Anglo-Saxon, European or East-Asian settings (Pierce, 2012; 
Kumar & Zattoni, 2014). Furthermore, Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera (2016, p.5) 
contend that “[t]he interaction between large shareholder and firms 
characteristics is a key element to understand the actual configuration of 
corporate governance where ownership structures are concentrated.” 
 
1.3 Thesis Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that understanding the dynamics 
under which the Saudi capital market operates is an area worthy of investigation, 
where blockholders play a significant role given their wide presence. The 
objective of the thesis is to understand the role blockholders play in the 
governance of Saudi public listed companies, and to what degree are minority 
shareholders prone to expropriation. In doing so, this thesis aims to answer the 
question of: ‘Do blockholders influence the governance of Saudi public listed 
corporations?’ 
 
In answering the research question, this thesis will present three empirical 
chapters (chapters 3, 4 and 5) on the relationship of blockholders with three key 
governance mechanisms; namely the board of directors (chapter 3), dividend 
policy (chapter 4) and audit quality (chapter 5).  
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Each study will focus on the governance mechanism in question on minority 
shareholder protection under blockholder control. The objective is to study the 
influence of different types of blockholders present in the Saudi capital market 
on these governance mechanisms in order to uncover the level of threat each 
type might cause to minority shareholders.  
 
Accordingly, the three empirical studies aim to answer these sub questions: 
 
1st Study (Chapter 3 – Blockholders and the Structure of the Board): 
 
What is the influence of blockholders on the composition of the board in 
Saudi Arabia? 
a. Do blockholders influence the independence of the board? 
 
2nd Study (Chapter 4 – Blockholders and Dividend Policy): 
 
What is the influence of blockholders on dividend payout in Saudi Arabia? 
b. Do blockholders influence the decision to payout dividends? 
c. Do blockholders influence dividend payout levels? 
 
3rd Study (Chapter 5 – Blockholders and Audit Quality): 
 
What is the influence of blockholders on audit quality in Saudi Arabia? 
d. Do blockholders influence the decision to assign a big 4 auditor? 
e. Do blockholders influence the level of expertise and independence 
of the audit committee? 
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1.4 Research Philosophy  
It is vital to determine and justify the research philosophy employed when 
conducting social science research. Research philosophy is related to the 
development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge (Saunders et al., 
2008). Research philosophy mainly concerns the assumptions regarding the 
nature of reality, i.e. ontological, the researcher’s relationship with what is 
researched, i.e. epistemological, and the research process being employed, i.e. 
methodological (Saunders et al., 2012; Collis & Hussey, 2009).  
 
The research questions of the study should motivate which research 
philosophy to be employed (Saunders et al., 2012; Collis & Hussey, 2009). 
Therefore, determining the research philosophy is important as it helps in 
choosing the appropriate research tools to analyze the phenomena under 
investigation. This thesis is concerned with blockholders and minority 
shareholders’ expropriation concerns in Saudi public listed companies. 
Specifically, the thesis examines the influence of blockholders on the governance 
of the firm through three key governance mechanisms, the board, dividends and 
audit quality.  
 
The two main research philosophical standpoints are positivism and 
interpretivism (Saunders et al., 2008).  Positivism is an objectivist view of reality, 
where the researcher is independent from what is being studied, and mainly 
follows a deductive approach of hypothesis testing in the form of quantitative 
analyses of large data samples. On the other hand, interpretivism holds a 
subjectivist view of reality, where social phenomena is created from the actions 
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and perceptions of the different social actors, including the researcher, and is in a 
continuous state of revision through the process of social interaction. 
Interpretivism research mostly follows an inductive process of theory building 
through focused qualitative enquiry from a relatively small sample (Saunders et 
al., 2008). 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify four paradigms for the analysis of theory 
in social science as shown in Figure 1.1, namely radical humanist, radical 
structuralist, interpretive and functionalist. The radical change paradigms, 
radical humanist and radical structuralist, are concerned with challenging and 
seeking to change the status quo (Saunders et al., 2012; Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
The current research aims to study the influence of blockholders on the 
governance of Saudi public listed companies and their relationship with minority 
shareholders in order to understand and rationally explain the structural reality, 
not seek to change it. Therefore, both radical change paradigms are not suitable 
for such research.  
 
The regulatory approach paradigms seek to explain social order either 
subjectively, through interpretivist, or objectively, through functionalist theory 
building, and thus are more suitable for the current research. The functionalist 
paradigm is the most applied approach in organizational and management 
research, which is problem oriented in nature and seeks to provide practical 
solutions to practical problems, while the interpretivist paradigm seek to make 
sense of the world, understand organizational affairs and discover irrationalities  
(Gioia & Pitre, 1990; Saunders et al., 2008).  
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Figure 1.1 Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Theory 
 
 
Source: (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.22) 
 
 
Scholars have argued against the black and white nature of the four research 
paradigms reported by Burrell and Morgan when conducting social science 
research (1979) (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). They assert that it is difficult to identify 
the boundaries of each research paradigm and that grey areas fall between the 
different paradigms, transition zones, are necessary for achieving a 
comprehensive view, which calls for the use of a pluralistic multiparadigm 
approach (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). 
 
Utilizing a multiparadigm approach offers researchers the opportunity of 
creating insights that encompasses different ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, which taps different aspects of organizational phenomena that 
leads to producing theoretical views that are unique, different and informative 
(Gioia & Pitre, 1990). This thesis undertakes a multiparadigm approach, the 
transitional zone that links interpretivist and functionalist paradigms. 
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Saudi Arabian culture is characterized by high power distance and strong level 
of secrecy in corporate dealings, where sensitive information, such as 
expropriation and blockholder influence, is difficult to discuss with related 
parties (Ali, 2009; Cassell & Blake, 2012; Piesse et al., 2011). Consequently, 
conducting an interpretivist approach in order to collect the data becomes 
difficult through qualitative inquiry, especially for such a sensitive topic. 
Therefore, a positivism standpoint seems to be more appropriate in order to 
study the aforementioned phenomena. However, an interpretive approach is 
necessary for analyzing the results and benefit from the broad theoretical 
framework presented in each empirical chapter. Given the possible influence of 
institutional factors unique to the under investigated setting of Saudi Arabia, it is 
important for the researcher to take an interpretivist stance when analyzing the 
findings. 
 
This thesis will employ a multiparadigm approach from the interpretivist-
functionalist transition zone and employs panel data econometric regression 
models from manually collected secondary data of the different ownership 
structures, governance mechanisms and control variables in question. 
Accordingly, the researcher remains independent from social actors and is able 
to build causality, test hypotheses regarding the phenomena, and further 
develop the theories behind blockholder influence on the governance of Saudi 
public listed companies. Further details on the regression models used and data 
types will be discussed in each empirical chapter. Figure 1.2 shows the overall 














- The Board 
(Chapter 3) 
- Dividend Policy 
(Chapter 4) 



























1.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
The thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. This thesis contributes 
to the P-P relationship and the private benefits of control associated with large 
shareholders by investigating the influence of blockholders on the governance of 
PLCs in a newly investigated setting, namely Saudi Arabia (Faccio et al., 2001; 
Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012; Young et al., 2008).  
 
Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the literature on the role of multiple 
blockholders in corporate governance, by examining their relationship with key 
governance mechanisms (Maury & Pajuste, 2005; Attig et al., 2008; Attig et al., 
2009; Edmans & Manso, 2009).  
 
Moreover, this thesis contributes to the political connections literature by 
analyzing the governance influence of blockholders from the Saudi Royal family, 
who possess financial, legal and social advantages over other types of owners in 
the country (Bona-Sánchez, Pérez-Alemán, & Santana-Martín, 2014; Faccio, 
2010; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). 
 
Finally, this thesis contributes to the Islamic business ethics literature by 
developing a conceptual framework based on evidence from a predominant 
Islamic country on the relationship between controlling blockholders, corporate 
governance and minority shareholders. Namely, the thesis examines the 
influence of institutional factors, namely the Arabian culture and Islamic religion, 
in shaping the behavior of blockholders towards minority shareholders and the 
governance of the firm.  
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1.6 Thesis Structure 
The thesis constitutes three studies on the role of blockholders in the 
governance of Saudi firms. Each study is represented in a stand alone empirical 
chapter that will include a literature review, methodology and results section. 
The next chapter will provide an overview of Saudi Arabia. Chapter three will 
present the first study, which analyses the blockholder and board structure 
relationship. Subsequently, chapter four will present the blockholder and 
dividend relationship, which serves as the second study. And the third and final 
study, which analyses the blockholder and audit quality relationship, will be 
presented in chapter five. Finally, a summary of the results from the three 
studies, as well as suggestions for future research will be offered. 
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Chapter Two  
Overview of Saudi Arabia 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide a background to the country that serves as the 
context of the study, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. After highlighting the 
motivations behind choosing Saudi Arabia in the preceding chapter, this chapter 
will reflect on the historical, political and economical factors that shape the 
country in order to set the scene for the empirical investigation in the 
subsequent chapters. 
 
2.2 Background to Saudi Arabia 
2.2.1 Brief History 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or generally referred to as simply Saudi Arabia, 
is a monarchy state that lies on the Arabian Peninsula in the Middle East at the 
heart of the Arab Islamic world. The establishment of modern Saudi Arabia took 
place in the early 20th century.  In 1932, King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud united 
numerous tribal territorial rulings, along with the emirates of Hijaz [the western 
part of the peninsula] and Ha’il [the northern part of the peninsula], and claimed 
Riyadh [a city in the central part of the peninsula] as the capital of the new state. 
This unity was achieved after a series of efforts led by the Ibn Saud family and 
their religious partners which spanned for more than a century (Wynbrandt, 
2010; Bowen, 2008).  
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Initiating from Najd [the central part of the Peninsula] in the 18th century, 
Mohammad Ibn Saud and his religious partner, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, 
joined forces to bring Najd and the rest of Arabia, who they believed have 
departed from the original Islamic teachings, back to what they believed is the 
pure form of Islam under the doctrine of tawhid [oneness of God] (Al-Rasheed, 
2010; Wynbrandt, 2010).  
 
This Saudi-Wahhabi movement [called after the surname of the founders] led 
to the establishment, and latter fall, of two Saudi states, the Emirate of Diriyah 
[1744-1818] and the Emirate of Najd [1824-1891]. This paved the way for the 
foundation of the third, and current, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the banner 
of religious legitimization led by King Abdulaziz and his Islamic religious group 
the Ikhwan [brotherhood] (Al-Rasheed, 2010).  
 
The main message of the founders was to spread Islam in the form of da’wa 
[call] and unite the Arabs under the enforcement of Islamic sharia [rulings] 
through gaining allegiance from tribal leaders and their followers (Al-Rasheed, 
2010). This strategy proved to be vital for their success in a region that marks 
the birth of Islam and hosts its two Holy Mosques of Mecca and Medina, in 
addition to the important role that tribal loyalty and kinship plays in the lives of 
Arabs in general (Bowen, 2008; Long & Maisel, 2010). 
2.2.2 Geography and Demographics 
Located in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia occupies more than 80% of the 
Arabian Peninsula, and is comprised of mostly desert terrain. As figure 2.1 
shows, Saudi Arabia abuts two long coastlines: the Red Sea to the west, and the 
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Persian Gulf to the east, and shares borders with eight Arab and Islamic 
countries: Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain [offshore], 
Kuwait, Iraq, and Jordan.  
 
With the predominant dessert terrain of the country, water shortage is one of 
the main resource problems that faces Saudi Arabia (Long & Maisel, 2010). 
However, in the last two decades, the Saudi government has invested billions of 
dollars in one of the largest sea water desalinization systems in the world 
(Bowen, 2008). 
 
Saudi Arabia is the largest country of the Gulf Cooperative Council [GCC] in 
terms of size, population and economy [measured by GDP]. The GCC was 
established for the purpose of promoting regional cooperation and common 
defense for conserving the monarchies of its member states (Bowen, 2008). The 
GCC constitutes six Arab states, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE. These countries share a lot of similarities in terms of 
culture, religion, economy amongst other factors (Pierce, 2012). 
 
Arabic is the only official language, and Islam is the only legal religion in Saudi 
Arabia. The entire Saudi population are Muslims, of which 90% are Sunni 
Muslims2 and the remaining 10% are Shia Muslims3 (Bowen, 2008). The major 
ethnic group is Arabs, which comprises more than 90% of Saudis (Long & Maisel, 
                                                        
 
2 The Wahhabi teachings are a strict form of Sunni 
3 Shia are generally concentrated in the eastern region along the Persian Gulf 
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2010). The total population is estimated to be around 27 million, where non-










2.3.1 Oil Based Economy 
It can be argued that the most significant event in the history of Saudi Arabia 
was the discovery of oil. Prior to the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, the main 
source of income for the government was the moderate revenues from 
pilgrimage visitors to the two Holy Mosques and limited agricultural resources 
(Long & Maisel, 2010).  
 
Soon after the establishment of the state in the 1930s, and after the success of 
the British in oil production in the region4, the Saudi government granted an 
American company, Standard Oil of California (SoCal, currently Chevron) 
concessions for oil exploration in 1933 (Long & Maisel, 2010). The concessions 
turned to immediate success, as oil was discovered in great quantities in the 
eastern region of Saudi Arabia and by 1939 SoCal was producing over half a 
million barrels a year (Bowen, 2008).  
 
To this day, oil remains the most important resource for Saudi Arabia, as it 
accounts for more than 90% of its exports and around 80% of the government 
revenues (Pierce, 2012). Holding the largest proven oil reserves in the world, 
Saudi Arabia has grown to be one of the largest producers of crude oil (CIA, 
2014).  
 
                                                        
 
4 The British had already established the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and had 
agreements to gain oil concessions in several gulf states, such as Kuwait, Bahrain 
and Iraq (Bowen, 2008). 
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Huge revenues from oil production over the past four decades helped the 
country to develop and build vast infrastructure projects, invest in healthcare 
and education, and raise the living standards of its citizens in general. Currently 
Saudi Arabia is ranked 20 from 230 countries in terms of GDP per capita (CIA, 
2014). 
 
Given the country’s high reliance on oil revenues, the government took action 
to diversify the economy over the past two decades, which is reflected in the 
mass privatization program of various previously fully government owned 
entities, such as the electricity, water, telecommunication and airline industries, 
as well as its development of the private sector and capital market by issuing 
laws and regulations that increased the confidence of investors and the general 
public (Fallatah & Dickins, 2012). Furthermore, huge government spending in 
various projects, which is fueled by high oil revenues, facilitated the growth of 
the private sector and the economy in general. 
2.3.2 Saudi Vision 2030 
Recently, the government of Saudi Arabia initiated an economical and social 
program called ‘Vision 2030’ which established strategies that aim to diversify 
government’s reliance on oil revenues. The initiative embraced the development 
of various sectors, including healthcare, education and the overall economy 
amongst others, in its strategies (KSA, 2016). 
 
The vision will introduce structural reforms that will develop and empower 
the private sector by increasing its transparency and efficiency. The vision also 
outlined the plan of a 5% part-privatization of the national oil company, 
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ARAMCO, in order to create the world’s largest energy conglomerate and to be 
partly listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange TADAWUL, by as early as 2017 (KSA, 
2016). 
 
Furthermore, the vision set clear targets and benchmarks for the country to 
achieve by the year 2030. These include, but are not limited to, increasing the 
foreign direct investment from 3.8% to 5.7% of the GDP, increasing the private 
sector’s contribution from 40% to 65% of the GDP, increasing the Public 
Investment Fund’s assets, which is the country’s sovereign wealth fund, from 
600 billion Saudi Riyals (the equivalent of 160 billion US Dollars as of December 
2016) to more than 7 trillion Riyals (the equivalent of 1.86 trillion US Dollars as 
of December 2016) making it the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, and 
advancing to be amongst the top 10 countries on the Global Competitive Index 
and top 15 largest economies in the world from the current 25th and 19th 
position, respectively (KSA, 2016). 
 
This vision might be vital for sustaining a prosperous future for the country, 
especially when regional turmoil and instability in bordering countries 
exhausted the government budget, which heavily relied on depleting oil 
revenues due to the huge drop in oil prices in recent years. Diversification of 
government income streams, encouraging foreign investments as well as 
developing the private sector and secondary markets will aid in solidifying the 
Saudi economy in facing any future challenges. 
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2.4 Saudi Stock Market - TADAWUL 
The Saudi capital market, officially known as TADAWUL or TASI all share 
index, is a relatively new stock market. The first public listed company in Saudi 
Arabia initiated in the early 1930’s, and the number of companies reached 14 by 
the late 1970’s, however, the market remained informal until 1984, when the 
government formed the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency [SAMA] which was 
assigned the task of developing, regulating and monitoring the capital market 
(Tadawul, 2014). Yet, it was not until 2003, with the issuance of the Capital 
Market Authority [CMA] which is responsible for regulating and supervising the 
capital market, did the market witness significant development, in terms of 
increased number of listed firms, advanced market regulations and rigorous 
reporting and disclosure requirements (Al-Nodel & Hussainey, 2010). 
 
By the year 2005, the Saudi stock market Tadawul had 81 listed companies, 
since then, the number of listed companies increased by more than one fold to 
reach 171 companies from 15 different sectors by the end of 2015 (Bloomberg, 
2015). Tadawul, is the largest and most liquid stock market in the Middle East 
and North Africa region (Tadawul, 2014; Koldertsova, 2010). Tadawul had a 
market capitalization of over 500 billion US Dollars as of October 2014 (ZAWYA, 
2014).  
 
Blockholders are widely present in the Saudi stock market; where government 
and family blockholders control more than two thirds of the companies listed in 
Tadawul (Di Benedetta & Berg, 2009; Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012; Solomon, 
2010; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). Family businesses that went public as well as 
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partially privatized government entities represent the majority of listed firms 
(Abdullah et al., 2014; Lessambo, 2014). Details on the concentration and 
distribution of different blockholder types present in the Saudi capital market 
will be presented in the empirical studies in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
The stock market in Saudi Arabia plays an important role in the economy and 
is accessed by many of its population. In their study on share ownership around 
the world, Grout et al. (2009) found that the country with the highest percentage 
of population for individuals investing in publicly listed shares, from a sample of 
54 countries, was Saudi Arabia. Grout et al. (2009) reported that 38.2% of the 
Saudi population invested in shares of publicly listed companies, compared with 
12.6%, 15.09%, 0.14% and 5.02% for the U.S., U.K., Russia and Iran respectively. 
In terms of actual figures, the number of individuals investing in public listed 
shares in Saudi Arabia reported in their study was 10,743,440. Only the U.S., 
Japan and China had a higher number of investing individuals in publicly listed 
shares (Grout et al., 2009). These figures reflect the importance of the stock 
market to the general public. 
 
The Saudi stock market experienced a massive bull market since the beginning 
of the millennium, which attracted many new investors from the general public 
in to the market. However, in 2006, a huge collapse occurred to the entire stock 
market and share prices dropped dramatically, and by December 2006 Tadawul 
had lost around 53% of its market capitalization, or the equivalent of 480 billion 
US Dollar (Alamri, 2014; Fallatah & Dickins, 2012; Al-Nodel & Hussainey, 2010). 
It is argued that the market was over inflated and a correction to the bubble was 
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inevitable, however, the majority of investors, who are unsophisticated 
individuals, were unaware of such situation and any accompanying 
consequences (Yang, 2007). 
 
This huge collapse dramatically affected the confidence in the stock market 
and shocked investors, of whom mostly were middle class citizens (Yang, 2007). 
This led the CMA to issue a new code, the Corporate Governance Regulations 
(CGR), immediately in order to regain the confidence of the general public in the 
stock market and better govern the listed firms (CMA, 2010). The corporate 
governance code and other regulations of the capital market will be discussed in 
more detail in section 2.5.2. 
 
2.5 Regulatory Framework 
2.5.1 Islamic Law and Sharia 
Saudi Arabia has been heavily influenced by Islam, it holds the place of the 
religions’ birth as well as the two Holy Mosques of Mecca and Medina. Thus Saudi 
Arabia is regarded as the custodian of Islam in the eyes of the Muslim population, 
and it has acted in that manner ever since its establishment under Ibn Saud and 
his religious partner Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (Almajid, 2008; Falgi, 
2009).  
 
Therefore, in establishing the country, King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, the founder of 
the Kingdom, has based the legislative system of the country on Islamic Law 
(Sharia). Unlike other Arab and Islamic nations, Saudi Arabia has no constitution; 
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Sharia instead serves as its constitution (Al-Fahad, 2005). Sharia consists of the 
Islamic Holy Book, The Quran, the teachings of Prophet Mohammed PBUH, 
Sunnah, and the interpretations and reasoning of religious scholars, Ijmaa’ (Di 
Benedetta & Berg, 2009; Almajid, 2008).  
 
While Sharia serves as the constitution of Saudi Arabia, detailed rulings and 
regulations pertaining different areas, such as administrative and commercial 
law for example, are issued through royal decrees (Al-Fahad, 2005). The role of 
Islam will be discussed in section 2.6.1, while the following section will elaborate 
on the regulations regarding the Saudi capital market. 
2.5.2 Capital Market Regulation  
As noted, the primary source of law in Saudi Arabia is the Islamic Law, Sharia. 
Regulations, however, are often issued by royal decrees, and are elaborations of 
Sharia, which provide more specific requirements and guidance on commercial 
relations. The legal framework governing companies in Saudi Arabia are the 
Companies Law [CL] and the Capital Market Law [CML], while the Capital Market 
Authority [CMA] is the main regulator of the Saudi capital market (Almajid, 
2008; Di Benedetta & Berg, 2009).  
 
The Companies Law, issued in 1965, is considered the first planned effort to 
regulate the operations of companies in Saudi Arabia. The law also introduced 
shareholder rights for the first time, such as the general assembly and voting 
rights (Di Benedetta & Berg, 2009; Falgi, 2009). In 2003, following the collapse of 
multinational corporations such as Enron and WorldCom, the Saudi government 
issued a royal decree that introduced the Capital Market Law [CML], and 
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established the Capital Market Authority [CMA] with the objective of regulating 
the functioning of the capital market.  
 
The CMA possesses financial, legal and administrative independence, from any 
other governmental authority, in decision making (Alsanosi, 2010; Almajid, 
2008). The CMA is supposed to protect the interests of the investing public by 
controlling and developing the capital market through the formulation and 
implementation of appropriate rules and regulations (Alsanosi, 2010; Almajid, 
2008). In order to restore investors’ trust in the stock market, following a major 
correction to the entire stock market in 2006, the CMA issued its first Corporate 
Governance Regulations [CGR] (Ramady, 2007). 
 
The CGR code follows a ‘comply or explain’ approach similar to that of the 
Combined Code of the U.K., and includes various recommendations covering 
shareholder rights, disclosure and transparency, internal control and risk 
management, and the board of directors. A second version of the CGR was later 
issued in 2010, which made several parts of the previous code mandatory5 (CMA, 
2010). Listed firms are required to issue an annual report of the board of 
directors that includes all the governance related recommendations of the CGR 
the company complies with or the reason behind non-compliance. The report 
also discloses information regarding board and executive remuneration as well 
as blockholder ownership.  
 
                                                        
 
5 A copy of the 2010 Saudi CGR is attached in Appendix A 
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The code in general is similar to the U.K. Cadbury Report of 1992, thus is 
largely based on an Anglo-American governance model, such as the OECD 
principles of corporate governance (Almajid, 2008; Falgi, 2009; Pierce, 2012; Al-
Bassam et al., 2018; Bahrawe et al., 2016). The introduction of the code was a 
major step in increasing the amount of information disclosed to the general 
public, which helped reduce the information asymmetry that existed between 
corporate insiders and outside shareholders.  
 
However, more effort needs to be taken to improve the governance of Saudi 
Arabia. The new efforts need to take into consideration the unique cultural and 
institutional aspects of the country, especially in light of two recent accounting 
scandals that hit the stock market, namely Al-Mojil Group, and Mobily (Rashad & 
Al Sayegh, 2015; Al Omran, 2016).  
 
Al-Mojil Group, a large constructions contracting listed firm, had its shares 
suspended from trading since 22/07/2012 after accumulating huge losses. 
Furthermore, Al-Mojil board of directors was recently accused of manipulation 
and fraud in the initial public offering of their shares by the Saudi stock market 
regulator in 18/06/2016 after an extended investigation. Three of its board 
members, including the founder, were sentenced to jail, for terms ranging from 
three to five years, and the company was fined 1.6 Billion Saudi Riyals, the 
equivalent of 427 million US Dollars. However the case is not yet settled as the 
defendants have appealed against these allegations (Torchia, 2016; Al Omran, 
2016; CMA, 2016; CMA, 2012).  
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Al-Mojil Group’s inflated IPO figures and manipulated accounts drew many 
investors into the family controlled firm in 2008, who suffered accumulated 
losses afterwards, which led to the suspension of trading for more than four 
years. Accordingly, this might be a clear reflection of a case where controlling 
blockholders, namely the founding family, expropriated minority shareholders 
through their ultimate control over the firm. 
 
Mobily, or formally known as Etihad Etisalat Co., is the second largest 
telecommunications company in Saudi Arabia. The firm grew significantly since 
it started operations in 2005 by ending the monopoly enjoyed by the 
government owned Saudi Telecommunication Company. In 2014, the firm 
misreported profits of 220 million Saudi Riyals (the equivalent of 58.6 million US 
Dollars), and later announced that they had actually incurred losses of 913 
million Saudi Riyals (the equivalent of 243.4 million US Dollars) (Mathew & 
Khan, 2015).  
 
The misreporting caused the Saudi Capital Market Authority to suspend 
trading of the firm’s shares from 25/02/2015 to 05/03/2015 and later from 
09/06/2015 to 03/08/2015, in order for the CMA to conduct an investigation 
behind the causes of the misreporting and for the firm to reissue a restated 
consolidated financial statements for the year 2014 and the first quarter of 2015 
(CMA, 2015b; CMA, 2015a; CMA, 2015c). Mobily has since complied with the 
CMA requirements and has also removed its CEO, Al Kaf who was the company’s 
first CEO, from his position after a detailed internal investigation lead by the 
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board to find the possible causes behind the misreporting (Mathew & Khan, 
2015; Rashad & Al Sayegh, 2015). 
 
Both cases reflect the importance of rigorous regulations and market oversight 
that limits the manipulation capacity of controlling insiders, by both 
blockholders and entrenched managers, as well as the importance of the external 
auditors in detecting any misreports and manipulation of accounts, in order to 
protect minority shareholders from expropriation and to hold the related parties 
accountable.  
 
Moreover, the regulations and efforts by the Saudi government need to take 
into account the unique institutional arrangements of the country in order to 
better tackle the governance issues and overcome any inadequacies that might 
arise from pure copying of Western developed corporate governance 
recommendations.  
 
The next section will present a discussion identifying the principal in the Saudi 
publicly listed sector, with an aim to reflect on the key decision makers and 
primary owners of public listed firms in Saudi Arabia. Identifying the principal 
will help better understand the Saudi context and acknowledge any possible 




2.6 Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
This section investigates corporate governance in the context of Saudi public 
listed companies. In order to study the corporate governance system in a 
particular context, it is important to identify the main principals in question, as 
in a typical principal-agent relationship. In the Anglo-American governance 
model, for example, the key principals are the shareholders, or capital providers, 
whereas the Continental European system, such as that found in Germany, gives 
more emphasis on a wider group of stakeholders, such as employees, banks, 
trade unions, and suppliers (Piesse et al., 2011; Hasan, 2009; Kasri, 2009; Lewis, 
2005).  
 
In identifying the main principal in the Saudi Arabian context, it is important 
to investigate the different factors that might have affected the development of 
the principal in the first place, and then examine the principals in practice. The 
three factors that will be studied are the influence of the Islamic religion, the 
legal system and the actual practices. 
2.6.1 Corporate Governance and Islamic Sharia 
Islam or Sharia, as a religion and legislation, is a way of life, in the sense that it 
does not only cover religious rituals and acts of worship, called Ibadat, but also 
structures transactions, relationships, dealings and acts of people with each 
other and with their environment, called Muamalat (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Falgi, 
2009; Febianto, 2011; Cheffins, 2008).  
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From the Islamic perspective, ownership rights originate from the concept of 
stewardship, Khilafah, as The Quran and Sunnah clearly assert that God, Allah 
The Almighty, is the sole, absolute and eternal, owner of property, all that is on 
the heavens and on earth, and man is the trustee and vicegerent of Allah (Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009; Hasan, 2009; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2004; Lewis, 2001). 
Furthermore, accountability is also a central aspect in Islam, as all humans will 
be held accountable for their deeds in the day of judgment (Lewis, 2001; Beekun 
& Badawi, 2005; Rizk, 2008a). 
 
Property rights in Islam are expected to present a comprehensive framework 
that identifies and protects the interests and rights of every individual, 
organization, community, and the state (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2004; Hasan, 2009). 
Though the individual’s possession of resources and his share in the outcome is 
approved and protected by Sharia, these rights are limited as not to conflict with 
the interest and well being of the society. Any property acquired through breach 
of trust, corruption, fraud, or unethical means does not satisfy the definition of 
property, al-mal, and therefore its ownership is not considered to be legitimate 
according to Sharia (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2004; Cheffins, 2008).  
 
The Sharia legality of the form of a joint stock company, and its accompanied 
limited liability and separate legal status, has been a matter of debate from 
Islamic Sharia scholars (Hassan et al., 2012; Zuryati et al., 2009). Consequenly, 
detailed laws on the protection of investor rights is generally absent in the body 
of Islamic literature, due to the relatively new existence of modern corporations 
and its associated controversy (Ahmed, 2012).  
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Therefore, Islamic law scholars need to clearly establish a stand on corporate 
personality and address in detail the various rights of shareholders in a 
corporate framework, such as that found in modern corporate law, in order to 
protect shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders from the possibility of 
appropriation by insiders (Ahmed, 2012; Zuryati et al., 2009). However, the 
existence of appropriate corporate governance measures, which are mostly 
developed in Western countries that do not contradict Islamic teachings, can also 
help in the protection of stakeholder interests in Saudi Arabia and other Islamic 
countries where the establishment of a corporation with separate legal status is 
permitted and protected by law (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002). 
 
Lewis (2005) summarizes three major underlying principles that 
differentiates the Islamic corporate governance system from its Western 
counterpart. Firstly, the Western concept of corporate governance is derived 
from a ‘secular humanistic’ perspective rather than being based on a religious 
moral authority, which is represented in the Islamic model under the concept of 
Tawhid, meaning the oneness of Allah, to whom is the destiny of all. Tawhid 
directs the relationships between humans as well as with their environment, 
obliges mankind to follow the guidance of Sharia in all aspects of life and 
prohibits any wrongdoings and shameful acts (Choudhury & Hoque, 2006; 
Hasan, 2009; Abdul Rahman, 1998). Accordingly, all Muslims should work 
towards this life and the Hereafter by adhering to the teachings of Islam, in order 
to gain blessings and avoid punishment (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Arsad et al., 
2015; Rizk, 2008b). 
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Secondly, the Western corporate culture is rooted in a self-interest paradigm 
with no overarching requirement to take account of the wider interests of 
society. Islam, however, makes huge emphasis on the accountability of the 
individual towards the community at large (Ummah), as well as the environment, 
where Muslims ought to be fair, honest and just toward others, and should not be 
motivated by greed or selfishness (Rizk, 2008b; Ali et al., 2017; Al Kahtani, 
2014). For example, the economic principle of Zakah, the special alms levy, or 
mandatory charity, paid to the deprived and people in need, reflects the 
consideration for different stakeholder groups the firm and individual should 
encompass (Choudhury & Hoque, 2006; Hasan, 2009; Lewis, 2005; Abdul 
Rahman, 1998).  
 
Thirdly, the model of Western corporate governance is based mainly on 
agency theory rather than stewardship theory, and therefore views mankind as a 
self-interested opportunistic agent who needs to be monitored and controlled. 
Conversely, in the Islamic view, all people are entrusted to act in the interest of 
the greater good. Under Islam, all humans are regarded as custodians, 
vicegerents, of Allah, and are entrusted to use all available resources efficiently 
and equitably for the benefit of the entire community, or Ummah, with the 
objective of sustaining, maintaining and preserving every existing thing (Iqbal & 
Lewis, 2009; Abdul Rahman, 1998; Rizk, 2014; Al Kahtani, 2014).  
 
Based on these considerations, it is argued that the principles of property 
rights and contracts under Islam offer a theoretical foundation that acknowledge 
the rights of all stakeholders (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2004; Cheffins, 2008), where 
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business dealings ought to be conducted in accordance with Sharia, as being fair, 
just and honest toward others (Rizk, 2008b; Al Kahtani, 2014). Likewise, Beekun 
and Badawi (2005, p.143) state that  
“The Islamic ethical system is balanced, fair, just, and benevolent, and 
seeks to respect the rights of both primary and derivative stakeholders 
without allowing for exploitation, nepotism and other human ills”.  
This Islamic ethical system directly affects the behavioural norms of individuals 
who are expected to ultimately serve the best interest of the society (Ali et al., 
2017; Rizk, 2014; Bedoui & Mansour, 2015). 
 
Another key Islamic concept is the institution of Hisba, an authority, individual 
or group, that ensures compliance with the requirements of Sharia, and the role 
of Muhtasib, who is delegated to promote virtue, all that is good, and discourage 
vice and all that is evil (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Lewis, 2005). In order to 
operationalize Hisba, several scholars advocated the introduction of a Sharia 
Supervisory Board (Lewis, 2001; Febianto, 2011; Safieddine, 2009; Hasan, 
2009). The Sharia Board has been mainly advocated for Islamic financial 
institutions, which rather tend to be complex in the nature of their operations 
and require in-depth knowledge and investigation to identify acceptable, Halal, 
and unacceptable, Haram, transactions. This includes, amongst others, 
transactions that involve Riba, the prohibited interest or usury in financial 
dealings, which is an integral part of the global financial system (Safieddine, 
2009).  
 
Hasan (2009, p.277) concludes that the Islamic corporate governance model 
“combines the element of Tawhid, Shura, Shari’ah rules and maintains the private 
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goal without ignoring the duty of social welfare”. In this case the Islamic 
principle of Shura, consultation, in decision making, which takes into 
consideration the opinion and input of various stakeholders, both direct and 
indirect, represent a foundation for a stakeholder view of the firm. Any decision 
that affects others has to be taken by consensus, or Shura, under Sharia (Azid et 
al., 2007; Lewis, 2005). Accordingly, Hasan (2009; 2011) summarizes the 
differences between the major aspects of the Islamic corporate governance 
model and that of the Western; the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European 
models, as follows in Table 2.1.  
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Ultimately, the Sharia governance model combines the elements of 
stewardship and legitimacy. Suchman (1995, p.574) defines legitimacy as 
“[A] generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”  
By advocating the principle of accountability and vicegerency, humans are seen 
as stewards who are supposed to act in the best interest of all (Azid et al., 2007; 
Rizk, 2008b). Additionally, by considering a wider group of stakeholders, direct 
and indirect, through involving them in the decision making process, via the 
Shura principle, as well as aiding the deprived, by the institution of Zakah, 
corporations become more inclined to legitimize their actions and existence 
towards the society at large under the Sharia governance model (Lewis, 2005).  
 
Under the Islamic economic system, the performance of the firm is not 
measured by the classical single dimensional financial aspect, it is rather a multi 
dimensional view that emphasizes on ethical aspects such as promoting human 
welfare, preventing corruption and enhancing social and economic stability (Ali 
et al., 2017; Bedoui & Mansour, 2015). Azid et al. (2007, p.23) further contend 
that the responsibility of the management in the Sharia or Islamic system, is “to 
increase the general prosperity and service of the [entire] society’s well being”. 
 
Ultimately, Islamic religion, or Sharia, assumes the principal to be a 
representation of various stakeholders, in which the main objective of the firm 
isn’t profit maximization, rather, continuity and societal welfare are the 
fundamental objectives of the Islamic ethical system that is expected to drive 
Islamic behavioral norms (Ali et al., 2017; Rizk, 2014; Bedoui & Mansour, 2015).  
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2.6.2 Corporate Governance and Saudi Law 
Saudi laws and regulations regarding public listed companies have been 
enacted to govern the relationship between the board of directors, managers and 
shareholders, in order to align the interests of directors and managers with that 
of the shareholders (Almajid, 2008). While the CGR, discussed earlier, do 
recognize the interest of stakeholders, as the aim of the code is to protect 
“shareholders rights as well as the rights of the stakeholders” (CMA, 2010, p.3), 
however, it does not set clear guidelines on how stakeholder rights are 
safeguarded nor the punishment to any breach of rights (Piesse et al., 2011).  
 
The legal system in Saudi Arabia generally emphasizes the protection of 
shareholders in particular, through voting rights and the general assembly for 
example. It is, therefore, argued that the Saudi corporate governance model, 
similar to many developing countries, has been influenced by the Anglo-
American ‘shareholder’ model, which focuses on maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth (Fallatah & Dickins, 2012; Piesse et al., 2011). Consequently, even though 
the code explicitly mentions the interest of stakeholders, it is more inclined 
towards protecting the rights of shareholders in particular as it lacks direct 
measures that represent other stakeholders’ interests, such as two tier board 
structures (Almajid, 2008; Fallatah & Dickins, 2012; Piesse et al., 2011). 
 
Furthermore, while the Saudi corporate law allows shareholders to take 
derivative actions against the directors of the company in the case of 
wrongdoings, there is no separate law that contains specific rulings for minority 
shareholders in particular (Lessambo, 2014). Therefore, it can be argued that the 
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Saudi legal system follows the so called shareholder model that protects the 
interests of shareholders in general, in which maximizing shareholder return is 
the main objective of the firm (Fallatah & Dickins, 2012). 
 
While the legal system in Saudi Arabia is Sharia based, in the corporate 
environment it fails to fully encompass the Sharia, or Islamic, governance model, 
where Shura in decision making for example, which takes into consideration the 
input from the various stakeholders, is the necessary management style (Piesse 
et al., 2011). The previously discussed Sharia governance model aims at 
maximizing the wellbeing of the entire society not solely shareholders. Hasan 
(2009, p.287) argues, that “It is observed however that the main objective of 
many corporations including the so called Islamic corporation is to maximize the 
shareholder’s value of wealth. This implies that in actual practice, many Islamic 
corporations adopt the shareholder model of corporate governance rather than 
the stakeholder model”.  
 
Kasri (2009, p.1) argues that “Although Islam as a way of life has always 
promoted good ethics, strong morals, unshakeable integrity and honesty of the 
highest order, in practice it is not easy to incorporate such ethical values into an 
‘Islamic’ corporate governance standard and then implement it”. Furthermore, 
Rizk (2008b, p.212) states that “Although it is not possible to locate societies 
where Islamic values, morals and ethical principles are truly implemented in 
every sphere of life, as described by the Qur’an and Sunna, this does not nullify 
the validity of the [Sharia] model itself”.  
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Ultimately, the Saudi legal system emphasizes on the protection of 
shareholders at large, who represent the chief principal in Saudi listed firms, 
without providing detailed measures and tools that help various stakeholders as 
well as minority shareholders to protect their interests and convey their voices 
(Almajid, 2008; Fallatah & Dickins, 2012; Piesse et al., 2011). This, however, does 
not reflect the Islamic ethical system that emphasizes on societal development 
and welfare, which is expected from a country that is heavily influenced by 
Islamic Sharia, which serves as its constitution (Ali et al., 2017; Bedoui & 
Mansour, 2015). 
2.6.3 Corporate Governance in Practice 
Corporate ownership in Saudi Arabia is highly concentrated, with a strong 
presence of two types of investors, the state and wealthy families (Al-Bassam et 
al., 2018; Alshehri, 2012; Piesse et al., 2011; Bukhari, 2014). Collectively, the 
government and founding families own more than 75% of the companies listed 
in the Saudi capital market (Lessambo, 2014).  
 
The Saudi government normally maintain majority shares in petrochemical 
and utility companies, and their primary objective is control over these strategic 
sectors, as they tend to hold a majority stake that averages around 35% (Piesse 
et al., 2011). For example, the Saudi government owns 70% of SABIC (Saudi 
Basic Industries Corporation), which is a global petrochemical manufacturer and 
is the largest listed company in terms of market capitalization in the Middle-East, 
and 70% of Saudi Telecom (STC), which is the largest telephone service provider 
in the country (Tadawul, 2014). Ultimately, firms with majority government 
ownership in Saudi become under complete control of the government, who are 
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able to appoint board members and executive managers without being 
challenged by other shareholders (Almajid, 2008). 
 
In the case of family ownership, two prevailing types can be found, wealthy 
families with strong links to the government, such as the members of royal 
family, along with founding families (Almajid, 2008; Solomon, 2010; Piesse et al., 
2011). As the stock market in Saudi Arabia started to develop, several family run 
businesses went public to generate capital that covers their growth potential 
(Falgi, 2009; Lessambo, 2014). Many listed companies still hold the name of their 
founders, and the founding family still control key executive positions and 
heavily influence decision making (Almajid, 2008; Piesse et al., 2011). Wealthy 
families, on the other hand, are heavily invested individuals who control shares 
in many companies in the Saudi market (Almajid, 2008; Lessambo, 2014).  
 
Along with Islamic religion that has been discussed previously, familial ties 
and kinship are the other dominant features of the Saudi culture (Long & Maisel, 
2010; Bukhari, 2014). The genealogical tribal nature of the region and the 
emphasis on familial ties and relationships are embedded aspects in the daily life 
of Saudis (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Bjerke & Al-Meer, 1993).  
 
In many cases, familial ties and friendship are more important than 
qualifications and merits in decisions for job appointments, including senior 
level positions (Bishara, 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Bjerke & Al-Meer, 1993). 
As a result, family blockholders, who dominate corporate boards in Saudi Arabia, 
provide certain families with the ability to practice favoritism and personal 
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relations for the appointment at the board as well as executive positions (Ali, 
1990; Di Benedetta & Berg, 2009; Falgi, 2009; Ali, 2005; Bukhari, 2014; Piesse et 
al., 2011). Therefore, few firms can actually be considered as publicly owned, 
where the investing public have a true representation in their boards through 
independent directors (Almajid, 2008; Bukhari, 2014).  
 
Consequently, executive managers and board members in the vast majority of 
the Saudi corporate environment become heavily pressured by the influence set 
by their appointees, either the government or the controlling families, to work 
for their best interest, even at the expense of minority shareholders’ interests 
(Alshehri, 2012). The problem is exacerbated when given the fact that many 
board members and executives were appointed not based on their qualifications 
and merits, rather based on their relationship with the controlling blockholder 
(Bishara, 2011). 
 
While the Saudi law protects the rights of shareholders, such as taking 
derivative actions against the directors of the company in the case of 
wrongdoings, there is no specific rulings for minority shareholders in particular, 
who might find it difficult to challenge powerful blockholders and their 
representatives (Lessambo, 2014). Combining poor minority shareholder 
protection with favoritism and kinship in the appointment of board 
memberships, ultimately, controlling blockholders become the main principal in 
Saudi public listed firms at the expense of minority shareholders (Falgi, 2009; 
Alshehri, 2012; Piesse et al., 2011) due to the uncontestable power they posses 
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in deciding on who sits on the board, the appointment of the executive team, and 
managing the direction of the firm.  
 
Ali (1990) argues that in Muslim lives there seems to be a contradiction 
between the ideal, the guidance of Sharia, and reality, actual practice by Muslims. 
Like the principle of Shura, consultation, for example, which is often contradicted 
by the means of authoritative autocratic approaches in the Arab Islamic world. In 
Saudi Arabia, not only stakeholders are neglected from decision making, through 
a proper representation in the board such as in two tier board systems, minority 
shareholders have little influence over the appointment of board members, 
corporate decision making and the direction of the firm. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented an overview of the Saudi Arabian context in order to 
set the scene for the empirical investigation on the role blockholders play in the 
governance of Saudi PLCs. The chapter started with a brief history and 
background of the country, followed by the past and current state of the 
economy and the capital market. A discussion on the Corporate Governance in 
Saudi public listed companies was proposed, with an aim to reflect on the key 
decision makers and primary principals of public listed firms. 
 
An emphasis has been given to the role of corporate governance in protecting 
the interests of shareholders, and stakeholders at large, as well as the wide 
presence and influence of blockholders in the Saudi stock market. In an 
 51 
underdeveloped national governance system similar to most developing 
countries, blockholders become more capable of expropriating firm resources at 
the expense of minority shareholders. As a result, it becomes important to 
examine how these controlling blockholders influence the governance of public 
listed companies in the Saudi market. 
 
Saudi Arabia is a country that is rooted in the Islamic religion and Arab 
culture. The massive growth Saudi Arabia enjoyed in the past couple of decades 
following the discovery of oil made it a country that enjoys great influence over 
the world economy. Saudi Arabia has the largest capital market in the region, and 
has ambitions to grow further and attract foreign investors into the market with 
an aim to diversify its reliance on oil.  
 
Islam as a religion, and the Islamic economic system, promotes ethical 
dealings, the involvement of various stakeholder groups and the development of 
societal welfare and discourages greed, selfishness and unjust actions. However, 
the Saudi corporate legal system has been heavily influenced by Western models 
that emphasize shareholder supremacy, as opposed to the Islamic stakeholder 
model. 
 
Most of the Saudi public listed companies are controlled by different types of 
blockholders, who represent the main principal in the Saudi capital market. 
Given the significant role the Saudi economy plays in the region and the world at 
large, it is crucial to investigate the role that controlling blockholders play in the 
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governance of Saudi PLCs in order to understand the level of protection minority 
shareholders enjoy under such circumstances. 
 
The next three chapters empirically investigate the influence of different 
blockholder types present in the Saudi market on three key governance 







Blockholders and the Structure of the Board 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of the thesis is to examine the role of blockholders in the governance 
of Saudi public listed companies. In doing so, this chapter will focus on the 
influence of blockholders in shaping the structure of the board of directors, 
specifically in terms of the level of minority shareholder representation through 
independent directorships. The board of directors is generally regarded as the 
most significant governance mechanism, which in turn influences the overall 
governance of the firm (Adams et al., 2010). Therefore it is vital to analyze the 
role blockholders play in the composition of the board in order to better 
understand the governance environment of Saudi PLCs.  
3.1.1 Research Context and Background 
Saudi Arabia, similar to other emerging and developing countries, is 
characterized by an underdeveloped national governance system, where laws 
and regulations regarding the governance of corporations are either absent 
entirely or cannot be effectively enforced (Yoshikawa et al., 2014). Consequently, 
external governance mechanisms, such as the take over market, become weak 
and inactive (Mishra, 2011; Young et al., 2008). As a result, internal governance 
mechanisms, such as the board of directors, become more significant in 
safeguarding shareholders’ interests (Douma et al., 2006; Munisi et al., 2014).  
 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is characterized by the wide presence of 
blockholders, who control more than two thirds of Saudi listed companies 
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(Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012). In dispersed ownership structures the main 
agency problem is between shareholders and managers [Principal-Agent or 
simply P-A]. However, in concentrated ownership structures the problem shifts 
between controlling and minority shareholders [Principal-Principal or simply P-
P] (Young et al., 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
 
It is argued that external governance mechanisms, which are assumed to 
alleviate the basic Principal-Agent problem such as the takeover market, fail to 
control Principal-Principal agency problems due to the strong position 
blockholders enjoy (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) contend 
that “other internally determined governance mechanisms (i.e., dividends, debt 
and board structure) may prove more significant in controlling Agency Problem 
II [P-P]” (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009, p.864).  
 
Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2004) argue that in closely controlled firms 
minority shareholders heavily rely on the board of directors to mitigate 
blockholder expropriation, as alternative governance mechanisms that solve 
Principal-Agent problems appear to be ineffective under the presence of a 
controlling blockholder. Expropriation might be achieved through several forms: 
by direct or indirect extraction of physical resources, by misallocation of key 
organizational positions, or by following strategic decisions that advances 
personal goals at the expense of firm performance (Denis & McConnell, 2003; 
Young et al., 2008) 
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3.1.2 Research Motivation and Significance 
The board of directors is generally regarded as the most significant 
governance mechanism (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Fama, 1980; Adams et 
al., 2010). The board of directors is a primary mechanism for minority 
shareholders to safeguard their interests (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012). Being 
the apex of internal governance, the board is expected to alleviate both P-A and 
P-P agency problems (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Fama, 1980; Setia-Atmaja et al., 
2009), even in Saudi Arabia (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012). 
 
While the board of directors is supposed to be the ultimate internal monitor, it 
is so as long as it represents the interests of minority shareholders. Due to the 
fact that controlling shareholders are able to influence board member choice, via 
their superior voting power, therefore their presence might undermine the 
board’s ability to properly serve its monitoring role, especially when the board 
lacks adequate independent representation (Young et al., 2008). Therefore 
examining the relationship between ownership and board structure is a critical 
area of investigation in the Saudi context, where the presence of controlling 
blockholders is widespread.  
 
Unlike studies on the impact of board characteristics on firm performance, 
which are “among the most extensively researched topics in the large body of 
corporate governance research” (Ben-Amar et al., 2013, p.86), few studies have 
actually addressed the ownership and board structure relationship in depth 
(Fraile & Fradejas, 2014; Munisi et al., 2014). 
 56 
3.1.3 Functioning of the Board 
Scholars have identified two major roles that the board of directors play in the 
organization, namely ‘control’ and ‘resource provision’ (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Adams et al., 2010). The control, or monitoring role is the oversight of the 
executive management by board members (Johnson et al., 1996; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). This monitoring role, which is generally associated with the agency 
theoretical perspective, is reflected in the tasks of hiring, firing, and 
compensating executives (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
The resource provision role, on the other hand, refers to the aptitude of board 
members in providing resources to the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). In that sense, board members contribute to the firm by acting as 
‘boundary spanners’ who provide counsel and advice, facilitate access to 
resources, build relations with and link the firm to external stakeholders and 
entities, provide legitimacy, and assist in the formulation of strategic and key 
decisions (Daily et al., 2003; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009).  
 
Regarding the two roles boards fulfill, diversity of members of the board of 
directors can be divided into two major classifications (Ben-Amar et al., 2013). 
On one hand, statutory diversity, which reflects the monitoring role that is best 
achieved through director independence (Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Statutory diversity denotes to the legal classification of the 
board member: executive, affiliate or independent. Out of the three board 
member types, independent directors are assumed to represent the interests of 
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minority shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  
 
On the other hand, demographic diversity, such as gender, culture, education 
and experience, represents the degree of resource provision directors can 
provide for the firm (Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 
2008). The resources that a board can provide comprise the ‘board capital’. 
Board capital, as Hillman & Dalziel (2003) describes, consists of both human and 
relational capital. While human capital represents the experience, expertise and 
reputation of board members, relational capital, on the other hand, represents 
the networks to other entities and external constituents board members provide 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
 
As this study is interested in the governance role of board monitoring that 
protects minority shareholder interest under the presence of different 
blockholders, the focus will be on the statutory diversity of the board through 
the independent representation of its members. Higher board representation of 
minority shareholder interests through independent directors is expected to 
alleviate both P-A and P-P problems (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja, 
Haman, & Tanewski, 2011; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009).  
 
Munisi et al. (2014) contend that indeed all studies on the ownership and 
board relationship focus on the monitoring role of the board, which is reflected 
in the statutory diversity of its members. Although studying director’s 
demographic diversity under different ownership structures is a fruitful area for 
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research, however, no disclosure of such data is available in Saudi Arabia, it is, 
therefore, not possible to conduct such investigation. 
3.1.4 Literature Gap 
Given that board members are elected by shareholders, it is no surprise that 
several studies find ownership structure to be a key determinant of board 
structure (Munisi et al., 2014; Fraile & Fradejas, 2014; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Kim 
et al., 2007; Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mak & Li, 2001; Li, 1994). Most research on 
the determinants of board structure mainly focused on managerial ownership as 
the ownership structure variable, and was carried out primarily in Anglo-
American contexts (Lasfer, 2006; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et 
al., 2008).  
 
Limited research investigate the role of outside blockholders as a determinant 
of board structure (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Li, 1994; Mak & Li, 2001; Sur et al., 
2013). Additionally, fewer studies do investigate the ownership and board 
relationship in non Anglo-American contexts, such as South-East Asia (Chen & 
Al-Najjar, 2012; Chizema & Kim, 2010; Li, 1994; Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008), 
Continental Europe (Li, 1994; Fraile & Fradejas, 2014; Baglioni & Colombo, 
2013), and most recently Sub-Saharan Africa (Munisi et al., 2014). 
 
However, few studies on the determinants of board structure have been 
carried out in the Middle East. The Middle East is an area with extremely 
distinctive institutional arrangements, where Islamic religion, Arabian culture 
and authoritarian governmental rulings play an imperative role in the countries 
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of the region (Bukhari, 2014). In this region, Saudi Arabia serves as a suitable 
candidate to investigate such relationship for several reasons.  
 
Firstly, the Saudi capital market is the largest in the region, therefore 
providing rich empirical data (Tadawul, 2014; Koldertsova, 2010). Secondly, 
Islam plays a direct role in the legal system of the country, as Shariah, Islamic 
law, serves as its constitution (CIA, 2014). Finally, Saudi Arabia showed high 
economic and political stability in a time of global financial crises and regional 
turmoil; the credit crunch and the Arab Spring (Viñals & Ahmed, 2012; Jones, 
2013). 
 
Considering independent directors as a reflection of minority shareholder 
representation, this study aims to investigate the role of blockholders as a 
determinant of board independence in a newly investigated setting of Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, the study seeks to answer the research question of, What is 
the influence of blockholders on the composition of the board in Saudi Arabia? 
Specifically, the objective is to empirically examine the influence of different 
blockholder types on board independence. 
 
The next section provides the theoretical framework of the study. The 
following section reviews the extant literature on the theoretical predictions and 
empirical evidence on the ownership and board independence relationship and 
develops the hypotheses of the study. Subsequently, the methodology of the 
study employed will be presented. The results and discussion will follow. And 
finally the study will end with concluding remarks. 
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3.2 Theoretical Framework 
This section will review the main theories that explain the blockholder and 
board relationship in general. The use of multi-theoretic perspective enables the 
researcher to better analyze the complexity of the phenomena surrounding 
organizations, and aids in understanding relationships and influencing factors 
(Boyd & Solarino, 2016; Christopher, 2010). It is important, however, for the use 
of a multi-theoretical perspective to have theories with commonalities and that 
are relevant to the focus of the study (Chen & Roberts, 2010). Accordingly, the 
main theory of the study is the agency theory, which reflects both the principal-
agent and the principal-principal problem, and will be further supported by the 
views of stewardship, stakeholder and resource dependence theories will be 
presented.  
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
The modern form of public incorporation is characterized by the separation in 
ownership and control rights. From an agency theoretical perspective, the 
separation of ownership and control rights causes various problems, mainly due 
to the information asymmetry that exists between shareholders [principals] and 
managers [agents] (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since 
managers know more about the company and the business they operate, the risk 
of them engaging in opportunistic behavior increases, particularly when 
“important decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects 
of their decisions” (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 301).  
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Various agency costs associated with safeguarding shareholder’s wealth arise, 
which might affect firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The total agency costs 
incurred are monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual losses. Monitoring 
costs, which are incurred by the principal, are the costs associated with 
monitoring managerial behavior as well as placing interest alignment incentives 
of agents. Bonding costs, on the other hand, are financial and non-financial costs 
incurred by the agent to signal to the principals that he is acting in their best 
interest. Finally, residual losses are any possible losses of potential profits to 
shareholders due to managerial misconduct (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
In order to mitigate the agency problem and minimize the associated agency 
costs, various governance mechanisms have evolved overtime. These 
mechanisms are either internal or external to the corporation. Internal 
governance mechanisms include the board of directors, mutual supervision by 
managers, debt financing, compensation contracts and blockholder monitoring. 
External governance mechanisms include the takeover market, legal shareholder 
protection, the product markets competition, and the managerial labor market 
(Daily et al., 2003; Durisin & Puzone, 2009). By reducing agency costs, these 
mechanisms are assumed to positively influence corporate performance (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). 
 
Small-dispersed shareholders are generally diversified through small 
ownership stakes in numerous firms. Such an ownership structure causes free-
rider problems (Grossman & Hart, 1980). Small shareholders are expected to 
suffer from shareholder apathy, due to their insufficient power and economic 
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incentives to monitor the management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Denis & 
McConnell, 2003).  
 
By contrast, blockholders possess greater power and incentives to intervene in 
case managers diverge from the shareholder maximization goal (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986; Becker et al., 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Blockholders utilize 
their high voting rights to elect directors, vote on change to corporate strategy, 
raise resolutions with the current management or engage in proxy contests 
(Edmans & Manso, 2011; Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). Blockholder, 
therefore, are expected to improve firm value, through the shared benefits of 
control, by aligning the interests of managers with that of shareholders, as well 
as reducing the cost of monitoring the management via other mechanisms 
(Wang & Shailer, 2015; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
 
As opposed to the shared benefits of control, the private benefits of control 
occur when blockholders abuse their power and expropriate the firm’s resources 
(Chang, 2003; Djankov et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010; Barclay & Holderness, 
1989). Consequently, blockholders detriment firm value by engaging in 
expropriate behavior at the expense of minority shareholders (Huyghebaert & 
Wang, 2012).  
 
Expropriation might be achieved through several forms: by, direct or indirect, 
extraction of physical resources, such as tunneling; by misallocation of key 
organizational positions to family or group related personnel, such as board 
memberships and/or the CEO; or to follow strategic decisions that advances 
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personal goals at the expense of firm performance, such as family or political 
agendas in the form of excess unrelated diversification (Chang, 2003; Djankov et 
al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010; Barclay & Holderness, 1989; Denis & McConnell, 
2003; Young et al., 2008; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012). 
 
Thus, while blockholder presence might substitute for the requirement of 
managerial monitoring by the board, minority shareholders still require 
adequate independent board representation in order to protect their interests 
from expropriation.  
 
From an agency theory perspective, independent directors are presumably 
considered to be in a better position than inside, executive, directors toward 
alleviating the P-A and P-P agency problems (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). The board of directors’ role as an “ultimate internal 
monitor” mediates these agency problems (Fama, 1980). Even though there are 
many responsibilities that the board of directors should perform, the board’s 
oversight role, as supported by agency theory, is considered as the boards’ most 
crucial role (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Fama, 1980).  
 
By increasing the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the 
board, minority shareholders ensure that blockholders and “managers are not 
the sole evaluators of their own performance” (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
3.2.2 Stewardship Theory 
While agency theory addresses the principal agent relationships in terms of 
interests divergence, Davis et al. (1997) argue that the causes of interest 
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alignment are ignored in the agency theory perspective, and that stewardship 
theory has been introduced to explain the “relationships based upon other 
behavioral premises”. Stewardship theory argues that managers (agents) aren’t 
necessarily motivated by individual goals; rather they are motivated to work in 
the best interest of the owners (principals). The relationship in this case is highly 
influenced by trust, collectivism and self-actualization rather than the economic 
self-serving behavioral concepts, such as opportunistic behavior, that have 
dominated the field of organizational theory and business policy (Davis et al., 
1997).  
 
In general, stewardship theory argues that better financial performance is 
likely to be achieved when managers are granted greater power and authority 
(Fox & Hamilton, 1994). Consequently, stewardship theory opposes the 
argument of agency theory, as it assumes that less independent boards are 
associated with better financial performance. They argue that as the number of 
executive directors increase, the board functions more productively; as inside 
directors better understand the nature of the business they manage, hence they 
make better decisions (Davis et al., 1997). 
 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabian population is comprised entirely of Muslims. 
Under Islam, all humans are regarded as custodians, vicegerents, of Allah [God], 
and are entrusted to use all the available resources efficiently and equitably for 
the benefit of the entire community (Iqbal & Lewis, 2009; Abdul Rahman, 1998).  
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By advocating the principle of accountability and vicegerency, humans are 
seen as stewards who are supposed to act in the best interest of all. Thus, under 
Islamic jurisdiction, lowered board independence should not be considered as a 
minority shareholder expropriation concern, as the blockholders themselves, 
their representatives and the management team who sit on the board are all 
expected to act as stewards in the best interests of minority shareholders. 
  
While the Islamic teachings promote stewardship behavior, which is expected 
to be acted upon by all Muslims, it does not reflect the reality of Muslims around 
the world (Ali, 1990). Therefore, although it is plausible to assume that 
stewardship theory should form the basis of analyzing the governance in Saudi 
Arabia from a religious point of view, the actual conduct within the Islamic world 
offers greater support to the self-serving agency model instead. 
3.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
A stakeholder can be defined as any individual or group who is affected by or 
is able to affect the achievement of firm objectives (Freeman & Reed, 1983). With 
a focus on the overriding obligations to the wide organizational stakeholders, 
based on trust and cooperativeness, stakeholder theory presents a shift away 
from agency theory, which takes a narrow perspective that focusses on the sole 
interests of shareholders (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Gaur et al., 2015).  
 
Stakeholder theory calls for aligning the interests of all stakeholder groups, 
therefore, it should be important to have representatives from these groups in 
the board, however, it is difficult and unrealistic to identify all of a firm’s 
stakeholders (Gaur et al., 2015). Stakeholder theory proponents argue that 
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larger and more competent boards are able to better serve the interests of a 
wider group of stakeholders, and that firms should balance the interests of its 
various stakeholders (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Gaur et al., 2015). 
 
Gaur et al. (2015) argue that blockholders tend to influence decision making to 
their interests, even if it was at the expense of other stakeholders. While in two 
tier board structures the interests of a wider group of stakeholders is fairly 
reflected, it is difficult to achieve such influence in single tier board structures, 
such as that present in Saudi Arabia (Bezemer et al., 2014). Ultimately, 
stakeholders tend to demand the appointment of independent board members to 
better protect their interests under blockholder control (Bammens et al., 2011). 
 
Consequently, in addition to the agency expectation where independent board 
members serve the best interest of minority shareholders, the stakeholder model 
is also in support of increased board independence that is expected to represent 
the interests of a wider group of stakeholders. 
 
Islamic religion, or Sharia, promotes the representation of various 
stakeholders, in which the main objective of the firm isn’t profit maximization, 
rather, continuity and societal welfare are the fundamental objectives of the 
Islamic ethical system (Ali et al., 2017; Rizk, 2014; Bedoui & Mansour, 2015). 
Moreover, Islamic teachings encourage collective decision making under the 
Islamic principle of Shura, i.e. consultation in decision making, which takes into 




While these principles represent a foundation for a stakeholder view of the 
firm, in which increased representation of various stakeholders at the board level 
is essential, such as in a two-tier board system, it is not the case in the actual 
practice of Saudi boards. The Saudi legal system is based on the Anglo-American 
single-tier board system and emphasizes on the protection of shareholders at 
large without providing detailed measures and tools that help various 
stakeholders as well as minority shareholders to protect their interests and 
convey their voices (Almajid, 2008; Fallatah & Dickins, 2012; Piesse et al., 2011). 
Consequently, this study will still consider agency theory as its main theoretical 
perspective and possibly reflect on the relevant theories, such as stakeholder, for 
support. 
3.2.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
Scholars have identified two major roles that the board of directors play in the 
organization, namely ‘control’ and ‘resource provision’ (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Adams et al., 2010). The control, or monitoring, role is the oversight of the 
executive management by board members (Johnson et al., 1996; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). This monitoring role, which is generally associated with the agency 
theoretical perspective, is reflected in the tasks of hiring, firing, and 
compensating executives (Daily et al., 2003).  
 
The resource provision role, on the other hand, refers to the aptitude of board 
members in providing resources to the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). In that sense, board members contribute to the firm by 
providing counsel and advice, facilitate access to resources, build relations with 
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and link the firm to external stakeholders and entities, provide legitimacy, and 
assist in the formulation of strategic and key decisions (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 
2003; Hillman et al., 2009; Bammens et al., 2011).  
 
The theoretical foundations of the resource provision function are based on 
Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) resource dependence theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003), as the widely adopted agency theory failed to explain the resource 
provision functions of the board (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Bammens et al., 
2011). Resource dependence theory describes the organizational dependence on 
contingencies in the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
 
According to the resource dependence theory, board members act as 
‘boundary spanners’ linking the corporation with its environment, by facilitating 
access to external resources that are critical to the firm’s success, offering expert 
advice (Hillman et al., 2009), as well as bringing reputation and critical business 
contacts to the firm (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). The benefits as well as the 
accessibility to these resources enhance the functioning, performance, and 
survival of the firm (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). 
 
The common classification of the different board members, as insider; 
outsider; executive; non-executive; or independent, has been widely used by 
researchers in analyzing the board members’ roles from both the agency theory 
as well as the resource dependency perspectives (Hillman et al., 2009).  
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While these classifications are more suitable for the agency theory standpoint, 
where the agency problems are alleviated by the monitoring and ratifying roles 
of the independent board members, the resource dependence can be reflected on 
much wider classifications, as they are supposed to provide the firm with access 
to external resources (Hillman et al., 2000).  
 
For the sake of consistency, as this study is conducted from an agency theory 
perspective, and for data limitations, the common classification of board 
members’ statutory diversity will be applied to the resource dependence theory 
as well, where independent directors are expected to provide better access to 
resources to the firm on top of their monitoring role. Therefore, independent 
board members become significant for minority shareholders as they improve 
monitoring and provide access to valuable resources to the firm. 
 
The next section will review the extant literature on the theoretical 
predictions and empirical evidence on the ownership and board independence 
relationship and develop the hypotheses of the study for the different 
blockholder types present in Saudi Arabia. 
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3.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Blockholders could be considered as both a solution and a cause of agency 
problems. On the one hand, blockholders have higher incentives and greater 
power, than small dispersed shareholders, to intervene in case management 
diverge from shareholder’s goal, thus solving the P-A problem between 
managers and shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Becker et al., 2011; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, controlling blockholders might be inclined 
to pursue private benefits to the detriment of minority shareholders, due to their 
uncontestable power, thus causing the P-P problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Young et al., 2008). In both cases the role of the board of directors in 
safeguarding shareholder interest is of key interest, where board effectiveness is 
reflected in its level of independence (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). 
 
Despite the dual agency problems associated with blockholders, strangely, 
very few studies actually consider the possible P-P agency problem in their 
analysis of the ownership and board structure relationship (Fraile & Fradejas, 
2014). Rather the main focus of blockholders presence is the assumed 
monitoring role that large shareholders play in the governance of corporations, 
thus serving as a substitute for board monitoring (Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012; Li, 
1994; Munisi et al., 2014; Rediker & Seth, 1995). While this might be the case in 
developed economies with a strong legal framework that holds all related parties 
accountable (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, et al., 2000), in developing economies 
blockholders might also be inclined to expropriate minority shareholders 
(Djankov et al., 2008). 
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In such a context, minority shareholders heavily rely on the board to safeguard 
their interests (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Fraile & Fradejas, 2014; Setia-Atmaja, 
Haman, & Tanewski, 2011). While blockholders are able to influence, to a great 
extent, the composition of the board through their high voting rights, they 
become able to appoint a board that assists them in expropriating firm resources 
(Young et al., 2008). However, in order to signal their legitimate intentions 
towards minority shareholders, blockholders might be inclined to appoint a 
more independent board that reflects the interests of minority shareholders as 
well (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2011; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, regardless of 
the blockholder motivations, whether to monitor the management or 
expropriate firm resources, higher independent representation would be 
beneficial for minority shareholders in a context that is characterized by both 
types of agency problems.  
 
While the principal principal agency P-P problem is well established in the 
literature (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), studies on the ownership and board 
structure often overlook such a problem even in developing countries (Chen & 
Al-Najjar, 2012; Munisi et al., 2014). In a recent study, Fraile and Fradejas (2014) 
assert that they are the first to study the ownership and board relationship while 
differentiating between the P-A and P-P agency problems, and how board 
composition, of outsiders and independents, is supposed to alleviate both. They 
study the ownership and board relationship in the Spanish context, which 
similar to Saudi Arabia is characterized by wide blockholder presence and weak 
external governance. They find that minority shareholder interests are not 
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sufficiently represented, through board representation, under the presence of 
blockholders in the Spanish context. 
 
Different types of blockholders, such as family and government, are expected 
to have different motivations, incentives, risk preferences and ability to influence 
firms (Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Sur et al., 2013). Recent studies show that indeed 
different shareholders have heterogeneous preferences, motivations and skills 
(Kim, 2010; Tihanyi et al., 2003; Sikavica & Kessler, 2013; Hoskisson et al., 2002; 
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009; Guthrie & Sokolowsky, 2010) which, in turn, 
influence corporate policies and governance structures differently (Cronqvist & 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Sur et al., 2013).  
 
Similarly, Desender et al. (2013) stress the importance of differentiating 
between blockholder types when considering their influence on board structure. 
However, most research on ownership and board structure relationship combine 
different blockholder types together, thus expecting them to have homogeneous 
preferences (Mak & Li, 2001; Fraile & Fradejas, 2014; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Kim 
et al., 2007; Li, 1994; Lasfer, 2006; Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012). Only one study 
differentiates between various blockholder types in analysing the ownership and 
board relationship (Sur et al., 2013), and it is carried out in Canada, which does 
not represents the context of a developing country.  
 
This study will focus on the main types of blockholders present in the Saudi 
market. In Saudi Arabia the presence of family, corporate and government 
ownership is prominent, where more than 80% of listed companies have at least 
a single blockholder (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012; Lessambo, 2014). However, 
 73 
there is no presence of institutional blockholders in Saudi Arabia, while foreign 
investors are not allowed to invest in the stock market, as of 2015 (Quttainah & 
Paczkowski, 2012; Di Benedetta & Berg, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, a unique ownership type in Saudi Arabia is royal family 
blockholders. Members of the royal family in Saudi Arabia are clearly identifiable 
due to their unique surname, Al-Saud, and generally enjoy political and relational 
advantages to other citizens of the country (IISS, 2000). Therefore, royal family 
blockholders can be viewed as politically connected blockholders. 
 
Multiple large shareholders are assumed to have a role in the governance of 
corporations (Attig et al., 2009). Boubaker, Cellier, & Rouatbi (2014) argue that 
multiple large shareholders protect minority shareholders from expropriation 
by blockholders. In Saudi Arabia, the presence of multiple blockholders, of 
different types in the same company, is very common (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 
2012).  
 
Additionally, Attig et al. (2008, p.721) claim that “most empirical studies focus 
little, if any, attention on the role of multiple large shareholders in corporate 
governance”. Indeed, no study on the ownership and board relationship has been 
found that utilizes the influence of multiple blockholders. This study aims to 
address this gap by analyzing the relationship between ownership and board 
structure while considering the role of multiple large shareholders. 
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Most previous studies mainly focus on the ratio of outside directors, being 
non-executive or affiliated directors, as a measure of board composition 
(Chizema & Kim, 2010; Donnelly & Kelly, 2005; Lasfer, 2006; Li, 1994; Mak & Li, 
2001; Munisi et al., 2014), while few studies consider the ratio of independent 
directors as a true measure of board independence (Baglioni & Colombo, 2013; 
Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012; Su et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2007). The former is mainly 
due to the lack of data availability that clearly distinguishes independents from 
overall outside directors.  
 
Two recent studies consider both measures for specific purposes (Sur et al., 
2013; Fraile & Fradejas, 2014). Sur et al. (2013) argue, and find empirical 
support, that based on their unique imperatives, institutional blockholders 
prefer independent directors, and corporate blockholders prefer outside 
directors in the Canadian market. Similarly, Fraile and Fradejas (2014) indicate 
that in Spain outside directors are representatives of blockholders, while 
independent directors represent minority shareholders interests.  
 
However, that is not the case in Saudi Arabia, as outside directors might also 
reflect the interests of management, where a first degree relative of any senior 
executive falls under this category (CMA, 2010). Thus, their categorization and 
rationale for classification choice does not represent the reality of possible 
material relationship between the related parties in the Saudi context. This study 
is concerned with the protection of minority shareholder interests, which is best 
represented by independent directors who enjoy complete independence from 
the management as well as blockholders.  
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Table 3.1 presents an overview of previous studies on the ownership and 
board composition relationship. In the subsequent sections, relevant literature 
and theoretical arguments will be reviewed for each blockholder type, in order 
to develop the hypotheses of the study.  
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Country Dependent variable(s) 
Independent variables which proved 
significant 
Results 





- Outside directors % 
 
 
- Independents % 
- Insider ownership 
 
 
- Blockholder ownership (at 5% level) 
- Non Linear U shaped for insider ownership and 
outside directors 
 







Outside directors % 
 
- Ownership concentration (at least 5%) 
 
- Government Ownership (%) 
 
- Negative relationship 
 
 








- Top 3 % Ownership 
 
 
- Family ownership (dummy) 
 
- Negative relationship 
 
 
- Negative relationship 
Sur et al. 
(2013) 
US 
- Inside directors % 
 
- Affiliated directors % 
 
- Independents % 
 
- Individual/Family % 
 
- Corporate % 
 
- Institutional % 
 
- Positive relationship between Individual/Family 
ownership and Insiders 
 
- Positive relationship between Corporate ownership 
and Affiliates 
 











China Independents % 
 
- Ownership concentration (Herfindahl 
index of largest 5 shareholders) 
 
- State Ownership % 
 
- Managerial ownership % 
 
- Negative relationship 
 
 
- Negative relationship 
 
 
- Positive relationship 
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Ownership Concentration (Herfindahl 
index of largest 10 shareholders) 






Korea Outside directors % 
- Foreign Ownership % 
 
- Ownership Concentration % 
 
- Positive relationship 
 
- Negative relationship 
Mak & Li 
(2001) 
Singapore Outside Directors % 
 
- Managerial Ownership % 
 
- Government Ownership (dummy at 
20%) 
 
- Negative relationship 
 










Outside Directors % 
 
- Ownership Concentration (dummy at 
5%) 
 
- Bank ownership (dummy at 5% 
 
 
-  State ownership (dummy at 5%) 
 
- Negative relationship 
 
 
- Negative relationship 
 
 
- Positive relationship 







Independents % Ownership Concentration % (at 5% level) Negative relationship 
 
Notes:  
1) Outside directors % = number of non-executive directors / total number of board members 
 
2) Independents % = number of independent directors / total number of board members 
 
3) Inside directors = number of executive directors / total number of board members 
 
4) Affiliated directors = Outside directors
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3.3.1 Family Blockholders 
Family blockholders are the most common type of concentrated ownership 
around the world (Singal & Singal, 2011; La Porta et al., 1999). Family control 
represents a distinctive type of blockholder. Family blockholders, in general, 
hold non-diversified portfolios, tend to be long-term oriented, and often hold 
senior managerial positions, thus placing them in a unique position to monitor 
and influence the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
 
Several studies have found that family controlled firms outperform their non-
family counterpart (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; van Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic, & 
Heugens, 2014; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). These findings support the argument 
that family members are well informed and maintain close attachment to the 
firm, resulting in decreased agency problems, and ultimately better performance 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, Sur et al. (2013) argue that family blockholders remain closely 
involved in firms’ activities, thus hardly rely on additional monitoring by outside 
directors. Based on a behavioral theory of ownership, they argue that family 
blockholders favor inside directors in order to maintain full control and follow 
their ideology and aspirational objectives. They study the relationship between 
ownership and board structure in Canada, and find support for their argument, 
where family ownership was positively and significantly related to insider 
representation on the board. 
 
 79 
Likewise, Desender et al. (2013) argue that family blockholders act as a 
substitute for board monitoring. They study how ownership structure influences 
the monitoring role of the board in Continental Europe. The level of audit fees 
contracted by the board measures the degree of the board’s monitoring role. 
They found support for their argument, as firms with family blockholders 
showed a weaker relationship between board independence and audit fees, 
hence family blockholders substituted for the monitoring function of the board. 
 
Similarly, Baglioni and Colombo (2013) argue, and find support for, that family 
blockholders substitute for independent director’s monitoring in Italy. Their 
results show that family ownership leads to less independent representation. In 
developed national governance systems, such as the US, indeed the ability of 
family blockholders to expropriate minority shareholders is insignificant, 
however, in less developed ones, the incentives for family blockholders to 
expropriate becomes much higher, in which the Italian context reflect such 
scenario (Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006; La Porta et al., 1999; Fallatah & Dickins, 
2012). Therefore, the rationalization of Baglioni and Colombo (2013) might not 
represent the reality of the relationship between family and minority 
shareholders through the level of board independence. 
 
Family blockholders are also expected to produce Principal-Principal agency 
problems. Uncontestable entrenched family owners might harm minority 
shareholders through various forms, such as pursuing non-value maximizing 
familial political agendas, expropriating firm resources in the form of tunneling 
or excess perks, or assigning senior positions to under qualified family members 
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(Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). These actions result in 
Principal-Principal agency problems that harm firm value at the detriment of 
minority shareholders. 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) investigate the role of board composition in family 
controlled firms in the US. They find that family firms with higher board 
independence are the best performing firms. Additionally, they find that family 
firms with low board independence perform considerably worse than non-family 
firms. Their results stress the importance of independent board members in the 
protection of minority shareholders from family opportunism. Thus, shedding 
light on the significance of board independence in mitigating conflicts of interest 
between shareholder groups [family and minority], rather than between 
managers and shareholders. They conclude by arguing that on one hand family 
blockholders monitor the firm, while on the other hand independent directors 
monitor the family. 
 
Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) investigate the role of internal governance 
mechanisms, including board structure, in family controlled Australian listed 
firms. They argue that due to weak external governance mechanisms in 
Australia, family owners will be more inclined to expropriate firm resources, 
therefore, assigning a less efficient board, in terms of independence. They find 
empirical support for their argument, where family firms demonstrate lower 
board independence levels compared to non-family firms, thus supporting the 
expropriation argument.  
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Saudi Arabian culture is characterized by high power distance, strong level of 
secrecy in corporate dealings, strong familial ties and a weak national 
governance system (Robertson et al., 2013; Ali, 2009; Bjerke & Al-Meer, 1993). 
Furthermore, Bukhari (2014) conducted a qualitative enquiry on the corporate 
governance institutions in Saudi Arabia and reported that controlling families 
dominate the board as well as corporate decision making. Family blockholders in 
Saudi Arabia are therefore expected to maintain their strong authority over the 
firm and its board, and will thus rely less on independent directors. Ultimately, 
family blockholders maintain a position that enables them to expropriate 
minority shareholders. Therefore the first hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H1. There is a negative relationship between family ownership and the proportion 
of independent directors in Saudi Arabia. 
 
3.3.2 Royal Family Blockholders 
Saudi Arabia has remained a monarchy for more than 80 years under the rule 
of the Al Saud Family (Long & Maisel, 2010). Consequently, members of the Saudi 
royal family enjoy political and relational advantages to other citizens of the 
country (IISS, 2000). Therefore, they can be considered as politically connected 
individuals similar to politicians in other countries (Faccio, 2010). Royal family 
members do not represent the government; rather they represent themselves as 
individuals with their own set of interests and motivations. 
 
The literature shows several advantages for firms that are politically 
connected, such as ease of access to finance, lower tax rates and preferential 
treatment by the government in the form of lower regulatory oversight or 
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financial bailout in times of distress (Bona-Sánchez, Pérez-Alemán, & Santana-
Martín, 2014; Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 
2006; Faccio, 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). These benefits are unique to 
politically connected firms, and thus puts them in a better position when 
compared to their non-politically connected counterparts. 
 
However, politically connected firms might represent higher tendencies to 
expropriate minority shareholders, due to their lower risk of punishment (Bona-
Sánchez et al., 2014; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). Researchers have shown that 
minority shareholders in China are less likely to be protected under the presence 
of a politically connected blockholder through less compliance with regulations 
(Berkman et al., 2010), by appointing under qualified board members (Fan et al., 
2007), and even having less independent boards (Ding et al., 2014). 
 
Similarly, Saudi royal family blockholders are expected to be able to control 
board appointments for their benefit, while overlooking the interests of minority 
shareholders and not bearing the risk of punishment, which results in a principal 
principal agency problem. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2. There is negative relationship between royal family ownership and the 
proportion of independent directors in Saudi Arabia. 
 
3.3.3 Government Ownership 
Government ownership is widely present, especially in less developed 
countries, and they tend to own large shares in previously privatized firms as 
well as other listed companies directly. Governments, either central or local such 
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as municipalities, have different objectives from other types of owners, either 
political, economical or other incentives (Megginson & Netter, 2001; 
Dharwadkar et al., 2000). However, few studies considered the role of 
government ownership on board structure, and their arguments and findings 
vary considerably (Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012; Munisi et al., 2014; Li, 1994; Mak & 
Li, 2001).  
 
On one hand, Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) argue that government ownership is 
generally associated with ineffective governance in China, and thus are expected 
to lead to less board independence. Similarly, Mak and Li (2001) state that 
government ownership reduces incentives to adopt strong governance in 
Singapore. This is mainly driven by the fact that firms with significant 
government ownership are associated with “weaker accountability for financial 
performance, easier access to finance, lack of exposure to the market for 
corporate control and weaker monitoring by shareholders” (Mak & Li, 2001, 
p.240). Both studies find support for their arguments, as government ownership 
is found to be negatively related to independent and outside board 
representation, respectively, resulting in a typical principal principal agency 
problem. 
 
On the other hand, Li (Li, 1994) argues that under government ownership, it is 
particularly necessary for the board of directors to signal its accountability and 
legitimacy to the public by appointing more outside directors. Similarly, Munisi 
et al. (2014) argues that government ownership in Sub-Saharan Africa should 
signal good governance practice to the market. They find support for their 
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argument as government ownership is associated with better corporate 
governance practices, through higher outside board representation. 
 
The government of Saudi Arabia aims at improving the corporate governance 
of the market, which is reflected in the recent issuance and revision of the 
corporate governance code (CMA, 2010), as well as its intention to open the 
market for foreign investors (CMA, 2014). The Saudi government played an 
important role in the development of the capital market and corporate 
governance in the past decade and should act as stewards towards other 
investors in firms they invest in (Bukhari, 2014). It is therefore expected that 
government ownership in Saudi will signal to the market its intentions to 
implement governance best practices by increasing the independent 
representation of its boards. Consequently, the third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3. There is a positive relationship between government ownership and the 
proportion of independent directors in Saudi Arabia. 
 
3.3.4 Corporate Ownership 
Corporations invest in other firms in order to cultivate distinctive capabilities 
and technologies through potential synergies, thus their main goal, in general, is 
not generating short term profits (Sur et al., 2013). According to the resource 
dependence theory organizations are embedded in a network of social 
relationships and interdependencies with their environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). In that sense, organizations remain dependent on external contingencies 
that are characterized by uncertainty (Hillman et al., 2009). Organizations, 
therefore, attempt to maintain control over vital resources, by engaging in power 
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in order to reduce, or manage, environmental dependence and uncertainty. By 
utilizing their control over resources, organizations aim to limit the power of 
others over them and increase their power over others (Hillman et al., 2009). 
 
Corporate owners have better understanding of the business environment, 
and are able to directly monitor the management of the acquired firm by 
appointing their executives or other affiliates as representatives on the board 
(Sur et al., 2013; Desender et al., 2013). Ultimately, corporate owners rely less on 
independent director monitoring. Sur et al. (2013) finds support for this 
preposition, as they find that corporate ownership is positively related to outside 
(non-independent) directors in Canada. 
 
As corporate owners are better capable of monitoring the management by 
appointing skillful affiliates on the board, it is expected that corporate 
blockholders negatively influence the independence level of the board. Whether 
this is in the best interest of minority shareholders, when corporate blockhoders 
act as stewards, or not, and cause principal principal agency problems, is beyond 
the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H4. There is a negative relationship between corporate ownership and the 
proportion of independent directors in Saudi Arabia. 
 
3.3.5 Managerial Ownership 
The expected influence of managerial ownership on board structure differs 
greatly from that of external blockholders. On one hand, the main agency 
problem [P-A] is expected to be alleviated through increased managerial 
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ownership, which aligns the interests of managers with that of shareholders as 
they become owners themselves [incentive alignment]. On the other hand, at 
higher levels of managerial ownership, where the management power becomes 
uncontestable, managers might be inclined to pursue non value maximization 
policies, such as excessive perks, at the expense of shareholders [entrenchment 
effect] (Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010; Claessens et al., 2002). 
 
Morck et al. (1988) were the first scholars to document the incentive 
alignment and entrenchment effects of managerial ownership on the 
performance of US firms. They found that managerial ‘incentive’ alignment is 
achieved in low levels of ownership through improved firm performance, 
whereas at higher ownership levels ‘entrenchment’ effects occur. Their finding of 
non-linear relationship was further supported by several later studies (De 
Miguel, Pindado, & De La Torre, 2004; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Short & 
Keasey, 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  
 
Following similar grounds, Fraile and Fradejas (2014) argue that managerial 
ownership will follow an incentive and entrenchment effect towards the 
governance structure of the board. Their results show a U shaped non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and the proportion of outside 
directors on the board, which reflects the tendency towards the need of outside 
directors at different managerial ownership levels. While the need of outside 
directors is substituted by incentive alignment of managerial ownership at low 
levels, the need of outside directors to offset managerial entrenchment at high 
ownership levels appears. 
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Managerial ownership is the most empirically examined variable in the 
ownership and board relationship literature (Fraile & Fradejas, 2014). Several 
studies find a negative relationship between managerial ownership and board 
outside directors (Donnelly & Kelly, 2005; Lasfer, 2006; Mak & Li, 2001). Chen 
and Al-Najjar (2012), on the other hand, find that managerial ownership is 
positively related to board independence in China.  
 
This study argues that whether it is the incentive effect or the entrenchment 
effect that influences managerial ownership towards board independence in 
Saudi Arabia, the relationship would constantly remain negative. While the 
incentive alignment substitutes for the need of independent directors by 
shareholders at low managerial ownership levels, entrenched managers at high 
ownership levels will use their voting power to minimize external monitoring by 
independent directors in order to extract higher private benefits of control. 
Accordingly, the fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H5. There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the 
proportion of independent directors in Saudi Arabia. 
 
3.3.6 Multiple Blockholders 
Multiple large shareholders are assumed to serve a governance role, as the 
second blockholder is able to limit the largest blockholder expropriation efforts 
(Pindado & Requejo, 2015; Attig et al., 2008). Research show that the presence of 
multiple blockholders increases dividend payment (Faccio et al., 2001; Pindado, 
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Requejo, & Torre, 2012), is related with significant valuation premium (Attig et 
al., 2008), and is associated with higher corporate risk taking (Mishra, 2011). 
 
Multiple large shareholders are expected to curb the largest blockholder from 
extracting private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Due to their ability and incentive to monitor both the largest blockholder and 
management, multiple blockholders limit minority shareholder expropriation 
concerns (Boubaker et al., 2014). Consequently, multiple blockholders substitute 
for the need of independent directors as a minority shareholder representation 
device. 
 
However, multiple blockholders might also collude with the largest 
blockholder in order to maximize their private benefit extraction at the expense 
of minority shareholders, especially in less developed countries (Cai et al., 2016). 
As a result, multiple blockholders intending to collude with the largest 
blockholder in minority shareholder expropriation are expected to maintain 
control over the board in order to remain unchecked. In order to control the 
board, multiple blockholders are expected to lower the level of board 
independence, therefore, eluding from monitoring by independent directors. 
 
While no previous studies considered the role of multiple blockholders on the 
level of board independence, nevertheless, it is expected that multiple 
blockholders would negatively influence board independence. This negative 
influence might reflect the case where multiple blockholders substitute for 
independent directors as a minority shareholder representation device, or in 
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which multiple blockholders collude with the largest blockholder in 
appropriative motivations and thus minimize the monitoring capacity of 
independent directors. In Saudi Arabia, the presence of multiple blockholders, of 
different types in the same company, is very common (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 
2012), however their respective role in corporate governance is much less 
examined. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H6. There is a negative relationship between the presence of multiple blockholders 
and the proportion of independent directors in Saudi Arabia 
 
After analyzing the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on the 
relationship between different types of blockholders and board structure in 
order to develop the hypotheses of the study, the next section will present the 
research methodology employed, which will cover the sample selection, variable 
measures and model specification of the study. The empirical investigation will 
help identify the actual role different blockholder types play in the 
representation of minority shareholders on the boards of Saudi Arabian public 
listed companies.  
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3.4 Research Methodology 
3.4.1 Sample Selection 
The sample of the study comprises all Saudi non-financial public listed 
companies on Tadawul, the Saudi stock exchange, for the six year period from 
2008 to 2013. Tadawul holds 117 traded non-financial listed companies as of 
September 2014 (ZAWYA, 2014). Excluded from the sample are companies that 
the full data set variables were not available. A final sample (N) comprises of 619 
firm year observations. Table 3.2 shows the total final sample size for each year. 
Data on board structure and firm level variables are manually collected from 
published annual reports, while ownership data is obtained from Reuters 
Thomson One Banker Database.  
 
Table 3.2 Total Firm Samples per Year 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
N 89 97 102 105 114 112 619 
 
The rationale behind the 2008 start year of the sample is that the disclosure of 
the ‘Board of Directors Report’ in the corporate annual report, which discloses 
the variables required for this study, only became mandatory in 2008 (CMA, 
2010), thus data for previous years was impossible to obtain. Furthermore, 2013 
was the last year of annual reports available when the data was collected for this 
research project. Finally, the exclusion of financial firms is justified by their 
unique business operation and strict legal requirements, as financial companies 
in Saudi Arabia have their exclusive governance code (CMA, 2010). 
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3.4.2 Variable Measures 
3.4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of the study is the independent representation level of 
the board of directors (INED). This measures the proportion of independent 
members to total number of board members. Thus regardless of the size of the 
board, the higher proportion of independent representation the higher the value 
of INED. There are three classifications of directorship in the Saudi market, 
executive, non-executive and independent directors (CMA, 2010). The definition 
of independent directors as reported in the Saudi corporate governance code is: 
 
“Independent Member: A member of the Board of Directors who 
enjoys complete independence. By way of example, the following shall 
constitute an infringement of such independence:  
1. He/she holds a five per cent or more of the issued shares of the 
company or any of its group.  
2. Being a representative of a legal person that holds a five per cent or 
more of the issued shares of the company or any of its group.  
3. He/she, during the preceding two years, has been a senior executive of 
the company or of any other company within that company’s group.  
4. He/she is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company 
or of any other company within that company’s group.  
5. He/she is first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the 
company or of any other company within that company’s group.  
6. He/she is a board member of any company within the group of the 
company which he is nominated to be a member of its board.  
7. If he/she, during the preceding two years, has been an employee with 
an affiliate of the company or an affiliate of any company of its group, 
such as external auditors or main suppliers; or if he/she, during the 




This study manually identified the independent directors based on the 
regulatory definition of independence, as some annual reports combine the non-
executives with independents in a single category, thus over representing the 
true independence of the board. 
 
Regarding board composition, the Saudi code requires firms to have a board 
that comprises of majority non executive directors. Specifically, the code 
requires the board to have at least two independent directors, or one third of the 
board size to be independent, which ever is greater (CMA, 2010). However firms 
are free to increase the number of independent directors to any point above the 
minimum requirement up to 100%. Therefore, studying the relationship 
between board independence and blockholder structure would reflect the level 
of minority shareholder representation the blockholders are willing to endure. 
3.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
Several ownership variables serve as the independent variables of the study, 
in order to investigate whether different blockholders prefer distinct board 
independence levels. The minimum disclosure level of ownership in Saudi Arabia 
is 5%. Therefore, blockholders of different types will be considered based on the 
5% threshold6.  
 
The first ownership variable is family ownership (FMLOWN). Family 
ownership represents the percentage ownership of family or individuals from 
                                                        
 
6 Different cutoff points, 5-20%, 20-50%, and >50%, have been examined in 
order to identify the level of ownership required to maintain influence. Which 
showed similar results to our combined findings of >5%.  
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total issued capital. Secondly, royal family ownership will be considered 
(RYLOWN). The percentage ownership of the Saudi ruling family members, Al-
Saud, to total issued capital measures RYLOWN.  
 
The third ownership variable measures the percentage of governmental 
ownership (GOVOWN). The government of Saudi Arabia directly holds shares in 
companies through three wholly-government-owned investment funds, namely, 
Public Investment Fund (PIF), Public Pension Agency (PPA) and General 
Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI) (ZAWYA, 2014). There are no private 
pension funds in Saudi Arabia thus citizens do not have other choices for 
retirement schemes. Moreover, only the government has the right to decide on 
the management and operation of these funds, therefore, it is more suitable to 
classify them as state ownership rather than institutional investors (Almajid, 
2008). Due to the lack of competition and government appointment of the 
management team, these governmental agencies differ greatly in terms of their 
investment choices and overall governance from traditional institutional 
investors.  
 
Fourthly, corporate ownership measures the percentage ownership held by a 
corporate entity (CRPOWN). While corporate ownership is common in Saudi 
Arabia, these corporations tend to be non-financial in nature. Although some 
corporations are privately held, which might represent a single family or 
individual investor, no data of ownership of these companies can be obtained. 
However, this study overlooked corporate ownership where the corporation’s 
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registered name is of a family or individual and combined them with family 
owners instead. 
 
The fifth ownership variable is managerial ownership (EXECOWN). 
EXECOWN represents the percentage ownership of the firm executive 
management to total issued capital. Executive management could be the CEO, 
CFO, COO or any member of the senior management team of the firm.  
 
The presence of multiple large shareholders will be the final ownership 
variable (MLS). A binary/dummy variable that measures 1 if more than one 
blockholder is present in a single firm, and 0 otherwise. In the case of multiple 
blockholders from the same family, the study will consider them as a single 
block, rather than multiple blockholders, due to their similar interests and 
kinship relations that forms a familial coalition (Jara-Bertin et al., 2008). In the 
aim of measuring the contestability of other blockholders in preventing the 
controlling blockholders and/or management from expropriating minority 
shareholders, it is more reasonable to differentiate between multiple 
blockholders and clear blockholder coalitions. 
 
3.4.2.3 Control Variables 
This study will control for factors that are expected to be a determinant of 
board independence beside the ownership variables presented earlier. Research 
shows that certain firm characteristics might be associated with the 
independence level of the board due to different levels of monitoring and counsel 
required (Guest, 2008; Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008; Chen & Al-Najjar, 
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2012). These differences are associated with firm complexity, monitoring costs 
and potential private benefits of control (Munisi et al., 2014). 
 
 Firstly, prior literature argue that firm performance affects the level of CEO 
influence and authority, as CEOs of good performing firms can demand less 
independent boards (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2008; Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1998). Poor performing firms, on the other hand, might be inclined 
to increase board independence to monitor the CEO and/or to avoid criticism for 
the lack of good governance practices (Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1998). Firm performance is measured through the accounting 
performance measure of return on assets (ROA).  
 
Secondly, product and/or international diversification represent firm 
complexity level that might increase the requirements for higher independent 
representation that provides external monitoring and expert advice to the 
management (Coles et al., 2008; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Guest, 2008). 
Diversification is measured as a binary/dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the firm has more than one product or international segments, and 0 otherwise 
(DIVERS).  
 
Thirdly, the size of the firm not only reflects the level of firm complexity, it also 
represents a higher propensity for expropriation of resources (Jensen, 1986). 
Therefore, larger firms ultimately require higher independent director 
representation for monitoring and advice (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008). 
Firm size is measured using the natural logarithm of total assets (FSIZE). Firm 
sales is another measure of firm size used in the literature, however, several 
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listed companies in our sample are recent start ups, thus don’t have sales figures, 
therefore using total assets as the measure of size is more reasonable.   
 
Fourthly, firms with high levels of free cash flow face increased agency costs 
and managerial discretion due to the potential of private benefits extraction 
(Jensen, 1986; McKnight & Weir, 2009). Free cash flow might be expropriated by 
either the management and/or controlling blockholders in various ways, such as 
tunneling, investments in negative net present value projects, or excessive 
perquisites (Jensen, 1986; La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000; Wang & Xiao, 
2011). Consequently higher free cash flow requires additional monitoring to be 
provided by independent directors (Munisi et al., 2014). In order to control for 
differences in firm size, free cash flow is measured as the level of cash holding 
divided by total assets (FCF) (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010). 
 
Fifthly, the leverage level the firm maintains might influence its board 
independence level in two ways. On one hand, debt is considered as a 
governance mechanism that reduces free cash flow available for managerial 
and/or controlling blockholder discretion, thus resulting in lower requirement 
for higher board monitoring through independent directors (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Jensen, 1986; McKnight & Weir, 2009; Fraile & Fradejas, 2014). On the 
other hand, higher debt is an indication of firm complexity, thus resulting in 
higher requirement for monitoring and advice by independent directors (Coles 
et al., 2008; Munisi et al., 2014). The leverage level is measured as total debt 
divided by total assets (LEVERG). 
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Finally, external auditors provide independent checks on the financial and 
accounting statements of the firm. The literature emphasized the benefits of 
having an expert auditor with long standing history, as these auditors possess 
advance knowledge and skills in addition to their reputational concerns (Mansi 
et al., 2004; DeAngelo, 1981). The well-known international auditors, which are 
generally referred to as the ‘Big Four’ (KPMG, Ernst & Young, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte), reflect such size and long standing.  
 
These so called Big Four all operate in the Saudi market and provide auditing 
services to numerous public listed companies.  Assigning a Big Four auditor does 
have its drawbacks, as audit fees would ultimately be much higher (Desender et 
al., 2013). Therefore, it is expected that firms that assign a Big-Four auditor 
demonstrate higher tendency to induce higher costs for the promotion of better 
governance, thus might employ a higher level of board independence. The 
presence of a Big Four auditor is measured as a binary/dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm has one of the Big Four as its external auditor, and 
0 otherwise (BIG4). 
3.4.3 Model Specification 
To test the hypotheses developed that aims to answer the research question of 
the study the following model has been used: 
  
INEDi,t = α0 + β1FMLOWNi,t + β2RYLOWNi,t + β3GOVOWNi,t + β4CRPOWNi,t + β5EXECOWNi,t 
+ β6MLSi,t + β7ROAi,t + β8DIVERSi,t + β9FSIZEi,t + β10FCFi,t  + β11LEVERGi,t + β12BIG4i,t + 




α0:  Intercept    
i:  Firm factor    
t:  Year factor    
INDDUM Industry dummy 
β:  Regression coefficient 




Table 3.3 presents the operationalization of the variables used in the model. 
The following section provides the results of the econometric models, as well as 
the discussion of the findings. 
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The presence of more than one Blockholder in a single 
Firm  









ROA = Net Income before tax divided by Total Assets 
Diversification DIVERS 
Product and/or International Diversification  
(value of 1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 
Firm Size FSIZE The natural log of Total Assets 
Free Cash Flow FCF 
















External Auditor is one of the Big Four 
(value of 1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 
 
Additional variables (Robustness Checks) 
Board Size LBSIZE The natural log of the Total Number of Board Members 
 100 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.4 provides information on the descriptive statistics of variables 
measured. The table reports that on average 45% of board members are 
independent directors, while this ratio ranges from 0% to 100% in the entire 
sample. The major ownership category is family ownership, where on average 
they hold 17% of the issued equity. Conversely, royal family ownership is the 
least manifested category, with average ownership of about 3%.  
 
However, royal family ownership displays the largest maximum level of 
ownership of 95%, this is only reflected in a single company of ‘Kingdom Holding 
Company’ where HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal owns 95% of the issued shares 
and also serves as the chairman of the board. Both government and corporate 
ownership on average hold about 9% of share capital, while managerial 
ownership is on average only 5%. The presence of multiple blockholders is a 
common theme, where more than one blockholder in a single company is found 
in around two thirds of the sample. 
 
Furthermore, the figures in Table 3.4 reflect that the variables are not 
normally distributed across the sample. The skewness of several variables fall 
beyond ±1.96, and the kurtosis mostly fall beyond ±2, which reflect the 
thresholds acceptable for normality (Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, utilizing OLS 
as an estimation method for our model is inappropriate, as it will produce biased 
estimates. Consequently, this study will employ fixed effects (FE) or random 







Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
 
 
Variables Min Max Std. Dev. Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis N 
      
 
  
INED 0 1 0.179 0.450 0.4 0.803 3.366 619 
FMLOWN 0 0.725 0.216 0.172 0.0815 1.168 3.033 619 
RYLOWN 0 0.95 0.116 0.028 0 5.828 41.623 619 
GOVOWN 0 0.836 0.177 0.087 0 2.598 9.415 619 
CRPOWN 0 0.75 0.160 0.089 0 1.983 6.254 619 
EXECOWN 0 0.7 0.133 0.049 0 3.476 14.942 619 
MLS 0 1 0.479 0.645 1 -0.604 1.365 619 
ROA -0.672 0.494 0.105 0.069 0.06 -0.938 12.938 619 
DIVERS 0 1 0.498 0.546 1 -0.185 1.034 619 
FSIZE 17.795 26.55 1.646 21.53 21.3971 0.566 3.389 619 
FCF 0 0.668 0.085 0.062 0.0346 3.473 19.335 619 
LEVERG 0.004 1.527 0.219 0.365 0.3359 0.700 4.136 619 




The distribution of different types of blockholders in the market, based on 
market sector and firm size, is reflected in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, respectively. 
These figures are constructed from the data collected for this study. Family 
blockholders are found to be fairly present in most sectors and firm sizes, 
especially in the retail and media sectors as well as medium sized firms, and the 
least in utility firms, namely from the petrochemical, cement and 
telecommunication sectors.  
 
Furthermore, royal family blockholders mostly hold considerable shares in the 
multi-investment and media sectors and to a slightly greater extent in large 
firms. Government ownership, however, is widely present in the market, mostly 
in large firms and utility sectors (namely petrochemical, cement, energy, 
telecom, real estate and transportation). The only exception is the multi-
investment sector where the government presence seems to be insignificant. 
Similarly, corporate ownership is also widely present, predominantly in large 
firms and the petrochemical and telecom sectors, with the exception of the 
transportation, media and tourism industries. Moreover, managerial ownership 
is fairly absent in large firms, and is mostly concentrated in the media and retail 
sectors. 
 
These findings reveal the wide presence of different blockholder types in the 
Saudi stock market. Furthermore, the findings reflect the importance of the 
petrochemical and utility sectors to the government that holds a majority share 
in these critical sectors and tend to deter family and managers from holding 
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Table 3.5 presents the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables. The results show that the correlation between the variables 
are comparatively low, all below 0.5, thus no indication of a multicollinearity 
problem in the model (Gujarati, 2003). All the independent variables of 
ownership are negatively related to the percentage of independent directors 
except the royal family ownership. Furthermore, the highest correlation between 
the independent variables, of 0.468, is between family ownership (FMLOWN) 
and executive ownership (EXECOWN), which reflects that family owners 
maintain close control of the company and prefer to incentivize the management 
of their firms by increasing their level of ownership. 
 
Additionally, moderately high correlation is found between firm size (FSIZE) 
and both leverage (LEVERG) and a big 4 auditor (BIG4), of 0.431 and 0.438 
respectively. This reflects the level of firm complexity that demands more 
qualified auditors as well as easier access to finance due to the larger asset base 
that serves as a collateral for lenders. Likewise, the correlation between leverage 
(LEVERG) and a Big Four auditor (BIG4) is 0.422. This could be attributed to the 
higher risk associated with debt that encourages the appointment of skilled 
auditors by the firm, or that the appointment of a Big Four auditor is demanded 
by the lender as a measure to safeguard their interests. 
 
Table 3.6 presents the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables, where 
all fall comfortably within the acceptable limit of less than 10, thus further 
confirming that multicollinearity is not present (Kutner et al., 2004). The next 
section will discuss the results of the empirical model as presented in Table 3.7. 
 106 
Table 3.5 Pearson Correlation Matrix for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 
Variables INED FMLOWN RYLOWN GOVOWN CRPOWN EXECOWN MLS ROA DIVERS FSIZE FCF LEVERG BIG4 
              
INED 1 
            
FMLOWN -0.205 1 
           
RYLOWN 0.014 -0.144 1 
          
GOVOWN -0.062 -0.280 -0.057 1 
         
CRPOWN -0.262 -0.293 -0.060 -0.094 1 
        
EXECOWN -0.164 0.468 0.036 -0.143 -0.130 1 
       
MLS -0.230 -0.019 -0.009 0.292 0.309 -0.111 1 
      
ROA -0.064 0.104 -0.138 0.109 0.005 0.216 0.135 1 
     
DIVERS -0.235 0.255 0.120 0.055 -0.123 0.178 0.014 0.063 1 
    
FSIZE -0.309 -0.134 0.109 0.490 0.303 -0.092 0.376 -0.016 0.344 1 
   
FCF 0.031 -0.053 -0.073 -0.042 0.027 -0.065 -0.037 0.256 0.025 -0.145 1 
  
LEVERG -0.250 0.132 0.047 -0.005 0.208 0.065 0.131 -0.268 0.263 0.431 -0.170 1 
 
BIG4 -0.298 0.170 0.085 0.132 0.190 0.148 0.251 0.037 0.330 0.438 0.007 0.422 1 
 
 















Mean VIF 1.61 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
FMLOWN -0.258**       -0.246** 
(-2.52)    (-2.43) 
RYLOWN 1.033    1.176 
(1.00)    (1.14) 
GOVOWN -0.582**    -0.657** 
(-2.22)    (-2.52) 
CRPOWN -0.288*    -0.249 
(-1.70)    (-1.48) 
EXECOWN -0.001    0.002 
(-0.01)    (0.02) 
MLS -0.077*** -0.079*** -0.074***  -0.076*** 
(-3.22) (-3.35) (-3.18)   (-3.25) 
OWNCNCTR  -0.283***    
 (-3.46)    
OWN5TO20   -0.196***   
  (-5.63)   
OWN20TO50   -0.155***   
  (-3.78)   
OWNABV50   -0.192***   
    (-4.26)     
LBSIZE       0.161*** 0.163*** 
      (3.13) (3.24) 
ROA -0.086 -0.080 -0.078 -0.060 -0.083 
(-1.37) (-1.28) (-1.28) (-0.94) (-1.33) 
DIVERS 0.081*** 0.077** 0.079*** 0.095*** 0.089*** 
(2.70) (2.60) (2.74) (3.18) (2.98) 
FSIZE 0.046** 0.039* 0.050** 0.031 0.039* 
(2.10) (1.84) (2.39) (1.42) (1.79) 
FCF -0.133* -0.141* -0.109 -0.135* -0.142* 
(-1.80) (-1.91) (-1.50) (-1.79) (-1.94) 
LEVERG -0.067 -0.053 -0.081* -0.039 -0.069 
(-1.55) (-1.25) (-1.94) (-0.92) (-1.60) 
BIG4 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 
(-0.28) (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.49) (-0.52) 
Constant -0.401 -0.238 -0.417 -0.573 -0.597 
(-0.86) (-0.52) (-0.94) (-1.24) (-1.28) 
R-sq 0.094 0.088 0.132 0.095 0.113 
N 619 619 619 619 619 
Notes:  
1. ***, ** and * denote p-value significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  




3.5.2 Discussion of Results 
Table 3.7 reports the panel data fixed effects (FE) regression Models 1 to 5. The 
dependent variable in all models is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board (INED). In order to investigate the relationship between the ownership 
variables and board independence, and given the nature of the unbalanced panel data 
set of the study, random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) techniques were utilized. 
Utilizing a panel data set that combines time series and cross sectional observations 
provides a more informative and robust results due to the higher degrees of freedom 
(Gujarati, 2003). Further checks reveal that fixed effects (FE) is the appropriate 
estimation method, as the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test results were significant at the 
1% level, namely Prob>chi2=0.0022 (Wooldridge, 2010; Gujarati, 2003). For 
robustness checks, Table 3.8 will present the results as tested by the random effects 
regression in order to further validify the results of the main model. 
 
Model 1, which is the primary model of the study, reports the independent variables 
of ownership, for the different types of blockholders, along with the firm specific 
control variables. The results indicate that family blockholders (FMLOWN) are 
negatively and significantly related to board independence (INED) at the 5% level. 
Therefore, accepting the first hypothesis (H1), where family blockholders in Saudi 
Arabia disregard the interests of minority shareholders and assign a less independent 
board. Therefore, family blockholders maintain ultimate control over corporate 
decision-making in the Saudi context. 
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This result corroborates the findings of previous literature examining the family 
ownership and board relationship, where all studies found the relationship to be 
negative, while the interpretation of the relationship greatly differs (Sur et al., 2013; 
Baglioni & Colombo, 2013; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). While family blockholders might 
be beneficial if the family acted in the best interest of minority shareholders, however, 
the risk of family expropriation would be amplified in case their interests diverge due 
to the lack of independent director monitoring (van Essen et al., 2015; Setia-Atmaja et 
al., 2009). 
 
On the one hand, Baglioni and Colombo (2013) and Sur et al. (2013) both maintain 
that family blockholders improve the overall governance of the firm, and thus family 
ownership substitutes for the need of independent director monitoring, in the Italian 
and US contexts, respectively. This stewardship rationalization can best symbolize the 
influence of the Islamic principle of vicegerency, which might impact family 
blockholders in Saudi Arabia. However, as discussed earlier in section 3.2, the self-
interested agency model could also reflect the attitude in Saudi Arabia instead of the 
Islamic stewardship principles, and that the Arabian culture of secrecy and high 
power distance might be the driver for maintaining control over the board (Bukhari, 
2014; Ali, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) argue that family blockholders in 
Australia minimize monitoring by independent directors in order to maximize their 
private benefits extraction, which is driven by the weak external governance context 
of Australia that enables controlling families to appropriate firm resources, thus 
resulting in a principal principal agency problem. Consequently, family blockholders 
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might expropriate minority shareholder’s interests by assigning under qualified 
family member in key positions, pursue familial agendas instead of profit 
maximization or by tunneling and direct theft of firm resources (Young et al., 2008; 
Wang & Xiao, 2011; Pindado & Requejo, 2015). Accordingly, minimizing external 
monitoring by independent directors makes family blockholders maintain full control 
over the board, and puts them in an uncontestable position to expropriate firm 
resources at the expense of minority investors.  
 
Ultimately, in Saudi Arabia, both explanations might hold. It is possible that 
controlling family blockholders maintain control over the board in order to better 
monitor the firm in the best interest of all, or to deter external monitoring by 
independent directors in order to maximize their private benefit extraction. This 
result also supports the findings of Bukhari (2014), who conducted a qualitative 
enquiry on the corporate governance institutions in Saudi Arabia and reported that 
controlling families dominate the board and corporate decision making.  
 
Moreover, royal family blockholders (RYLOWN) are found to be insignificantly 
related to board independence (INED), therefore the second hypothesis (H2) of 
negative relationship is rejected. This finding also differs from previous studies that 
found politically connected firms to negatively influence the board of director’s 
independence level (Ding et al., 2014), and the qualifications of its members (Fan et 
al., 2007).  
 
This result, of no relationship, could be attributed to the fact that in more than 90% 
of firms that have a royal family blockholder in our sample, the royal family member 
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serves as the chairman of the board himself. Therefore, acting as a chairman enables 
him to control the board without the need to assign board positions to any desired 
party, whether executives, non-executives or independents. Ultimately, royal 
blockholders do not affect the independence level of the board because they control 
firm decision making by serving as chairmen of the board themselves. 
 
Surprisingly, the relationship between board independence (INED) and government 
ownership (GOVOWN) is found to be negative and significant at the 5% level. This is 
opposite to the expected hypothesis (H3) where the government is expected to signal 
good corporate governance practices and encourage the market to improve its overall 
governance by acting as stewards (Bukhari, 2014), thus the hypothesis is rejected.  
 
This finding is also opposite to that reported by Li (Li, 1994) and Munisi et al. 
(2014), who found similar results in a multi country sample and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
respectively. However, this finding supports that found in China and Singapore by 
Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) and Mak and Li (2001), respectively. Their results reveal 
that government ownership is generally associated with ineffective governance 
structures and weaker accountability towards shareholders, as suggested by the 
agency theory. 
 
However, this result, of negative relationship might reflect that the Saudi 
government prefers to maintain close control over board decision-making rather than 
empowering external parties in their firms (Piesse et al., 2011; Almajid, 2008). The 
case of retaining control from the government could be reinforced by investments in 
strategic sectors, such as petrochemical and utility companies, where the Saudi 
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government is generally the controlling blockholder. For example, the Saudi 
government owns 70% of SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries Corporation), which is the 
largest listed company in the Middle-East in terms of market capitalization, and 70% 
of Saudi Telecom, which is the largest telephone service provider in the country 
(Tadawul, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, corporate ownership (CRPOWN) is also found to be negative and 
significantly related to board independence (INED) at the 10% level. Confirming the 
prediction of the proposed hypothesis (H4), therefore the hypothesis is accepted. This 
finding is similar to the results of Sur et al. (2013), who found that corporate 
ownership is positively related to affiliate directors rather than independent directors 
in Canada.  
 
Additionally, these findings further corroborate the predictions of the resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) which expects that corporate 
blockholders substitute for the requirement of an independent board through their 
advanced monitoring capabilities. Corporate owners have better understanding of the 
business environment, and are able to directly monitor the management of the 
acquired firm by appointing their executives or other affiliates as representatives on 
the board rather than independent directors. 
 
However, managerial ownership (EXECOWN) is found to be insignificantly related 
to board independence (INED), thus rejecting the proposed negative relationship of 
hypothesis (H5), which reflects both the incentive and entrenchment effects. Likewise, 
this finding does not support previous results of managerial ownership and board 
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independence in contexts such as the UK, Spain and Singapore by (2006), (2014) and 
Mak and Li (2001), respectively. 
 
Moreover, this could reflect the prevalence of power that external blockholders in 
Saudi Arabia enjoy when compared to internal/managerial owners, where most other 
blockholder types significantly influenced board independence. This finding is similar 
to the results of Munisi et al. (2014), where in Sub-Saharan Africa, managerial 
ownership is also found to be not related to board independence. Therefore, due to 
the dominant power external blockholders possess in the Saudi context, increased 
managerial ownership would still not allow for their interests to be reflected in 
decision making, such as the appointment of directors to the board. 
 
Additionally, the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) is found to be 
negatively and significantly related to board independence (INED) at the 1% level. 
Thus supporting the last hypothesis (H6), which assumes that multiple blockholders 
will substitute for an increased representation of independent directors. Likewise, as 
each blockholder will vote himself, or his representative, to hold board seats, there 
will plausibly be less room for independent directors, due to the limit on board size 
imposed by the Saudi corporate governance regulation; where board size must be 
between 3 and 11 (CMA, 2010). Consequently, the presence of multiple blockholders 
reduces the level of board independence in Saudi Arabia.  
 
While there is a chance that multiple blockholders might collude and expropriate 
firm resources, it is generally expected that second large shareholders would monitor 
the largest controlling blockholder from self serving behavior (Barroso Casado et al., 
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2016; Attig et al., 2009). Thus, even though multiple large shareholders reduce board 
independence in Saudi Arabia, it is expected that they will represent the interests of 
minority shareholders through their stewardship role, and therefore, substituting for 
the need of independent directors. 
 
Several control variables show significant relationship with board independence. In 
support to the firm complexity argument, which assumes the need for an increased 
independent representation, both firm diversification (DIVERS) and firm size (FSIZE) 
show a positive significant relationship with board independence (INED) at the 1% 
and 5% levels, respectively. Firms that are more diversified and firms that are larger 
are considered as more complex firms, thus require more diverse skills and 
monitoring efforts, which is expected to be provided by independent board members. 
This finding is similar to that found in other countries such as the US (Coles et al., 
2008), UK (Guest, 2008), China (Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012), and Spain (Fraile & Fradejas, 
2014). 
 
Finally, the level of free cash flow (FCF) shows significant relationship at the 10% 
level, where the relationship is negative with board independence (INED). Free cash 
flow serves as an opportunity for private benefit extraction, thus controlling managers 
and/or blockholders demand a less independent board that might limit their capacity 
towards such expropriation in Saudi Arabia. In this case, minority shareholders 
remain unprotected through the decreased presence of independent directors when 







3.5.3 Robustness Checks 
In order to further examine the robustness of the results, several models have 
been employed. Models 2 and 3 in Table 3.7 examine the role of ownership 
concentration on board independence regardless of the type of blockholder. 
Model 2 measures the entire combined ownership concentration of over 5% 
(OWNCNCTR), whereas Model 3 divides the level of concentration into three 
groups; comprising a dummy variable that equals 1 if the total ownership 
concentration in a firm falls under each threshold of 5% to 20% (OWN5TO20), 
20% to 50% (OWN20TO50) and over 50% (OWNABV50), and 0 otherwise. The 
motivation behind this measurement is to examine whether blockholders of 
different levels of ownership influence board independence differently or not. 
Different results for different levels of ownership could signal the incentive and 
entrenchment effects previously documented in the literature (De Miguel et al., 
2004; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). 
 
The results of Model 2 demonstrate that ownership concentration 
(OWNCNCTR) is negatively and significantly associated with board 
independence at the 1% level. This result is similar to the previous findings, as 
all blockholder types in Saudi Arabia with significant relationship to board 
independence are found to be negative; namely family, government and 
corporate blockholders.  
 
Additionally, Model 3 reveals that the blockholder negative influence on board 




three thresholds are found to be negatively and significantly related to board 
independence at the 1% level. Therefore, no matter what level of ownership the 
blockholder retains, above 5%, the influence on the independence level of the 
board in Saudi Arabia is similar. This could reflect the possibility of minority 
shareholder expropriation by any size of blockholders in Saudi Arabia, who will 
possess the power to appoint board members, and ultimately, control firm 
decisions at all levels of ownership. 
 
Models 4 and 5 investigate the influence of board size (LBSIZE) on board 
independence. Board size is calculated as the natural logarithm of the total 
number of board members. Model 4 excludes the ownership variables, while 
Model 5 includes all ownership variables along with the board size variable. In 
both models the board size is found to be positively and significantly associated 
with board independence at the 1% level. This result indicates that firms tend to 
appoint independent directors by increasing the number of board seats instead 
of replacing other executive or affiliated directors. Thus reflecting the demand 
for retaining control by either executives and/or blockholders, which represent 
the heart of the principal agent (P-A) and/or principal principal (P-P) problem 
that independent directors are expected to alleviate. 
 
Furthermore, Table 3.8 presents the main model as tested by the random 
effects regression.  Clarke et al. (2015) posit that “while the Hausman test has a 
role to play in comparing the estimates obtained from FE [fixed effects] and RE 
[random effects] models, it does not necessarily provide the definitive answer 




does not control for industry effects, these can be observed in the results of the 
random effects technique which will be used to further examine the validity of 
the results. Similarly, the significance of the results from the random effects does 
not differ at all from that of the fixed effects reported in the study, thus granting 
further support to our main findings. 
 
Corporate governance research has illustrated the problem of endogeneity 
concerning board structure and firm characteristics (Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001; Brown et al., 2011; Gippel et al., 2015). For example, board structure might 
lead to better firm performance, while at the same time, past firm performance 
might cause a need to change board members. However, this study analyses the 
influence of ownership structure on board independence, as board members are 
elected directly by shareholders, hence, it is reasonable to expect that ownership 
affects board structure rather than the other way around.  
 
Furthermore, the generalised method of moments, or simply GMM, is a viable 
solution to the endogeneity problem (Lee et al., 2015; Keasey et al., 2015; 
Pindado et al., 2012). However, as GMM relies on lagged values and the main 
independent variables of this study, which are ownership structure, tend to be 
stable over time, therefore GMM becomes unsuitable for such type of data 
(Andres, 2011; Goergen & Renneboog, 2001).  
 
The following section provides the concluding remarks of this chapter, which 





Table 3.8 Random Effects Panel Data of Board Independence on Ownership Structure, 
Control Variables and Industry Dummies 
 
 
INED   
FMLOWN -0.265   
 (-4.08)***   
RYLOWN 0.033   
 (0.25)   
GOVOWN -0.202   
 (-2.15)**   
CRPOWN -0.387   
 (-4.30)***   
EXECOWN -0.074   
 (-0.86)   
MLS -0.063   
 (-3.13)***   
ROA -0.059   
 (-0.97)   
DIVERS 0.014   
 (0.61)   
FSIZE -0.010   
 (-0.82)   
FCF -0.125   
 (-1.80)*   
LEVERG -0.021   
 (-0.54)   
BIG4 -0.003   
 (-0.20)   
Constant 1.01   
 (3.98)***   
Industries Yes   
R-sq 0.345   




1. ***, ** and * denote p-value significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  






This chapter investigated the role of blockholders on the structure of the 
boards of Saudi public listed companies. The level of board independence under 
blockholder control reflects the degree of minority shareholder representation 
in the decision making and governance of the firm.  
 
Random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) models were used to test the 
relationship between different blockholder types, namely family, royal family, 
government, corporate and managerial ownership, and board independence 
(INED). After controlling for conventional determinants of board structure, the 
results for 117 non-financial listed companies in Saudi Arabia from 2008-2013, 
where a final sample (N) comprises of 619 firm year observations, show that that 
minority shareholder interests are not well represented through higher level of 
board independence under control by all types of blockholders. 
 
The findings of the study reveal the existing principal principal agency 
problem between all types of blockholders and minority shareholders in Saudi 
Arabia, as the former is associated with less independent board representation. 
As Table 3.9 shows, family ownership, government ownership, corporate 
ownership and multiple blockholders have all been found to be significantly 








Table 3.9 Summary of Hypotheses and Empirical Findings of Blockholder and Board 
Structure Relationship 
 
Blockholder Type Expected Findings 
Family - - 
Royal Family - no 
Government + - 
Corporate - - 
Managerial - no 
MLS - - 
 
 
The exclusion of outside independent directors under blockholder control 
reflects the dominance of the Arabian culture in Saudi Arabia, which is 
characterized by high power distance and strong level of secrecy in business 
dealings (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Bukhari, 2014). By allowing increased 
independent representation on the board, blockholders become obligated to 
reveal information they otherwise regard as private to outside independent 
members.  
 
The motivation behind blockholders’ control over the board might be to better 
monitor the firm and act as stewards in the best interest of all, or to deter 
external monitoring by independent directors in order to maximize their private 
benefit extraction. The stewardship rationalization can best symbolize the 
Islamic principle of vicegerency, which is expected to have an influence on 




stakeholders. However, as discussed earlier in section 3.2, the self-interested 
agency model might also reflect the attitude of individuals in Saudi Arabia, who 
might utilize their strong position to expropriate firm resources.  
 
Ultimately, in Saudi Arabia, both explanations might hold. Whether 
maintaining control by these blockholders is motivated by favorable or harmful 
intentions is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the following 
empirical chapters will aim at further answering this question by examining the 
influence of blockholders on dividend policy and audit quality, respectively. 
Triangulating the findings of the three studies will provide better understanding 
of the role blockholders play in the governance of Saudi public listed companies, 
and whether they expropriate minority shareholders or not. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, this study 
provides empirical evidence on the determinants of board structure in a Middle 
Eastern setting with unique institutional arrangements that has been largely 
under investigated in the literature. The Arab culture and Islamic religion of 
Saudi Arabia might greatly influence the determinants of board independence 
when compared with studies carried out in different contexts, such as the US 
(Coles et al., 2008), UK (Guest, 2008), China (Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012), Africa 
(Munisi et al., 2014) and Spain (Fraile & Fradejas, 2014). 
 
Secondly, this study distinguishes between the types of blockholders present 
in the Saudi market, which includes a unique type of royal family members. 




such differentiation and combine blockholders in a single category, either 
internal or external (Mak & Li, 2001; Fraile & Fradejas, 2014; Rediker & Seth, 
1995; Kim et al., 2007; Li, 1994; Lasfer, 2006; Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012). It is 
important to differentiate between different blockholder types in order to 
examine the respective role of each type separately, and to avoid any biased 
results that might occur in the econometric models (Sur et al., 2013). 
 
Thirdly, this study contributes to the ownership and board literature by 
examining the role of the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on the 
level of board independence. MLS is a relatively newly examined topic in the 
literature, with no studies utilizing it as a determinant of board structure (Attig 
et al., 2009; Boubaker & Sami, 2011; Cai et al., 2016; Sacristán-Navarro et al., 
2015).  
 
 Finally, this study increases our understanding of the dynamics of the Saudi 
capital market, which is largely understudied, by examining the principal 
principal problem [P-P] between controlling and minority shareholders. This is 
achieved by studying the board composition and ownership structure 
relationship, which reflects the level of minority shareholder representation the 
market provides under the presence of controlling blockholders. The Saudi 
market is characterized by wide presence of blockholders, and therefore it is 










Blockholders and Dividend Policy 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The presence of blockholders poses the threat of expropriating firm resources 
at the expense of minority shareholders. Due to their strong position; of high 
voting power, blockholders are expected to directly influence corporate decision 
making (Djankov et al., 2008). The interests of blockholders, whether economical 
or political, might greatly differ from that of minority shareholders. 
Consequently, minority shareholders rely on different means to protect their 
invested wealth, especially in a less developed country such as Saudi Arabia 
(Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Djankov et al., 2008; Dyck & Zingales, 2004).  
 
In that regard, dividend payments to shareholders is considered a key 
governance mechanism that alleviates minority shareholder expropriation 
concerns (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Pindado et al., 2012; Truong & Heaney, 
2007). Cash dividend payouts limit the free cash flow available for misuse by 
controlling blockholders and/or managers, as well as placing the firm under 
external scrutiny from the capital market (Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984). 
This chapter investigates blockholders’ influence on the dividend policy of Saudi 
PLCs, in order to examine the level of governance minority shareholder 





4.1.1 Research Context and Background 
Saudi Arabia, similar to other emerging and developing countries, is 
characterized by an underdeveloped national governance system, where laws 
and regulations regarding the governance of corporations are either absent 
entirely or cannot be effectively enforced (Yoshikawa et al., 2014) Consequently, 
external governance mechanisms, such as the take over market, become weak 
and inactive (Mishra, 2011; Young et al., 2008). As a result, internal governance 
mechanisms, such as dividend payout, become more significant in safeguarding 
shareholders’ interests (Douma et al., 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009).  
 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is characterized by the wide presence of 
blockholders, who control more than two thirds of Saudi listed companies 
(Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012; Santos, 2015). In dispersed ownership 
structures the main agency problem is between shareholders and managers 
[Principal-Agent or simply P-A]. However, in concentrated ownership structures 
the problem shifts between controlling and minority shareholders [Principal-
Principal or simply P-P] (Young et al., 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
 
Consequently, minority shareholders bear the risk of expropriation by 
controlling blockholders [P-P] on top of the basic managerial agency problem [P-
A]. Expropriation might be achieved through several forms: by direct or indirect 
extraction of physical resources, by misallocation of key organizational positions, 
or by following strategic decisions that advance personal goals at the expense of 





It is argued that external governance mechanisms, which are assumed to 
alleviate the basic Principal-Agent problem, such as the takeover market, fail to 
control Principal-Principal agency problems due to the strong position 
blockholders enjoy (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). By reducing the level of free cash 
flow available for expropriation, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) contend that “other 
internally determined governance mechanisms (i.e., dividends, debt and board 
structure) may prove more significant in controlling Agency Problem II [P-P]” 
(Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009, p.864).  
 
Thus in a context such as Saudi Arabia, that is characterized by wide 
blockholder presence and the absence of strong external governance, minority 
shareholders will heavily rely on dividend payouts, beside other factors, as a 
governance mechanism that alleviates their risk of being expropriated (Truong & 
Heaney, 2007; La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000). 
 
4.1.2 Research Motivation and Significance 
The motivation for firms to payout dividends has puzzled financial economists 
for more than fifty years (Frankfurter & Wood, 2003; Frankfurter & Wood, 2002; 
La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000; Denis & Osobov, 2008). The seminal 
work of Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1961) asserts that in perfect markets 
dividends are irrelevant to shareholder wealth. Higher dividend payout reduces 
retained earning and capital gains, while lower dividend payout increases 





However, in reality, firms tend to maintain a deliberate dividend payout policy, 
and investors do value dividend payments (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 
2000; Lintner, 1956; Pindado et al., 2012). Furthermore, despite the higher tax 
liability dividends incur in some countries, strangely, shareholders still prefer 
dividend payments over retained earnings, and stock prices have been found to 
react positively following dividend announcements (Crockett & Friend, 1988; 
Frankfurter & Wood, 2002; Easterbrook, 1984).  
 
While the literature could not fully rationalize the determinants of dividends 
in a single model, both theoretically and empirically, it is rather a combination of 
factors that is reflected in, but not limited to, the risk tolerance of the investor, 
agency costs, information transmission, and liquidation costs of holdings, that 
partially explains the shareholder’s preference for dividends (Frankfurter & 
Wood, 2002; Crockett & Friend, 1988). 
 
The finance literature has extensively examined the determinants of dividend 
payouts (Denis & Osobov, 2008), and it is well documented that dividends are 
considered as a governance mechanism that is influenced by the governance 
structure of the firm (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010; Pindado et al., 2012; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000). Driven by the reduction of free cash flow available 
for expropriation (Jensen, 1986), and the accompanying monitoring by the 
capital market (Easterbrook, 1984), which dividend payments incur on 
corporations, the overall governance of the firm is expected to be improved 
when firms with high agency costs payout higher dividends (Adjaoud & Ben-





In developed countries, such as the US and UK, dividends are considered as an 
unwritten contract between shareholders and corporate managers (Frankfurter 
& Wood, 2002), which is reflected by the dispersed ownership structure of their 
context that is characterized by the separation of ownership and control. 
However, in Saudi Arabia, and in developing economies in general, concentrated 
ownership changes the balance of powers, in which blockholders maintain 
control over decision making (Djankov et al., 2008; Santos, 2015), including 
dividends (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000). It is therefore imperative to 
examine the influence of blockholders on dividend policy, in order to examine 
the level of protection minority shareholders enjoy (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003). 
 
4.1.3 Literature Gap 
Early literature examining the relationship between ownership structure and 
dividends has mainly focused on two types of ownership, namely managerial and 
institutional, and was carried out in the US and UK (Crutchley & Hansen, 1989; 
Jensen et al., 1992; Short et al., 2002; Rozeff, 1982). Several later studies 
extended beyond the US and UK into more developing countries, namely Egypt, 
Malaysia and Jordan, however they only focused on insider and institutional 
ownership as well (Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Benjamin et al., 2015; Al-Gharaibeh, 
2013). Recent studies, albeit limited, incorporated new ownership types in 
analyzing the ownership and dividend relationship, such as family and 
government ownership, as these owner types hold large blocks in many 
countries around the world (Gugler, 2003; Pindado et al., 2012; Khan, 2006; 





While these studies generally considered these blockholder types in isolation, 
only one study, by Djebali & Belanès (2015), did incorporate the different types 
of blockholders in a single dividend model, however it is based on the developed 
context of France.  Therefore, little is known about the influence of different 
blockholder types on dividends in a developing context. In that regard, Saudi 
Arabia represents a developing context with distinctive institutional 
arrangements, where Islamic religion and authoritarian governmental rulings 
play an imperative role in the economy, and is therefore a suitable candidate for 
such study. 
 
Merely two studies examined the determinants of dividend policy in Saudi 
Arabia (Osman & Mohammed, 2010; Al-Ajmi & Hussain, 2011). Al-Ajmi and 
Hussain (2011) measured the influence of government and blockholder 
ownership on dividend payments as part of their model, and found no 
relationship between blockholders and dividends, while Osman and Mohammed 
(2010) only considered government ownership and found that it positively 
influences dividends.  
 
However, both studies only used a dummy variable for blockholder presence, 
which eliminates the relative power of the degree of ownership concentration 
the blockholder possesses, and its corresponding effect on dividend decisions. 
Moreover, they failed to incorporate several important governance mechanisms, 




of directors, into their model in order to fully analyze the governance role that 
dividends play in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Additionally, these studies fail to differentiate between different blockholder 
types; rather they used a combined blockholder measure that treats different 
owners as a homogenous group. However, different types of blockholders; such 
as families or corporations, are expected to have different set of skills, 
capabilities, motivations and investment horizons that makes their influence on 
dividend policy distinct from one another. This study will focus on the main 
types of blockholders present in the Saudi market.  
 
Considering dividends as a governance tool that mitigates minority 
shareholder expropriation, this study aims to fill the gap in the literature and add 
to the findings of Al-Ajmi and Hussain (2011) and Osman and Mohammed 
(2010) by investigating the role of blockholders as a determinant of dividend 
policy in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this study will comprehensively analyze the 
role of dividends as a governance mechanism under different blockholder sets; 
namely family, royal family, government, corporate, managerial and multiple 
blockholders, in the context of Saudi Arabia, in order to examine the level of 
governance minority shareholders experience under the presence of controlling 
blockholders. 
 
Accordingly, this chapter seeks to answer the research question of, to what 
degree do blockholders impact the dividend policy of Saudi PLCs? Specifically, 




types on dividend policy, of both the decision to pay dividends and the amount 
the firms actually pay out. 
 
The next section provides the theoretical framework of the study. The 
following section reviews the extant literature on the ownership structure and 
dividend policy relationship as well as develops the hypotheses of the study. 
Afterwards, the research methodology employed will be presented. 
Subsequently, the results and discussion will follow. Finally, concluding remarks 
will close the study. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
Several theoretical explanations regarding the determinants of dividend policy 
have been proposed over the past few decades, and intensive empirical 
examinations have been employed to test their applicability (Frankfurter & 
Wood, 2002). Yet no model have been able to fully explain the dividend puzzle 
(Frankfurter & Wood, 2002; Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010). The major theoretical 
standpoints on dividends with regards to ownership structure are taxation, 
agency, signaling and stakeholder (Frankfurter & Wood, 2002; Short et al., 2002; 
Gaur et al., 2015). This section will review these theories and relate them to the 
Saudi context in order to build the theoretical framework of the study. The use of 
multi-theoretic perspective enables the researcher to better analyze the 
complexity of the phenomena surrounding organizations, and aids in 
understanding relationships and influencing factors (Boyd & Solarino, 2016; 




4.2.1 Tax Effect Hypothesis 
One of the first explanations of dividend payment is the different tax treatment 
of dividends compared to capital gains (Frankfurter & Wood, 2002). Different 
countries have different taxation policies (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 
2000). In the US both high and basic rate income tax payers are better off when 
profits are retained in the firm rather than paid as dividends, while tax-exempt 
shareholders are merely neutral in terms of preference between retained 
earnings and dividends (Short et al., 2002). On the other hand, in the UK, tax-
exempt shareholders are better off when profits are distributed in the form of 
dividends rather than retained in the firm (Short et al., 2002).  
 
These two opposed scenarios encourage different dividend policies that will 
affect shareholder’s wealth differently. Taxation factors is argued to be the 
foundation behind the high dividend payments found in UK listed firms, which is 
triggered by the high ownership presence of tax-exempt institutional investors, 
namely pension funds (Short et al., 2002). The tax effect hypothesis also 
proposes the ‘dividend clientele effect’ of different tax levels investors entail, in 
such that companies attract certain investor types based on their dividend 
payout policy (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). 
 
However, Saudi Arabia, similar to other countries in the region such as the 
United Arab Emirates, do not have a personal income tax systems (Al-Kuwari, 
2009; Al-Ajmi & Hussain, 2011; Chazi et al., 2011). In such circumstances the tax 
explanation becomes irrelevant to the dividend policy of the firm, as both income 




study will disregard the taxation explanation of dividends in studying the effect 
of blockholders on the dividend payout policy of Saudi PLCs and rely on other 
theoretical views. 
4.2.2 Agency Theory 
As the taxation theory failed to justify the payment of dividends when the tax 
costs of dividends are higher than that of retained earnings, as in the case of US, 
researchers reflected on the governance role that dividends might play in 
reducing agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982). Dividend payout 
represents a governance mechanism that alleviates both the classical principal-
agent problem, between management and shareholders, and the principal-
principal agency problem, between blockholders and minority shareholders (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). 
 
Two factors related to dividend payouts causes the alleviated agency costs to 
shareholders. Firstly, dividend payment to shareholders decreases the free cash 
flow available under insider control (Jensen, 1986). Free cash flow unpaid as 
dividends might be expropriated by controlling blockholders and/or 
management in various forms, such as excessive perquisites, investment in 
negative net present value projects, or transfer pricing (Crockett & Friend, 1988; 
Frankfurter & Wood, 2002). Therefore minority shareholders benefit from 
dividend payment in the form of reduced free cash flow that might otherwise be 
expropriated (Sáez & Gutiérrez, 2015). 
 
Secondly, dividend payments are associated with increased monitoring by the 




funds available for investment opportunities thus require the firm to seek 
financing from the capital market for its investment needs. This in turn places 
the firm under external monitoring by the professional capital market, who will 
limit excessive perquisite consumption and investments in less than optimal 
projects (Frankfurter & Wood, 2002). 
 
In both cases minority shareholders will be better off by receiving dividend 
payments that alleviates their expropriation concerns from insider private 
benefit extraction (Farinha, 2003), either from controlling blockholders and/or 
powerful managers (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000; Sáez & Gutiérrez, 
2015; Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006). 
4.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
A stakeholder can be defined as any individual or group who is affected by or 
is able to affect the achievement of firm objectives (Freeman & Reed, 1983). With 
a focus on the overriding obligations to the wide organizational stakeholders, 
based on trust and cooperativeness, stakeholder theory presents a shift away 
from agency theory, which takes a narrow perspective that focusses on the sole 
interests of shareholders (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Gaur et al., 2015).  
 
Stakeholder theory calls for aligning the interests of the different stakeholder 
groups and balancing their interests (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Gaur et al., 2015). 
Gaur et al. (2015) argue that blockholders tend to influence decision making to 
their interests, even if it was at the expense of other stakeholders. However, 
Holder et al. (1998) argue, and find empirical support for their claim, that 




debt and equity holders. They find that corporate focus, in terms of firm size and 
diversification, is negatively related to dividend payout, which reflects that more 
focused firms reduce dividend payouts to preserve liquidity and indicate their 
preparedness to meet implicit and explicit claims to stakeholders (Holder et al., 
1998). 
 
Islamic religion, or Sharia, promotes the representation of various 
stakeholders, in which the main objective of the firm isn’t profit maximization, 
rather, continuity and societal welfare are the fundamental objectives of the 
Islamic ethical system (Ali et al., 2017; Rizk, 2014; Bedoui & Mansour, 2015). 
However, the Saudi legal system is heavily influenced by the Anglo-American 
system and emphasizes on the protection of shareholders at large without 
providing detailed measures and tools that help various stakeholders as well as 
minority shareholders to protect their interests and convey their voices 
(Almajid, 2008; Fallatah & Dickins, 2012; Piesse et al., 2011). 
 
Therefore, although it is plausible to assume that stakeholder model should 
form the basis of analyzing the governance in Saudi Arabia from a religious point 
of view, the actual conduct within Saudi Arabia offers greater support to the self-
serving agency model instead. 
4.2.4 Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory rationalizes dividend payment as a signal that conveys 
information to the market, due to the information asymmetry that exits between 
corporate insiders and the external market. Corporate executive managers, who 




the performance of the firm from the general public (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Additionally, blockholders, who have the power and incentive to closely monitor 
the firm, are also more informed about firm performance (Jiang et al., 2011). 
Both executive managers and controlling blockholders are able to influence 
corporate decision making, including dividend payments (Mancinelli & Ozkan, 
2006; Farinha, 2003; Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010). 
 
By distributing dividends to shareholders, firms might signal information 
regarding the expected future earnings of the firm (Miller & Rock, 1985), the 
severity of the agency problem it faces (Short et al., 2002; Truong & Heaney, 
2007), and the way it treats its shareholders (Frankfurter & Wood, 2002). 
Several empirical studies found a positive relationship between dividend 
announcement and stock prices, which reflects that dividends might signal 
expected future growth in profits, while a cut in dividends signals an expected 
decline in future profits (Asquith & Mullins, 1986; Miller & Rock, 1985; 
Frankfurter & Wood, 2002).  
 
The signaling characteristics of dividends could also be considered as a 
solution to the agency problem, as dividend payments reduce information 
asymmetry between insiders and outside shareholders. Furthermore, controlling 
insiders, both management and/or blockholders, might signal their good 
treatment of minority shareholders in order to attract investors to acquire their 
stocks, or to gain preferential financing from the capital market (Short et al., 




dividends in firms under blockholder control signals the commitment by the 
blockholder not to expropriate minority shareholders (Pindado et al., 2012).  
 
In conclusion, under both the signaling and agency theory expectations, 
minority shareholders are expected to prefer dividends over retained earnings 
in order to alleviate the problems associated with public listed companies, 
between management and shareholders, as well as the problems associated with 
the presence of a controlling blockholder, between blockholders and minority 
shareholders. Consequently, dividends act as a vital internal governance 
mechanism against minority shareholders expropriation. 
 
Given that Saudi Arabia has a widespread presence of controlling blockholders 
and an absence of strong external governance framework, dividend payments 
are in the best interest of minority shareholders. Instead of expropriating firm 
resources, minority shareholders are better off when blockholders distribute 
dividends to shareholders in the context of Saudi Arabia. Whether dividends 
affect the free cash flow available for expropriation or signal the treatment of 
firm resources and its shareholders, higher dividends are beneficial to minority 
shareholders, while lower dividends are harmful to minority shareholders.  
 
The next section will review the extant literature on the theoretical 
predictions and empirical evidence on the ownership structure and dividend 
policy relationship, as well as develop the hypotheses of the study for the 





4.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The determinants of dividends has attracted vast attention from researchers 
over the past four decades with an aim to solve the so called ‘dividend puzzle’ 
(Baker et al., 2002; Miller & Modigliani, 1961; Frankfurter & Wood, 2002; Denis 
& Osobov, 2008). While conventional studies on the determinants of dividends 
barely consider the governance role of dividend in their analyses, few studies do 
incorporate a wider view of corporate governance in explaining dividend policy 
(Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010; Pindado et al., 2012; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; 
Jensen et al., 1992).  
 
The finance literature has extensively examined the determinants of dividend 
payouts (Denis & Osobov, 2008), and it is well documented that dividends are 
considered as a governance mechanism that is influenced by the governance 
structure of the firm, especially its ownership structure (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 
2010; Pindado et al., 2012; La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000). Early 
literature examining the relationship between ownership structure and 
dividends has mainly focused on two types of ownership, namely managerial and 
institutional, and was carried out in the US and UK (Crutchley & Hansen, 1989; 
Jensen et al., 1992; Short et al., 2002; Rozeff, 1982).  
 
Imbedded in the classical agency problem between management and 
shareholders, due to the dispersed ownership context of the US, Jensen (1986) 
Rozef (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) all developed models that reflected the 
relationship between ownership structure and dividends. In these models 




ownership negatively impacts dividends, while outside blockholders overcome 
managerial entrenchment. Similarly, studies conducted on the UK examined 
ownership by institutional blockholders on dividend policy, and found that large 
institutional ownership increase dividend payouts (Short et al., 2002; Khan, 
2006). 
 
Several later studies extended beyond the US and UK into more developing 
countries, namely Egypt, Malaysia and Jordan, however they only focused on 
insider and institutional ownership as well (Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Benjamin et 
al., 2015; Al-Gharaibeh, 2013). While managerial and institutional owners are 
important types of blockholders, they are not the most common outside of the US 
and UK, where family ownership prevails, followed by government ownership 
(La Porta et al., 1999). 
 
Recent studies, albeit limited, incorporated new ownership types in analyzing 
the ownership and dividend relationship, such as family and government 
ownership, as these owner types hold large blocks in most countries around the 
world. While these studies offered insights on the governance role of dividends 
under the presence of a blockholder in contexts such as Europe (Djebali & 
Belanès, 2015; Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006; Pindado et al., 2012), South America 
(Gonzalez et al., 2014), and East Asia (Chen et al., 2005; Bradford et al., 2013), no 
studies have thoroughly examined the dividend and blockholder relationship in 






Merely two studies examined the determinants of dividend policy in Saudi 
Arabia (Osman & Mohammed, 2010; Al-Ajmi & Hussain, 2011). Al-Ajmi and 
Hussain (2011) measured the influence of government and blockholder 
ownership on dividend payments as part of their model, and found no 
relationship between blockholders and dividends, while Osman and Mohammed 
(2010) only considered government ownership and found that it positively 
influences dividends.  
 
However, both studies only used a dummy variable for blockholder presence, 
which eliminates the relative power of the degree of ownership concentration 
the blockholder possesses, and its corresponding effect on dividend decisions. 
Moreover, they failed to incorporate several important governance mechanisms, 
such as the presence of multiple blockholders and the independence of the board 
of directors, into their model in order to fully analyze the governance role that 
dividends play in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Additionally, these studies fail to differentiate between different blockholder 
types; rather they used a combined blockholder measure that treats different 
owners as a homogenous group. However, different types of blockholders; such 
as families or corporations, are expected to have different set of skills, 
capabilities, motivations and investment horizons that makes their influence on 
dividend policy distinct from one another. This study will focus on the main 





In Saudi Arabia the presence of family, corporate and government ownership 
is widely noted, where more than 80% of listed companies have at least a single 
blockholder (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012). However, there is no presence of 
institutional blockholders in Saudi Arabia, while foreign investors are forbidden 
from investing in the stock market, as of 2015 (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012; Di 
Benedetta & Berg, 2009). Furthermore, a unique ownership type in Saudi Arabia 
is royal family blockholders. Members of the royal family in Saudi Arabia are 
clearly identifiable due to their unique surname, and generally enjoy political 
and relational advantages to other citizens of the country (IISS, 2000). 
 
Multiple large shareholders are assumed to have a role in the governance of 
corporations (Attig et al., 2009). Boubaker, Cellier, & Rouatbi (2014) argue that 
multiple large shareholders protect minority shareholders from the 
expropriation by blockholders. In Saudi Arabia, the presence of multiple 
blockholders, of different types in the same company, is very common 
(Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012). Thus, this study will consider the dividend 
policy of firms under family, royal family, government, corporate, managerial 
and multiple blockholder control, in order to reflect the minority shareholders’ 
treatment and expropriation concerns under different ownership structures. 
 
Table 4.1 presents an overview of previous studies on the ownership and 
dividend relationship around the world, as well as the determinants of dividends 
in Saudi Arabia. In the following sections, relevant literature and theoretical 
arguments will be reviewed for each blockholder type, in order to develop the 




Table 4.1 Empirical Studies on Dividends and Ownership Structure 






Dependent Variable(s) Independent Variables Significant Results 
Abdelsalam 
et al. (2008) 
Egypt Logit and OLS 
- Dividend Decision 
 
- Dividend Ratio 
 
- Managerial Ownership % 
 
- Blockholder Ownership % 
 
- Institutional Ownership % 
 
- Free Float % 
 
- Positive relationship between institutional 
blockholders and dividend decision and 
dividend ratio 
 
- Positive relationship between ROE and dividend 














- Dividend Adjustment 
 
- Dividend Decision 
 
- Dividend Per Share 
 
- Previous Dividend 
 
- Profitability (EPS) 
 
- Cash Flow (Cash Flow per 
Share) 
 
- Firm Size (log of assets) 
 
- Leverage (debt to assets) 
 
- Blockholder Dummy (at 10%) 
 
- Government Ownership 
Dummy (at 10%) 
 
- Life Cycle (retained earnings 
to common equity) 
 
- Positive significant relationship between lagged 
dividend, EPS, CFPS, life cycle and dividend 
decision and ratio 
 
- Positive relationship between firm size and 
dividend decision 
 





- Tangibility (Non current 














- Dividend Yield 
 
- Dividend to Assets 
 
- Dividend Decision 
- Profitability (ROA) 
 
- Firm Size (log of sales) 
 
- Leverage (debt to assets) 
 
- Agency Costs (log of number 
of shareholders) 
 
- Business Risk (std dev. of ROI) 
 
- Government Ownership 
Dummy (at 10%) 
 
- Maturity (firm age) 
 
- Tangible Assets (non current 
assets to total assets) 
 
- Growth Opportunity (market-
to-book ratio) 
 
- Positive relationship between Profitability, Size, 
Government Ownership and Maturity with both 
Dividends Payout and Dividend Decision for 
non-financial firms 
 
- Negative relationship between Leverage and  
Business Risk with both Dividend Payout and 
Dividend Decision for non-financial firms 
 
- Positive relationship between Profitability and 
Size with both Dividend Payout and Dividend 
Decision for financial firms 
 
- Negative relationship between Business Risk 
and both Dividend Payout and Dividend 




- Dividend Payout 
Ratio 
 
- Government Ownership % 
 
- Free Cash Flow 
 




- Positive relationship between Government 
Ownership, Size, and Profitability with Dividend 
Payout 
 





- Growth (growth rate of sales) 
 
- Leverage (debt/equity) 
 
- Business Risk (stock price 
Beta) 
 













- Dividend Payout 
Ratio 
- Institutional Ownership (% 
from 5%) 
 
- Managerial Ownership 
Dummy (for ownership above 
the sample mean) 
- Positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and dividend payout 
 
- Negative relationship between managerial 

















firms only)  
- Dividend Decision 
 
- Dividend to Net 
Income 
 
- Dividend to Net Sales 
 
- Insider Largest Blockholder 
Dummy 
 
- Institutional Largest 
Blockholder Dummy 
 
- Government Largest 
Blockholder Dummy 
 
- Ownership Concentration of 
the Largest Blockholder 
 




- U shaped relationship between Ownership 
Concentration and both Dividend Decision and 
Dividend Ratio 
 
- Negative relationship between Insider 
Blockholders and both Dividend Decision and 
Dividend Ratio 
 
- Positive relationship between Institutional 
Blockholders and Dividend Decision 
 
- Negative relationship between Institutional 













- Dividend to Assets 
 
- Net Income 
 
- Positive relationship between family firms and 
dividends 
 
- Positive relationship with no separation in 
voting and cash flow rights of family firms and 
dividends 
 
- Positive relationship between the presence of a 
non-family second blockholder and dividends  
 









- Change in Dividends 
(total amount of 
dividends paid by the 
firm – last year 
dividend) 
 
- Institutional Blockholder 
Dummy (from 5%) 
 
 
- Managerial Blockholder 
Dummy (from 5%)  
 
- Positive relationship between Institutional 
Blockholder and Dividends 
 
- Negative relationship between Managerial 
Blockholders and Dividends 
Khan 
(2006) 
UK OLS and GMM - Gross Dividends 
 
- Top 5 Ownership (total 
ownership by the largest 5 
blockholders) 
 
- Top 5 Ownership Squared 
(Top 5 X Top 5) 
 
- Insurance Blockholders % 
(from 5%) 
 




- Negative decreasing relationship between Top 5 
Ownership and Dividend (inverse u shape but 
very low inflection point)  
 
- Positive relationship between Insurance 
Blockholders and Dividend 
 
- Negative relationship between Individual 













- Dividend Payout 
Ratio 
 
- Dividend Yield 
 
- Voting Rights of Largest 
Shareholder 
 
- Voting Rights of all 
Blockholders (from 2%) 
 
- Multiple Blockholders Dummy 
(from 5%) 
 





- Negative relationship between the voting rights 
of the largest shareholder and dividend payout 
and yield 
 
- No significant relationship for all other variables 
(thus multiple blockholders do not monitor the 





France OLS - Dividend Per Share 
 
- Ownership Concentration (3 
Largest Blockholders %) 
 
- Family Blockholders Dummy 
 
- Institutional Blockholder 
Dummy 
 
- Multiple Blockholders Dummy 
(from 10%) 
 
- Board Independence 
 
 
- Positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and dividend payout 
 
- Negative relationship between family 
blockholders and dividend payout 
 
- Positive relationship between institutional 
blockholders and dividend payout 
 
- Negative relationship between multiple 
blockholders and dividend payout 
 
- Positive relationship between board 
















- Dividend Ratio 
 
- Dividend Decision 
 
- Family CEO Dummy 
 
- Family Blockholder Dummy 
(when largest blockholder is a 
 
- Negative relationship between family ownership 
and dividend ratio and decision 
 









- Pyramidal Family Control 
Dummy 
 
- Majority Family Board 
Dummy 
control and dividend ratio 
 
- Positive relationship between majority family 




- Dividend Yield 
 
- Dividend Payout 
Ratio 
 
- Government Ownership 
Dummy 
 
- Control Chain (number of 
levels) 
 
- Positive relationship between government 
blockholders and dividend yield and payout 
 
- Negative relationship between control chains 
and dividend yield 
Chen et al. 
(2005) 
Hong Kong Fixed Effects 
- Dividend Payout 
Ratio 
 
- Dividend Yield 
 
- Family Ownership - 
thresholds of 
- 10%,  
- 10% - 35% 
- 35% - 100% 
 
- No relationship between Family ownership and 




- Dividend Per Share 
 
- Dividend Payout 
Ratio 
- Government Ownership % (of 
8 different government 
agencies 
- No relationship between Government 
Ownership and Dividend Per Share 
 
- Partly positive relationship between 







4.3.1 Family Blockholders 
The most common type of concentrated ownership around the world are 
Family blockholders (Singal & Singal, 2011; La Porta et al., 1999). Family control 
represents a distinctive type of ownership. Generally, family blockholders hold 
non-diversified portfolios, tend to be long-term oriented, and often hold senior 
managerial positions, thus placing them in a unique position to monitor and 
influence the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
 
Furthermore, several studies have documented that family controlled firms 
outperform their non-family counterpart (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; van Essen, 
Carney, Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2014; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). These findings 
support the argument that family members are well informed and maintain close 
attachment to the firm, resulting in decreased agency problems, and ultimately 
better performance (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
 
Pindado et al. (2012) study the role of dividends as a governance mechanism 
in family firms from nine European countries. They found that family firms paid 
more dividends to alleviate minority shareholder expropriation concerns 
(Pindado et al., 2012). Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) also find that family controlled 
firms in Australia employ higher dividend payouts compared to the non-family 
counterpart. Their findings indicated that family blockholders in Australia do not 
expropriate minority shareholders through dividends, and that family 
blockholders rely on dividends as a governance mechanism above others, such 





However, family blockholders are also expected to cause Principal-Principal 
agency problems. Uncontestable entrenched family owners might pursue non-
value maximizing objectives, such as family political agendas, expropriate firm 
resources to the detriment of minority shareholders, or assign senior positions 
to under qualified family members (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja et al., 
2009). With an aim of expropriating firm resources, at the expense of minority 
shareholders, family blockholders are able to maximize the available resources 
for appropriation by not paying out dividends. 
 
Djebali and Belanès (2015), Gugler (2003) and Gonzalez et al. (2014) studied 
the role of family blockholders on dividend policy in France, Austria and 
Colombia, respectively. In support of the expropriation argument, and P-P 
agency problems, they found that increased ownership by family blockholders 
negatively influence dividends. Therefore minority shareholders bear higher 
risks of expropriation under family controlled firms, in France, Austria and 
Colombia, by receiving lower dividends (Djebali & Belanès, 2015; Gugler, 2003; 
Gonzalez et al., 2014). 
 
Furthermore, family blockholders tend to use control enhancing mechanisms 
in many parts of the world, such as dual class shares and/or pyramidal 
ownership structures (La Porta et al., 1999). Ultimately, family blockholders 
control firm decision making without bearing equal economic losses, through 
higher voting rights and lower cash-flow rights (Bebchuk et al., 2000). In that 
sense, Pindado et al. (2012) and Gonzalez et al. (2014) both find that family 




dividends. Pindado et al. (2012) find that family blockholders that have higher 
disproportionate ownership, through higher voting rights in dual class shares, 
negatively effects dividend payments in Europe. While Gonzalez et al. (2014) find 
that family ownership through pyramidal structures is associated with 
decreased dividends in Colombia.  
 
Saudi Arabia is a country that is characterized by high level of authority and 
strong familial relationships in addition to a weak national governance system 
(Robertson et al., 2013; Ali, 2009; Bjerke & Al-Meer, 1993). In such a context, 
family blockholders are able to expropriate minority shareholders without the 
fear of being held liable, thus causing a principal principal agency problem. In 
order to increase the resources available for appropriation, family blockholders 
are expected to reduce dividend payments in Saudi Arabia. Therefore the first 
hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H1. There is a negative relationship between family ownership and dividends in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.3.2 Royal Family Blockholders 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy state that falls under the rule of 
the Al Saud Family (Long & Maisel, 2010). Having remained in power for over 80 
years, members of the Saudi royal family generally enjoy superior political and 
relational advantages to other citizens of the country, similar to politically 
connected individuals in other countries (Faccio, 2010). Royal family members 
do not represent the government; rather they represent themselves as 





Firms that are politically connected are generally associated with several 
advantages over firms that aren’t, such as ease of access to finance, lower tax 
rates and preferential treatment by the government in the form of lower 
regulatory oversight or financial bailout in times of distress (Bona-Sánchez, 
Pérez-Alemán, & Santana-Martín, 2014; Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; 
Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; Faccio, 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). These 
benefits are unique to politically connected firms, and thus puts them in a better 
position when compared to their non-politically connected counterparts. 
 
Due to their lower risk of punishment, politically connected firms might 
represent higher tendencies to expropriate minority shareholders, (Bona-
Sánchez et al., 2014; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). Researchers have shown that 
minority shareholders in China are less likely to be protected under the presence 
of a politically connected blockholder through less compliance with regulations 
(Berkman et al., 2010), by appointing under qualified board members (Fan et al., 
2007), and even by holding high levels of cash for tunneling rather than being 
invested or paid to shareholders in the form of dividends (Liu et al., 2015). 
 
Furthermore, politically connected firms generally have easier access to 
financing in the form of bank loans or government subsidies (Khwaja & Mian, 
2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008). Khwaja and Mian (2005) find 
that politically connected firms in Pakistan borrow 45% more than non 
politically connected firms, while at the same time, they have 50% higher rate of 
default risk. Likewise, Faccio et al. (2006) analyze the likelihood of government 




significantly receive higher bailout than non politically connected firms. They 
also find that the performance of these politically connected firms is much worse 
at the time of and subsequent to the bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006). 
 
Ultimately, politically connected owners, like royal family blockholders, are 
able to finance dividend payments through debt financing while still being able 
to appropriate firm resources. This enables them to signal their fair treatment to 
minority shareholders and firm resources without curtailing their private 
benefits extraction that causes principal principal agency problems. Accordingly, 
the second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2. There is positive relationship between royal family ownership and dividends in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.3.3 Government Ownership 
The presence of government ownership is fairly common in less developed 
countries, where previously fully government owned organizations that went 
through a privatization process become a public listed company with a majority 
ownership held by the government (Megginson & Netter, 2001; Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000). The government, or the state, normally maintains its ownership 
through various governmental agencies or institutions (Abdullah et al., 2014). 
Being a state that represents the highest level of authority in a country, 
governments normally are in a powerful position to influence the firm’s ability to 




Firms under governmental ownership are regarded as a low default risk by 
financial institutions, thus are able to have easy access to external financing, 
which enables them to easily payout dividends (Gul, 1999; Abdullah et al., 2014).  
 
Several empirical papers find support to this argument, as government 
ownership has been mainly found to positively influence dividend payouts.  
Gugler (2003), Abdullah et al. (2014), Bradford et al. (2013), Al-Kuwari (2009) 
and Osman and Mohammed (2010) have all found that dividends are positively 
related to governmental ownership in Austria, Malaysia, China, the GCC and 
Saudi Arabia, respectively. These results from different settings indicate that 
government ownership normally has the capacity to pay dividends to its 
shareholders. 
 
Still, few studies didn’t find any relationship between governmental 
ownership and dividend policy. Truong and Heaney (2007) and  Al-Ajmi and 
Hussain (2011) both find no relationship between dividend policy and 
government ownership in a multi country sample and Saudi Arabia, respectively. 
Their argument is that government ownership and dividends might serve as 
complimentary governance mechanisms rather than substitutes (Al-Ajmi & 
Hussain, 2011). 
 
The Saudi government normally maintain shares in strategic sectors, such as 
petrochemical and utility companies, thus their primary objective is control 
rather than investment. For example, the Saudi government owns 70% of SABIC 




terms of market capitalization, and 70% of Saudi Telecom (STC), which is the 
largest telephone service provider in the country (Tadawul, 2014).  
 
Moreover, these firms with government ownership tend to be the best 
performers in the Saudi market, as besides them being utility companies or ones 
with no or minimal competition, they actually have little risk of going bankrupt, 
and have generally been the most sought after investments by the public, e.g. 
SABIC and STC (Almajid, 2008). By maintaining control over such sensitive 
organizations, the government doesn’t intend to expropriate its resources and 
not payout dividends.  
 
Saudi Arabia is ranked amongst the 20 highest GDP countries in the world 
(CIA, 2014), and its main income is from oil revenues, therefore, the Saudi 
government is not in a position to expropriate minority shareholders by not 
paying dividends. Moreover, the Saudi government is expected to have easier 
access to financing, therefore, will be able to constantly payout dividends to 
signal their intentions to improve the overall governance of the capital market in 
order to build investor confidence. Consequently, the third hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
H3. There is a positive relationship between government ownership and dividends 






4.3.4 Corporate Ownership 
Corporations invest in other firms in order to cultivate distinctive capabilities 
and technologies through potential synergies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Thus 
their main goal, in general, is not generating short term profits, as opposed to 
institutional ownership, rather is to develop synergies and/or ensure 
uninterrupted supply of resources (Sur et al., 2013).  
 
Corporations have generally nurtured a unique set of knowledge and 
capabilities that enable them to better govern the acquired firm. Ultimately, 
corporate ownership is expected to positively influence the overall governance 
structure of the firm (Desender et al., 2013), which in turn should lead to higher 
dividend payouts.  
 
Furthermore, corporate owners might signal to the general public their 
intention not to expropriate minority shareholders, by the means of tunneling 
firm resources, by paying out dividends (Bradford et al., 2013). As corporate 
owners are better capable of governing the firm, in addition to their intention to 
signal their just treatment to minority shareholders and firm resources, it is 
expected that corporate blockholders positively influence dividend payouts. 
Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
 






4.3.5 Managerial Ownership 
The expected influence of managerial ownership on dividends differs greatly 
from that of other types of external blockholders. On one hand, the main agency 
problem [P-A] is expected to be alleviated through increased managerial 
ownership, which aligns the interests of managers with that of shareholders as 
they become owners themselves [incentive alignment]. On the other hand, at 
higher levels of managerial ownership, where the management power becomes 
uncontestable, managers might be inclined to pursue non value maximization 
policies, such as excessive perks, at the expense of shareholders [entrenchment 
effect] (Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010; Claessens et al., 2002). 
 
The incentive alignment and entrenchment effects of managerial ownership on 
the performance of US firms were first reported by Morck et al. (1988). They 
found that managerial ‘incentive’ alignment is achieved in low levels of 
ownership through improved firm performance, whereas at higher ownership 
levels, ‘entrenchment’ effects occur in the form of poorer performance. Their 
finding of non-linear relationship was further supported by several later studies 
(De Miguel, Pindado, & De La Torre, 2004; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Short & 
Keasey, 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  
 
Similarly, Farinha (2003) argue that managerial ownership will follow an 
incentive and entrenchment effect towards dividend policy. His results show a U 
shaped relationship between the level of managerial ownership and dividend 
payout ratio in the UK. His results show that when managerial ownership falls 




managerial ownership act as substitute governance mechanisms. As managerial 
ownership goes beyond that level, dividend policy becomes an essential 
governance mechanism for shareholders against managerial expropriation 
concerns (Farinha, 2003).  
 
However, these findings reflect the case of a well developed country such as 
the Us and UK, thus it might not be a proper representation of other developing 
contexts, such as China or even Saudi Arabia, where minority shareholders face 
difficulty in protecting their interests (Claessens et al., 2002; Djankov et al., 2008; 
La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000). In such contexts, while low levels of 
managerial ownership might lead to lower dividends due to incentive alignment, 
high ownership levels of entrenched managers will also cause lower dividends 
due to the incontestability of the entrenched manager by minority shareholders 
(Al-Gharaibeh, 2013; Kalcheva & Lins, 2007). 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that managers prefer to retain earnings over 
dividend payments that reduces the free cash flow under their control (Jensen, 
1986). Thus managerial ownership is expected to negatively effect dividend 
policy. Indeed several empirical studies confirm this relationship, as Jensen et al. 
(1992), Short et al. (2002) and Al-Gharaibeh (2013) all find that higher 
managerial ownership results in lower dividend payouts in the contexts of the 
US, UK and Jordan, respectively.  
 
This study argues that whether it is the incentive effect or the entrenchment 




Arabia, the relationship would constantly remain negative. Either through 
substitution effects between dividends and managerial ownership due to 
incentive alignment at low levels of ownership, or though expropriation motives 
of increasing the free cash flow under managerial control by lowering dividends 
that entrenched managers desire. Accordingly, the fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H5. There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and dividends 
in Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.3.6 Multiple Blockholders 
The presence of more than one blockholder in a firm is assumed to serve a 
vital governance role, as the second blockholder is able to limit the largest 
blockholder expropriation efforts (Pindado & Requejo, 2015; Attig et al., 2008). 
Researchers found that the presence of multiple blockholders is associated with 
significant valuation premium (Attig et al., 2008), and higher corporate risk 
taking (Mishra, 2011). 
 
Generally, multiple large shareholders are expected to curb the largest 
blockholder from extracting private benefits of control at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Due to their ability to monitor both the largest 
blockholder and management, multiple blockholders limit minority shareholder 
expropriation concerns (Boubaker et al., 2014).  
 
Similarly, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) find that the presence of a second large 
blockholder increases dividend payout, through alleviating the expropriation 




Furthermore, Pindado et al. (2012) finds that the presence of a non family 
second blockholder increases the dividend payouts of family firms in a sample 
that comprises nine European countries. 
 
However, multiple large shareholders are also able to collude with each other 
and appropriate firm resources at the expense of minority shareholders (Cai et 
al., 2016). In that scenes, the presence of multiple blockholders leads to lower 
levels of dividend payouts, in order to maximize the resources available for 
expropriation. Djebali and Belanès (2015) Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) both 
find support for this argument, as they found that the presence of multiple 
blockholders either negatively influenced dividend payment in France, or didn’t 
influence it in Italy, respectively. 
 
Lastly, the presence of multiple blockholders, of different types in the same 
company, is very common in the Saudi capital market, yet, minority shareholder 
rights are not reasonably protected (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012). In such a 
context, it would be expected that multiple blockholders would collude with each 
other and expropriate firm resources at the expense of minority shareholders 
resulting in a principal principal agency problem. Thus the presence of multiple 
blockholders would lead to lower dividend levels, in order to maximize the 
resources available for appropriation. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
H6. There is a negative relationship between the presence of multiple blockholders 






After analyzing the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on the 
relationship between different types of blockholders and dividend policy in 
order to develop the hypotheses of the study, the next section will present the 
research methodology employed, which will cover the sample selection, variable 
measures and model specification of the study. The empirical investigation will 
help identify the actual role different blockholder types play on dividend policy 






4.4 Research Methodology 
4.4.1 Sample Selection 
The sample of the study comprises all Saudi non-financial public listed 
companies on Tadawul, the Saudi stock exchange, for the six year period from 
2008 to 2013. Tadawul holds 117 traded non-financial listed companies as of 
September 2014 (ZAWYA, 2014). Excluded from the sample are companies that 
the full data set variables were not available. A final sample (N) comprises of 619 
firm year observations. Table 4.2 shows the total final sample size for each year. 
Data on dividend policy and firm level variables are manually collected from 
published annual reports, while ownership data is obtained from Reuters 
Thomson One Banker Database.  
 
Table 4.2 Total Firm Samples per Year 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
N 89 97 102 105 114 112 619 
 
The rationale behind the 2008 start year of the sample is that the disclosure of 
the ‘Board of Directors Report’ in the corporate annual report, which discloses 
the variables required for this study, only became mandatory in 2008 (CMA, 
2010), thus data for previous years was impossible to obtain. Furthermore, 2013 
was the last year of annual reports available when the data was collected for this 
research project. Finally, the exclusion of financial firms is justified by their 
unique business operation and strict legal requirements, as financial companies 





4.4.2 Variable Measures 
4.4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
This study investigates the influence of blockholders on the dividend policy of 
the firm. In that regard, two dividend measures serve as the dependent variable, 
namely dividend decisions (DIVDUM) and dividend to assets (DIVSCL). These 
two measures have been extensively used in the literature, as they reflect both 
the decision to payout dividends as well as the magnitude of dividend payment 
relative to firm size (Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Truong & Heaney, 2007; Al-Ajmi & 
Hussain, 2011; Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Pindado et al., 2012). DIVDUM is a 
binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm decides to pay dividend, and 0 
otherwise. DIVSCL is measured as the total value of cash dividend distributed by 
the firm divided by firms’ total assets. 
 
4.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables represent the ownership structure of the firm. 
Several ownership variables are used in order to investigate how different 
blockholders influence dividend policy. The minimum disclosure level of 
ownership in Saudi Arabia is 5%. Therefore, blockholders of different types will 
be considered based on the 5% threshold7.  
 
The first ownership variable is family ownership (FMLOWN). Family 
ownership represents the percentage ownership of family or individuals from 
                                                        
 
7 Different cutoff points, 5-20%, 20-50%, and >50%, have been examined in 
order to identify the level of ownership required to maintain influence. Which 




total issued capital. Secondly, royal family ownership will be considered 
(RYLOWN). The percentage ownership of the Saudi ruling family members, Al-
Saud, to total issued capital measures RYLOWN.  
 
The third ownership variable measures the percentage of governmental 
ownership (GOVOWN). The government of Saudi Arabia directly holds shares in 
companies through three wholly-government-owned investment funds, namely, 
Public Investment Fund (PIF), Public Pension Agency (PPA) and General 
Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI) (ZAWYA, 2014). There are no private 
pension funds in Saudi Arabia thus citizens do not have other choices for 
retirement schemes. Moreover, only the government has the right to decide on 
the management and operation of these funds, therefore, it is more suitable to 
classify them as state ownership rather than institutional investors (Almajid, 
2008). Due to the lack of competition and government appointment of the 
management team, these governmental agencies differ greatly in terms of their 
investment choices and overall governance from traditional institutional 
investors.  
 
Fourthly, corporate ownership measures the percentage ownership held by a 
corporate entity (CRPOWN). While corporate ownership is common in Saudi 
Arabia, these corporations tend to be non-financial in nature. Although some 
corporations are privately held, which might represent a single family or 
individual investor, no data of ownership of these companies can be obtained. 




registered name is of a family or individual and combined them with family 
owners instead. 
 
The fifth ownership variable is managerial ownership (EXECOWN). 
EXECOWN represents the percentage ownership of the firm executive 
management to total issued capital. Executive management could be the CEO, 
CFO, COO or any member of the senior management team of the firm.  
 
The presence of multiple large shareholders will be the final ownership 
variable (MLS). A binary/dummy variable that measures 1 if more than one 
blockholder is present in a single firm, and 0 otherwise. In the case of multiple 
blockholders from the same family, the study will consider them as a single 
block, rather than multiple blockholders, due to their similar interests and 
kinship relations that forms a familial coalition (Jara-Bertin et al., 2008). In the 
aim of measuring the contestability of other blockholders in preventing the 
controlling blockholders and/or management from expropriating minority 
shareholders, it is more reasonable to differentiate between multiple 
blockholders and clear blockholder coalitions. 
 
4.4.2.3 Control Variables 
This study will control for factors that are expected to be a determinant of 
dividend policy beside the ownership variables presented earlier. Research 






Firstly, as this study aims to investigate the governance role of dividends 
under blockholder control, it is important to control for other significant 
governance variables as well. Out of the various governance variables, the board 
of directors is considered as the most significant governance mechanism (Daily, 
Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Fama, 1980; Adams et al., 2010). The board of directors 
is a primary mechanism for minority shareholders to safeguard their interests 
(Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012). One of the main board characteristics is the 
independent representation of its members (Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The level of board independence reflects the degree of minority 
shareholder representation in central corporate decision making (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja, 2009). Board independence is measured as the total 
number of independent board members divided by the size of the board (INED). 
 
Secondly, firm dividends is generally associated with future profitability 
(Jensen et al., 1992). In that sense, current firm performance reflects its future 
earnings, as well as its growth prospects (Jensen et al., 1992; Abdelsalam et al., 
2008; Gul, 1999; Miller & Rock, 1985). Likewise, in the case of losses, firms are 
unable to payout dividends (Farinha, 2003). Therefore firm performance is a 
main determinant of dividend policy. Firm performance is measured through the 
accounting performance measure of return on assets (ROA). 
 
Thirdly, the literature clearly indicates that corporate leverage influences its 
dividend policy (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Jensen, 1986; Jensen et al., 1992). Debt 
is considered as a governance mechanism that reduces free cash flow available 




payment of debt installments, thus resulting in lower requirement to pay 
dividends, acting as substitute governance mechanisms (Farinha, 2003; Jensen, 
1986). Furthermore, obligatory debt installments will lower the firm’s ability to 
payout dividends (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; McKnight & Weir, 2009). Thus 
leverage is expected to negatively influence dividend payout (Adjaoud & Ben-
Amar, 2010). The leverage level is measured as total debt divided by total assets 
(LEVERG). 
 
Fourthly, firms with high levels of free cash flow face increased agency costs 
and managerial discretion due to the potential of private benefits extraction 
(Jensen, 1986; McKnight & Weir, 2009). Free cash flow might be expropriated by 
either the management and/or controlling blockholders in various ways, such as 
tunneling, investments in negative net present value projects, or excessive 
perquisites (Jensen, 1986; La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000; Wang & Xiao, 
2011). Consequently higher free cash flow should influence dividend policy, as 
minority shareholders would be better off by receiving dividends when the level 
of free cash flow is high (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010). In order to control for 
differences in firm size, free cash flow is measured as the level of cash holding 
divided by total assets (FCF) (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010). 
 
Fifthly, the size of the firm not only reflects the level of firm complexity, it also 
represents a higher propensity for expropriation of resources (Jensen, 1986; 
Farinha, 2003). Furthermore, it is expected that large firms have easier access to 
external financing, and rely less on retained earnings to finance their projects, 




Consequently, it is expected that firm size would influence dividend policy. Firm 
size is measured using the natural logarithm of total assets (FSIZE). Firm sales is 
another measure of firm size used in the literature, however, several listed 
companies in our sample are recent start ups, thus don’t have sales figures, 
therefore using total assets as the measure of size is more sensible.   
 
Finally, the need to finance growth prospects is expected to influence dividend 
policy, as it is much cheaper to retain earnings rather than acquiring external 
financing sources (Jensen et al., 1992). Thus the level of firm maturity reflects its 
growth prospects, and consequently its dividend policy (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 
2010). This study will consider the age of the firm to reflect the level of maturity 
that indicates the growth prospects of the firm. Firm age is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the firm 
(LNAGE). 
 
4.4.3 Model Specification 
Due to the unique nature of the dividend measures, which reflects the main 
dependent variables of the study, special care is required in order to avoid 
potential biases and inconsistent estimates driven by the values of its 
observations. Namely, the first measure of dividend is the decision to payout 
dividend by the firm (DIVDUM), which is constructed as a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm pays out any amount of dividends and 0 otherwise. 
This binary variable is best studied using a binary logistic regression (Logit) that 




Hussainey, 2009; Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Truong & Heaney, 2007). Therefore 
the first model (1), below, represents logit regression. 
 
Moreover, the second measure of dividend is the scaled cash dividend 
payment (DIVSCL), which equals the total amount of dividend paid divided by 
firm total assets. The choice behind using the scaled measure of dividend ratio is 
motivated by several reasons.  
 
Firstly, the value of firm size, in terms of total assets, is much less volatile than 
other measures used in the literature, such as net income. Secondly, net income 
can be easily influenced by the accounting choices the firm follow, and is easily 
managed through different earnings management techniques. Finally, as this 
measure is heavily used in the literature, it enables us to compare our results 
with that of previous findings (López-Iturriaga & Santana-Martín, 2015; Pindado 
et al., 2012; Osman & Mohammed, 2010).  
 
However, this measure suffers from a censoring problem, where firms that do 
not pay dividends have a value of 0, and which they constitute about 34.4% of 
the observations. Therefore using standard regression models might cause the 
results to be inconsistent and biased towards the zero observations (Mancinelli 
& Ozkan, 2006; Truong & Heaney, 2007; Al-Kuwari, 2009). Consequently, 
applying a tobit model that censors the zero observations, left censored, allows 
to adjust for such bias (Tobin, 1958). Consequently, the second model (2), below, 





To test the hypotheses developed that aims to answer the research question of 
the study, the following two models have been implemented: 
  
Pr (DIVDUMi,t = 1) = Logit [α0 + β1FMLOWNi,t + β2RYLOWNi,t + β3GOVOWNi,t + 
β4CRPOWNi,t + β5EXECOWNi,t + β6MLSi,t + β7INEDi,t + β8ROAi,t + β9LEVERGi,t + 
β10FCFi,t  + β11FSIZEi,t + β12LNAGEi,t + ε] 
 
 
DIVSCL*i,t = α0 + β1FMLOWNi,t + β2RYLOWNi,t + β3GOVOWNi,t + β4CRPOWNi,t + 
β5EXECOWNi,t + β6MLSi,t + β7INEDi,t + β8ROAi,t + β9LEVERGi,t + β10FCFi,t  + 








           0                      if   DIVSCL  ≤ 0 
 
α0:  Intercept    
i:  Firm factor    
t:  Year factor    
β:  Regression coefficient 




Table 4.3 presents the operationalization of the variables used in the study. 
The following section provides the results of the econometric models, as well as 
discussing the findings of these results. 
(1) 
(2) 










A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
















The percentage of Family Ownership = Family 




The percentage of Royal Family Ownership = Royal 
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The percentage of Ownership by other Corporate 





The percentage of Managerial Ownership = Executive 









The presence of more than one Blockholder in a single 
Firm 






The percentage of Independent Non-executive 
Directors sitting on the board = Number of 
Independents over Total Number of Board Members 
Firm 
Performance 








Total Debt divided by Total Assets 
 
Free Cash Flow FCF 





















The total amount of Dividend paid by the firm in the 
previous year = Dividend Per Share times Number of 




4.5 Results and Discussion 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.4 provides information on the descriptive statistics of variables 
measured. The results show that roughly 65% of the observations in the sample 
paid dividends. While the average amount of dividend paid relative to firm size, 
in terms of total assets, is about 4.5%, and ranging from 0 to 43%.  
 
The major ownership category is family ownership, where on average they 
hold 17% of the issued equity. Conversely, royal family ownership is the least 
manifested category, with average ownership of about 3%. Both government and 
corporate ownership on average hold about 9% of share capital, while 
managerial ownership is on average only 5%. The presence of multiple 
blockholders is a common theme, where more than one blockholder in a single 
company is found in around two thirds of the sample. 
 
Additionally, the figures in Table 4.4 reflect that the variables are not normally 
distributed across the sample. The skewness of several variables fall beyond 
±1.96, and the kurtosis mostly fall beyond ±2, which reflect the thresholds 
acceptable for normality (Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, utilizing OLS as an 
estimation method for our model is inappropriate, as it will produce biased 
estimates. Consequently, this study will employ binary logistic (Logit) and tobit 






























Variables Min Max Std. Dev. Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis N 
DIVDUM 0 1 0.476 0.656 1 -0.656 1.431 619 
DIVSCL 0 0.43 0.066 0.045 0.03 2.570 10.788 619 
FMLOWN 0 0.725 0.217 0.173 0.0815 1.168 3.033 619 
RYLOWN 0 0.95 0.117 0.028 0 5.828 41.623 619 
GOVOWN 0 0.836 0.177 0.087 0 2.598 9.415 619 
CRPOWN 0 0.75 0.161 0.089 0 1.983 6.254 619 
EXECOWN 0 0.7 0.133 0.049 0 3.476 14.942 619 
MLS 0 1 0.479 0.645 1 -0.604 1.365 619 
INED 0 1 0.179 0.450 0.4 0.803 3.366 619 
ROA -0.672 0.494 0.105 0.069 0.06 -0.938 12.938 619 
LEVERG 0.004 1.527 0.219 0.365 0.3359 0.700 4.136 619 
FCF 0 0.668 0.085 0.062 0.0346 3.473 19.335 619 
FSIZE 17.795 26.550 1.646 21.531 21.3971 0.566 3.389 619 





Table 4.5 presents the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables. The results show that the correlation between the variables 
are comparatively low, mostly below 0.5, except for one observation which still 
lies below 0.7, thus no indication of a multicollinearity problem in the model 
(Gujarati, 2003). The highest correlation found is between firm performance 
(ROA) and both dividend decision (DIVDUM) and dividend payout (DIVSCL), of 
0.474 and 0.689, respectively. This finding confirms the argument that firm 
performance is one of the main drivers of dividend policy (Farinha, 2003), and is 
similar to that reported in the literature (López-Iturriaga & Santana-Martín, 
2015). 
 
Additionally, moderately high correlation is found between family ownership 
(FMLOWN) and executive ownership (EXECOWN) of 0.468, which reflects that 
family owners maintain close control of the company and prefer to incentivize 
the management of their firms by increasing their level of ownership. 
Furthermore, moderately high correlation is also found between firm size 
(FSIZE) and leverage (LEVERG) of 0.431. This confirms the argument that the 
level of firm complexity reflects the easier access to finance due to the larger 
asset base that serves as a collateral for lenders. 
 
Table 4.6 presents the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables, where 
all fall comfortably below the acceptable limit of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004). Thus 
further confirming that a severe multicollinearity problem is not present in our 
sample. The next section will discuss the results of the empirical model as 




Table 4.5 Pearson Correlation Matrix for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Variables DIVDUM DIVSCL FMLOWN RYLOWN GOVOWN CRPOWN EXECOWN MLS INED ROA LEVERG FCF FSIZE AGE 
               DIVDUM 1 
             DIVSCL 0.496 1 
            FMLOWN 0.241 0.043 1 
           RYLOWN 0.029 -0.064 -0.144 1 
          GOVOWN 0.151 0.181 -0.280 -0.057 1 
         CRPOWN -0.161 0.021 -0.293 -0.060 -0.094 1 
        EXECOWN 0.161 0.165 0.468 0.036 -0.143 -0.130 1 
       MLS 0.208 0.148 -0.019 -0.009 0.292 0.309 -0.111 1 
      INED -0.062 -0.028 -0.206 0.014 -0.062 -0.261 -0.164 -0.230 1 
     ROA 0.474 0.689 0.104 -0.138 0.109 0.005 0.216 0.135 -0.064 1 
    LEVERG -0.085 -0.256 0.132 0.047 -0.005 0.208 0.065 0.131 -0.249 -0.268 1 
   FCF 0.025 0.201 -0.053 -0.078 -0.042 0.027 -0.065 -0.037 0.032 0.256 -0.170 1 
  FSIZE 0.129 0.002 -0.134 0.109 0.490 0.303 -0.092 0.376 -0.308 -0.016 0.431 -0.145 1 
 AGE 0.041 0.125 -0.391 -0.093 0.212 -0.242 -0.208 -0.134 0.258 0.026 -0.329 -0.045 -0.119 1 
 
 



















Table 4.7 Logistic Regression of Dividend Decision on Ownership Structure and Control 
Variables 
DIVDUM 





























EXECOWN  -1.920   
  (-0.72)   
MLS 
 
1.170* 1.024 0.629 
  
(1.91) (1.60) (0.96) 
OWNCNCTR   3.448**  
   (2.00)  
OWN5TO20    3.438*** 
    (2.50) 
OWN20TO50    3.822*** 
    (2.76) 
OWNABV50    4.741*** 
    (3.06) 
INED 
 
2.392 2.889* 2.687* 
  
(1.59) (1.89) (1.71) 
ROA 
 
16.071*** 14.835*** 16.530*** 
  
(4.46) (4.08) (4.39) 
LEVERG 
 
-2.147 -2.040 -1.182 
  
(-1.38) (-1.29) (-0.68) 
FCF 
 
-0.757 -0.827 -0.636 
  
(-0.31) (-0.33) (-0.25) 
FSIZE 
 
1.178*** 1.115*** 1.042*** 
  
(3.21) (3.08) (3.00) 
AGE 
 
1.151** 0.956** 1.037** 
  
(2.39) (1.97) (2.12) 
Constant 
 
-30.424*** -28.477*** -28.886*** 
  (-3.81) (-3.66) (-3.73) 




1. ***, ** and * denote p-value significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  


























































EXECOWN 0.026   0.012 0.053** 
 
 (0.85)   (0.57) (2.12) 
 
MLS 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 
 
(0.43) (0.18) (-0.35) (-0.60) (-0.62) 
 
OWNCNCTR  0.094***    
 
  (4.44)    
 
OWN5TO20   0.058***   
 
   (3.63)   
 
OWN20TO50   0.073***   
 
   (4.40)   
 
OWNABV50   0.096***   
 
   (5.42)   
 
LAGDIV    0.015***  
 
    (11.54)  
 
INED 0.035* 0.034* 0.025 0.019 0.023* 
 
 
(1.82) (1.77) (1.37) (1.56) (1.74) 
 
ROA 0.435*** 0.434*** 0.460*** 0.134*** 0.173*** 
 
 
(9.26) (9.30) (9.72) (6.64) (8.34) 
 
LEVERG -0.050** -0.450** -0.044** -0.018 -0.023* 
 
 
(-2.44) (-2.27) (-2.19) (-1.51) (-1.71) 
 
FCF 0.022 0.015 0.023 0.042** 0.029 
 
 
(0.67) (0.49) (0.72) (2.01) (1.23) 
 
FSIZE 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.007*** -0.006** 
 
 
(0.80) (0.45) (0.67) (-2.66) (-2.06) 
 
AGE 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.012*** 
 
 
(2.84) (2.73) (2.94) (1.40) (3.01) 
 
Constant -0.192** -0.150* -1.970** 0.098* 0.078 
 
 (-2.01) (-1.74) (-2.37) (1.85) (1.19) 
 
R-sq    0.720 0.553 
 
N 619 619 619 619 619 
 
Left Censored 220 220 220   
 
Uncensored 399 399 399   
 
Notes:    1. ***, ** and * denote p-value significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 





4.5.2 Discussion of Results 
Table 4.7 reports the panel data logistic regression (Logit) of dividend decision 
(DIVDUM) on ownership structure and control variables, while Table 4.8 reports 
the panel data tobit regression (Tobit) of scaled dividend payout (DIVSCL) on 
ownership structure and control variables. Model 1, which is the primary model 
of the study, reports the independent variables of ownership, for the different 
types of blockholders, along with the firm specific control variables on dividend 
decision. While models 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide additional tests on dividend payout, 
which will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
  
The results show that family blockholders (FMLOWN) are positively and 
significantly related to both dividend decision (DIVDUM) and dividend payout 
(DIVSCL) at the 1% level. This result is opposite to the first hypotheses (H1), 
which expects family blockholders to negatively influence dividends in order to 
maximize their private benefits of control, thus the hypothesis is rejected. These 
results provide evidence that family blockholders in Saudi Arabia do not intend 
to expropriate minority shareholders by increasing the free cash flow available 
for appropriation. It is important for family blockholders to provide such 
positive dividend strategy in order to sustain their legitimacy for minority 
investors; after all family blockholders are the most type of blockholders present 






On the one hand, under the agency theory explanation, family blockholders 
might view dividend payment as a viable governance mechanism that disciplines 
the management. As family investors tend to be under diversified, it is important 
for them to protect their invested wealth from managerial expropriation. In that 
sense, dividends act as a governance mechanism that limits the level of free cash 
flow under managerial disposal (Jensen, 1986), and/or increases the level of 
monitoring by the external capital market (Easterbrook, 1984). This rationale is 
supported by the results of Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), who report that family 
ownership positively influenced dividends in Australia. They report that family 
blockholders where found to prefer dividend payments over other governance 
mechanisms, such as board independence, as a managerial disciplining device in 
the Australian context (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). 
 
On the other hand, under the stakeholder and signaling theories, family 
blockholders might signal to minority shareholders and other stakeholders their 
intention of not expropriating firm resources by obtaining private benefits of 
control. By signaling such good commitments, family blockholders aim at gaining 
investors trust in acquiring firm shares (Setia-Atmaja, 2009). This rationale is 
supported by the findings of Pindado et al. (2012), who report that family 
ownership positively influenced dividends in nine European countries. Their 
results show that family blockholders pay higher dividends in order to alleviate 
minority shareholder expropriation concerns (Pindado et al., 2012). Therefore, 
under the agency, stakeholder and signaling explanations, the results of 
increased dividends show that family blockholders tend not to create 





These results might reflect the role that Islamic teachings play in shaping the 
behavior of family blockholders within the Saudi capital market, where fair 
treatment and just dealing represent core Islamic values (Muneeza & Hassan, 
2014; Lewis, 2005; Rizk, 2008a). As a result, family blockholders positively 
influence the governance of Saudi public listed companies by reducing the free 
cash flow available for insider appropriation, therefore acting in the best interest 
of the various stakeholders. 
 
Moreover, royal family blockholders (RYLOWN) are found to be insignificantly 
related to dividend decision (DIVDUM), but positively and significantly related to 
dividend payout (DIVSCL) at the 10% level. This finding partly supports the 
second hypothesis (H2), which expects that royal family blockholders would 
positively influence dividend policy with their easier access to financing, while 
still being able to appropriate firm resources if desired.  
 
This result shows that royal family blockholders do not influence the decision 
to pay dividend, however, when the firm decides to payout dividends, royal 
family blockholders push these dividends higher. These results must be 
interpreted with caution. While royal family blockholders are able to expropriate 
minority shareholders and still payout higher dividends, however, this might not 
be the case as royal family blockholders might actually aim at improving the 
governance of the firm and signal these intentions to the general public by 





Furthermore, the result of no significant relationship between dividend 
decision and royal family blockholders might reflect that royal family 
blockholders do not care about dividend decisions, as they are able to extract 
private benefits of control in all circumstances. However, this result might also 
suggest that royal family blockholders do not pressure firms to payout dividends. 
As royal family blockholders in Saudi Arabia normally own large blocks, as well 
as holding the chairman of the board position, they might leave the decision, of 
whether to pay dividends or retain earnings for operational and growth 
expenses, to be decided by the executive team and the board. 
 
Similarly, government ownership (GOVOWN) shows an insignificant 
relationship with dividend decision (DIVDUM), but positive and significant 
relationship with dividend payout (DIVSCL) at the 5% level. This finding partly 
supports the third hypothesis (H3), which expects that government ownership 
would lead to higher dividends, due to the easier access to financing, thus the 
hypothesis is accepted. This result shows that government ownership does not 
affect whether to pay dividends or not, however, when the firm decides to 
payout dividends, firms that have the government as a blockholder tend to 
distribute higher dividends.  
 
The finding that government ownership positively influences dividend ratio 
corroborates that of most previous studies which found that dividends are 
positively related to governmental ownership in different contexts such as 
Austria (Gugler, 2003), China (Bradford et al., 2013), Malaysia (Abdullah et al., 




(Osman & Mohammed, 2010) mainly due to the easier access to financing and 
lower default risk government owned firms enjoy.  
 
Another explanation of the positive influence of government ownership on the 
dividend payout might be the intention of the Saudi government to act as a 
example of good practice and assist in the improvement of the market’s 
corporate governance (Bukhari, 2014). Whether the Saudi government’s positive 
influence on dividend payouts is motivated by the agency theory of free cash 
flow that governs the management, or to signal to the market its treatment of 
firm resources, it is generally in the best interest of minority shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, the non-significant relationship between government ownership 
and dividend decision might indicate that government ownership and dividends 
act as complimentary governance mechanisms. Thus government blockholders 
do not demand dividend distribution, rather they use dividends as a 
complimentary governance mechanism to their potent monitoring capabilities. 
This finding supports that of Truong and Heaney (2007) and Al-Ajmi and 
Hussain (2011), who both find no relationship between dividend policy and 
government ownership in a multi country sample and Saudi Arabia, respectively, 
which reflects the complementarity between these two mechanisms. 
 
Likewise, corporate ownership (CRPOWN) is also found to be insignificantly 
related to dividend decision (DIVDUM), but positively and significantly related to 
dividend payout (DIVSCL) at the 5% level. This finding partly supports the fourth 




dividends, due to their capability to better govern the firm, thus the hypothesis is 
accepted. This result shows that corporate ownership does not influence the 
decision to pay dividend, however, when the firm decides to payout dividends, 
corporate blockholders tend to increase the level of dividends paid, relative to 
firm size. 
 
The results show that corporate owners in Saudi Arabia tend to signal to 
minority shareholders and other stakeholders their intention not to expropriate 
firm resources, which can be easily achieved through inter-corporate tunneling 
(Bradford et al., 2013), by increasing the amount of dividends paid. Moreover, 
the non-significant relationship between corporate ownership and dividend 
decision could imply that corporate ownership and dividends act as 
complimentary governance mechanisms. As corporate owners are better capable 
of governing the firm, through their developed knowledge and expertise, they 
are well suited to act as a complimentary governance mechanism to dividend 
decision. 
 
Additionally, managerial ownership (EXECOWN) is found to be insignificantly 
related to both dividend decision (DIVDUM) and dividend payout (DIVSCL). 
Therefore, the fifth hypothesis (H5), which expects a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and dividends, which reflects both the incentive 
and entrenchment effects, is rejected. The finding of no significant relationship 
can be viewed as both dividend payments and managerial ownership act as 




under the incentive alignment hypothesis or the expropriation motivations 
under entrenched levels of ownership. 
 
However, this result could also indicate that managers in the Saudi context do 
not enjoy comparable power, in terms of decision making, to that of outside 
blockholders. As all other types of external blockholders, namely: family, royal 
family, government and corporate blockholders, from the preceding discussion 
where found to influence dividend policy, in one way or another. Accordingly, 
managers in Saudi Arabia might be encouraged by external blockholders through 
means of increasing their level of ownership, in order to align their interests with 
that of shareholders, without giving them full control over key decision making. 
This also supports the notion that the agency problem in countries with 
concentrated ownership, such as Saudi Arabia, is the one between controlling 
and minority shareholders [P-P], rather than the one between management and 
shareholders [P-A] (Young et al., 2008). Previous studies by Abdelsalam et al. 
(2008) and Truong and Heaney (2007) reported similar results, where 
managerial ownership did not influence dividend policy. 
 
Furthermore, the presence of multiple blockholders (MLS) is found to be 
positively and significantly related to dividend decision (DIVDUM) at the 10% 
level, but insignificantly related to dividend payout (DIVSCL). This finding is 
opposite to the last hypothesis (H6), which assumes that multiple blockholders 
would collude to expropriate minority shareholders by reducing dividend 
payments, in order to maximize the resources available for appropriation, thus 





The results indicate that multiple blockholders in Saudi Arabia act in the best 
interest of the various stakeholders, including minority shareholders, by means 
of minimizing the free cash flow available for expropriation, in the form of higher 
decisions to payout dividends. Due to their ability to monitor both the largest 
blockholder and management, multiple blockholders limit minority shareholder 
expropriation concerns (Boubaker et al., 2014). Similar results have been 
reported in the literature, such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), who finds that the 
presence of a second large blockholder increases dividend payout in Germany. 
Their result of increased dividends is achieved through direct monitoring by the 
second largest blockholders, which in turn alleviates the expropriation capacity 
of the largest blockholder (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003).  
 
Likewise, Pindado et al. (2012) finds that the presence of a non family second 
blockholder increases the dividend payouts of family firms in a sample from 
Europe. These results reveal that the non family second blockholders are able to 
minimize the appropriation ability of the controlling family blockholder, and 
thus protects minority shareholders from being expropriated (Pindado et al., 
2012). 
 
Moreover, the non-significant relationship between the presence of multiple 
blockholders and dividend payout rate could be explained by two competing 
arguments. On the one hand, the non-significant relationship could imply that 
both multiple blockholders and dividends act as complimentary governance 




other hand, the non-significant relationship could also reflect that multiple 
blockholders in Saudi Arabia are not able to contest the demands of the 
controlling shareholders, such as influencing the governance of the firm through 
the payment of higher dividends, and thus multiple blockholders become an 
ineffective governance mechanism. Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) reported 
similar findings, where multiple blockholders had no influence on the dividend 
policy in Italy. 
 
Several control variables show significant relationship with dividend policy. 
Firstly, the level of board independence (INED) is found to be positively and 
significantly related to dividend payout (DIVSCL) at the 10% level. This reflects 
that better governed firms, in terms of minority shareholder representation 
through independent directors, payout higher dividends. Therefore, minority 
shareholder interests are further protected when the overall governance of the 
firm is stronger.  
 
Secondly, firm performance (ROA) is found to be positively and significantly 
related to both dividend decision (DIVDUM) and dividend payout (DIVSCL) at the 
1% level. This strong positive relationship confirms that firm profitability, which 
signals future prospects by reflecting the state of firm performance, is a key 
determinant of dividend policy. More profitable firms are also able to raise the 
funds required to distribute dividends.  
 
Thirdly, firm leverage (LEVERG) is found to be negatively and significantly 




argument that debt reduces the free cash flow and acts as a substitute 
governance mechanism to dividends. Leverage obliges the firm to repay 
continuous debt installments, which in turn protects minority shareholder 
interests by reducing the free cash flow available for appropriation, as well as 
placing the firm under scrutiny by the creditor.  
 
Fourthly, firm size (FSIZE) shows significant relationship at the 1% level with 
dividend decision (DIVDUM), where the relationship is positive. Thus confirming 
that larger firms enjoy easier access to finance, due to their higher asset base 
that serves as collateral, which enables them to pay dividends more often. While 
larger firms provide higher propensity to appropriate firm resources, the results 
reveal that in Saudi Arabia, minority shareholders are not being expropriated in 
large firms.  
 
Finally, in support to the growth prospects argument, firm age (AGE) is found 
to be positively and significantly related to both dividend decision (DIVDUM) 
and dividend payout (DIVSCL) at the 1% level. As firms mature overtime, their 
financing requirements for growth declines. These financing requirements in 
young firms are best financed through retained earnings rather than being paid 
out in the form of dividends. Thus older, more mature firms have higher levels of 
earnings that can be easily paid out as dividends. These results imply that 
minority shareholders’ interests are protected in the Saudi context, where firms 
with low growth prospects distribute higher and more frequent dividends rather 
than appropriating firm profit, in the form of excessive perquisite or tunneling, 
for example. 
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4.5.3 Robustness Checks 
 
In order to further examine the robustness of the results, several models have 
been employed. Models 2 and 3 in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 examine the role of 
ownership concentration on dividend decision (DIVDUM) and dividend payout 
(DIVSCL), respectively, regardless of the type of blockholder. Models 2 measure 
the entire combined ownership concentration of over 5% (OWNCNCTR) as the 
independent variable. Model 3 divides the level of concentration into three 
groups; comprising a dummy variable that equals 1 if the total ownership 
concentration in a firm falls under each threshold of 5% to 20% (OWN5TO20), 
20% to 50% (OWN20TO50) and over 50% (OWNABV50), and 0 otherwise. The 
motivation behind this measurement is to examine whether blockholders of 
different levels of ownership influence dividend policy differently or not. 
Different results for different levels of ownership could signal the incentive and 
entrenchment effects previously documented in the literature (De Miguel et al., 
2004; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). 
 
The results of Models 2 demonstrate that ownership concentration 
(OWNCNCTR) is positively and significantly associated with dividend decision 
(DIVDUM) and dividend payout (DIVSCL) at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
This result further supports the previous findings, where all blockholder types in 
Saudi Arabia with a significant relationship to dividend policy are found to be 
positive; namely family, royal family, government and corporate blockholders. 
Therefore, blockholders in the Saudi context, of any type, do not tend to 
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expropriate minority shareholders; rather they positively influence dividend 
policy instead of using internal funds to extract private benefits of control.  
 
Additionally, Model 3 reveals that the blockholders’ positive influence on 
dividend policy is similar at the three different concentration thresholds. All the 
three thresholds are found to be positively and significantly related to both 
dividend decision (DIVDUM) and dividend payout (DIVSCL) at the 1% level. 
Therefore, no matter what level of ownership the blockholder retains, above 5%, 
the influence on the dividend policy of Saudi firms is similar. Hence, blockholders 
of any level in the Saudi market tend to possess equal power to influence 
decisions on the dividend policy, and ultimately, the overall governance of the 
firm. This could reflect the signaling by these blockholders towards their good 
treatment of minority shareholder through higher dividend payout policies. 
 
Models 4 and 5 in table 4.7 utilize a different estimation technique, namely 
generalized least squares regression (GLS), where model 4 includes lagged 
dividend as a control variable (LAGDIV). Lagged dividend is considered a key 
determinant of future dividend policy, as prior research show that firms aim to 
maintain stable dividend payments (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010; Lintner, 1956). 
Thus, it is important to investigate whether the results change with the inclusion 
of lagged dividend. Still, the results of the GLS regression in Models 4 and 5 
report similar results, in terms of direction and significance, between the 
dividend payout (DIVSCL) and the independent and control variables, to that 
reported in the Tobit model.  
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Yet, three additional remarks can be extracted from these results. Firstly, the 
lagged dividend measure (LAGDIV) showed positive and significant relationship 
with the dividend ratio (DIVSCL) at the 1% level. This confirms the notion that 
firms tend to maintain sticky dividend policies, however, the inclusion of this 
measure did not affect the results of the study. 
 
Secondly, in Model 5, managerial ownership (EXECOWN) is, for the fist time, 
found to be significantly related to dividend ratio (DIVSCL) at the 5% level. 
Therefore, managerial blockholders in Saudi Arabia payout higher dividends in 
the best interest of minority shareholders, instead of utilizing these funds for 
private benefit extraction. This result further supports the previous findings of 
the different blockholder types in the Saudi market, which all did not aspire to 
expropriate minority shareholders. 
 
Thirdly, in both Models 4 and 5, firm size (FSIZE) show negative and 
significant relationship with dividend ratio (DIVSCL) at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. While this result is opposite of that found in the firm size (FSIZE) 
and dividend decision (DIVDUM) relationship, it is not surprisingly so due to the 
nature of these variables. Our main dividend ratio variable (DIVSCL) is a scaled 
measure of dividend payout in terms of firm total assets. And the firm size 
measure (FSIZE) is measured as the natural log of total assets. Therefore, the 
larger the firm size in terms of total assets, realistically, the smaller the amount 
of scaled dividend payment would turn out to be. Therefore, it is not surprising 
to find that firm size is negatively related to dividend ration in our study. 
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Corporate governance research has recently illustrated the problem of 
endogeneity concerning dividend policy and ownership structure variables 
(Benjamin et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2005; Gippel et al., 2015; Wellalage & Locke, 
2015). While there are several tools that try to limit the endogeneity problem, 
there is no solution that can eliminate it completely (Gippel et al., 2015). Out of 
the various methods used in the literature, regressions that utilize a generalised 
method of moments [GMM] are largely recommended (Lee et al., 2015; Keasey et 
al., 2015; Pindado et al., 2012).  
 
GMM is a viable solution to the endogeneity problem, however, as GMM relies 
on lagged values, and as the main independent variables of this study, which are 
ownership structure, tend to be stable over time, GMM becomes unsuitable for 
such type of data (Andres, 2011; Goergen & Renneboog, 2001). Additionally, our 
main dependent variables, which are dividend ratio (DIVSCL) and dividend 
decision (DIVDUM), are either a censored or binary variables, in which a 
censoring problem that leads to biased estimates towards the zeros might occur. 
Thus using Tobit and Logit as the main models of the study, respectively, will 
prevent such censoring problem (Bradford et al., 2013; Barclay et al., 2009; Al-
Najjar & Kilincarslan, 2016). 
 
The following section provides the concluding remarks of this chapter, which 




This chapter investigated the role of blockholders on the dividend policy of 
Saudi public listed companies. The level of dividend payout under different types 
of blockholders reflects the degree of minority shareholder’s concerns regarding 
the expropriation of firm resources by controlling blockholders. Lower dividend 
payments indicate higher propensity for private benefit extraction by 
blockholders due to the increased free cash flow available for appropriation.  
 
A Logit and Tobit models were used to test the relationship between different 
blockholder types and both dividend decisions (DIVDUM) and dividend ratio 
(DIVSCL), respectively, for 117 non-financial listed companies in Saudi Arabia 
from 2008-2013. After controlling for conventional determinants of dividends, 
the results of 619 firm year observations show that minority shareholder 
interests are mostly protected under control by all types of blockholders in the 
context of Saudi Arabia.  
 
The findings of the study reveal that blockholders do not reduce dividends in 
order to maximize the resources available for private benefit extraction in Saudi 
Arabia. Rather, as Table 4.9 shows, most blockholders positively influence 
dividend policy, namely family, royal family, government, corporate and multiple 
blockholders, either to signal their fair treatment to minority shareholders, or to 
utilize dividends as a governance mechanism that reduces the free cash flow 


















Family - - + + 
Royal Family + + no + 
Government + + no + 
Corporate + + no + 
Managerial - - no no 
MLS - - + no 
 
 
These results might reflect the role that Islamic teachings play in shaping the 
behavior of blockholders within the Saudi capital market, where fair treatment 
and just dealing represent core Islamic values (Muneeza & Hassan, 2014; Lewis, 
2005). The Islamic ethical system promotes the protection of the rights of the 
various stakeholders and urges humans to act as stewards entrusted in achieving 
continuity and societal welfare (Ali et al., 2017; Rizk, 2014; Bedoui & Mansour, 
2015). The strong influence of the Islamic religion on Saudi Arabia is far 
reaching, and might well demonstrate the favorable conduct of blockholders 
(Bukhari, 2014), who protect the interests of all shareholders as well as other 
stakeholders by positively influencing the dividend policy of the firm.  
 
 192 
The results might further reflect the institutional legitimacy of minority 
shareholder protection that controlling blockholders are pressured to cope with 
in order to gain the trust of the general public to invest in the firm’s stocks. The 
highly concentrated ownership of the Saudi capital market, as well as the 
powerful position controlling families and the government enjoy, creates a 
situation where the expropriation of minority shareholders remain a huge 
concern, and therefore it becomes crucial for blockholders to signal their 
intentions of protecting minority shareholders and serve the best interest of the 
firm and its stakeholders instead by positively influencing dividend policy, for 
example (Pindado et al., 2012; Edmans, 2014). 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the findings of the study indicate that 
blockholders of different types in Saudi Arabia tend to reduce the agency 
problem inherent in public listed companies under their presence and act in the 
best interest of other stakeholders, including minority shareholders by 
improving dividend policy. These findings might offer assurance to different 
stakeholders that blockholder presence in Saudi Arabia is not detrimental to the 
firm, and that the interests of current and potential shareholders are protected. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, this study 
provides one of the earliest empirical investigations on the blockholder and 
dividend relationship in a developing context, namely Saudi Arabia, while taking 
into consideration the different types of blockholders and their respective level 
of ownership. Saudi Arabia reflects a unique institutional setting that differs 
greatly from that of Anglo-American (Khan, 2006; Short et al., 2002), European 
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(Djebali & Belanès, 2015; Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006), Latin (Gonzalez et al., 2014) 
or even East Asian contexts (Abdullah et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2005; Bradford et 
al., 2013), which have been investigated in the literature. 
 
Secondly, this study combines all the types of blockholders present in the 
Saudi market, which includes a unique type of royal family members, which are 
similar to politically connected blockholders. Studies on the ownership and 
dividend relationship generally focus on a single blockholder type, such as family 
(Chen et al., 2005; Gonzalez et al., 2014; Pindado et al., 2012), institutional 
(Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Al-Gharaibeh, 2013; Short et al., 2002), or government 
(Abdullah et al., 2014; Bradford et al., 2013; Al-Ajmi & Hussain, 2011; Osman & 
Mohammed, 2010; Al-Kuwari, 2009). Few studies do incorporate two 
blockholder types in analysing the ownership dividend relationship (Truong & 
Heaney, 2007; Djebali & Belanès, 2015), however, no study included family and 
government blockholders in a single study, let alone all these blockholder types 
together.  
 
 Finally, this study increases our understanding of the dynamics of the Saudi 
capital market, which is largely understudied, by examining the principal 
principal agency problem [P-P] between controlling and minority shareholders. 
This is achieved by studying the dividend policy and ownership structure 
relationship, which reflects the level of expropriation concerns minority 
shareholders encounter under the presence of controlling blockholders, who are 





Blockholders and Audit Quality 
 
5.1 Introduction 
With the aim of investigating the role of blockholders in the governance of 
Saudi firms, this chapter studies the level of audit quality under the control of 
different blockholder types present in the Saudi capital market. Audit quality 
plays a significant role in the assurance of the fairness in firm’s financial reports 
(DeFond & Zhang, 2014). Accordingly, audit quality serves a primary governance 
role that helps protect minority shareholder interests by reducing information 
asymmetry through improved financial reporting (Cohen et al., 2002). 
Ultimately, the audit quality level represents the severity of the agency problem 
between controlling insiders and minority shareholders.  
5.1.1 Research Motivation 
The modern form of public incorporation, which is characterized by the 
separation in ownership and control rights, is at the heart of the corporate 
governance realm. One of the main drivers of the agency problem in modern 
corporations is the information asymmetry that exists between firm’s insiders, 
being the management and/or controlling blockholders, and firm’s outsiders, 
being the dispersed minority shareholders and other stakeholders (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The interests of controlling insiders, 
whether economical or political, might greatly differ from that of outsiders, and 
there is high information asymmetry that exists between the two. 
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Since self interested insiders know more about the company and the business 
they operate, the risk of them engaging in opportunistic behavior increases. The 
presence of controlling insiders poses the threat of appropriating firm resources 
at the expense of minority shareholders. Whereas minority shareholders rely on 
publicly disclosed information in order to make their investment decisions; in 
the form of annual reports and financial statements, controlling insiders might 
intend to withhold information which might indicate any act of appropriation 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Ultimately, the quality of disclosed information becomes 
crucial for safeguarding the interests of minority shareholders and other 
external stakeholders. 
 
Audit quality serves an essential role in reinforcing assurance on the integrity 
of the firm’s financial reports. Audit quality, which reflects the quality of 
disclosed information, can be achieved in two ways (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
Firstly, by increasing external oversight over the auditing process of the firm, 
such as through qualified independent external auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Lennox, 1999; Mansi et al., 2004). Secondly, by improving reporting quality 
through improved internal audit structures, such as the audit committee 
(Woidtke & Yeh, 2013; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Abernathy et al., 2013).   
 
All listed firms undertake an annual audit, which is conducted by an 
independent, competent and qualified auditor, in order to provide an external 
and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial 
statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the 
company in all material matters (Hawkamah & IFC, 2008). External auditors 
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serve an essential role in reinforcing assurance in the quality of the financial 
reports by providing independent checks on the financial and accounting 
statements of the firm (DeAngelo, 1981; Lin & Liu, 2009; Mansi et al., 2004).  
 
With regards to the external auditor, audit quality refers to the ability of the 
audit firm to detect misstatements in the firms’ financials, and the willingness to 
report these misstatements if uncovered (Lin & Liu, 2009; DeAngelo, 1981). 
Therefore, the quality of the auditing task is important in safeguarding 
shareholder interests by improving accounting transparency, which minimizes 
information asymmetry between the parties (Liu et al., 2016). 
 
Moreover, the extant literature emphasized the benefits of having a large 
expert auditor with long standing history, as these auditors possess advance 
knowledge and skills, which enables them to better monitor the firm and achieve 
higher levels of expertise in performing the auditing task (Lennox, 1999; Francis, 
2004; Mansi et al., 2004). Additionally, these large auditors are more 
independent, rely less on a single client, and have more at stake in the event of 
reputational damage caused by negligence or colluding behavior, when 
compared to small auditors (Mansi et al., 2004; DeAngelo, 1981; Francis, 2004).  
 
The globally renowned international auditors, which are generally referred to 
as the ‘Big Four’ (KPMG, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte), 
reflect such size and standing, and are generally associated with higher quality 
audits (Francis, 2004; Mansi et al., 2004; Moizer, 1997). These so called ‘Big 
Four’ all operate in the Saudi market and provide auditing services to numerous 
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public listed companies, where on average 68.5% of the audit market share from 
all industries in the Saudi market is audited by one of the Big Four (Slamen et al., 
2014). 
 
On the other hand, audit quality might also be achieved by improving the 
internal audit function of the firm (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). Audit committees 
have gained significant status within the internal audit function after the US 
Sarbanes-Oxley [SOX] act of 2002 gave specific guidelines on enhancing the 
power and responsibility of the audit committee over firm reporting process 
(Naiker & Sharma, 2009; Malik, 2014). The establishment of the audit committee 
is based on the protection of shareholder rights (Al-Twaijry et al., 2004). 
 
In Saudi public listed firms, the audit committee is at the apex of internal audit, 
where all listed firms are required to have an established audit committee (Al-
Twaijry et al., 2004). Audit committees are responsible for supervising the 
internal audit process, nominating the appointment, dismissal and remuneration 
of the external auditor, and reviewing the internal audit reports, interim and 
annual financial statements and the accounting policies employed (CMA, 2010). 
 
Accordingly, the audit committee serves a vital role which links the external 
auditors, the internal audit and the board (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Woidtke & 
Yeh, 2013). Two audit committee characteristics are generally attributed to its 
effectiveness; namely the independence and financial expertise of its members 
(DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Carcello & Neal, 2003; Chen & Zhou, 2007).  
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Audit committees with higher levels of independence and financial expertise 
are able to serve their required role more effectively and are generally 
associated with improved audit reporting quality (Woidtke & Yeh, 2013; 
Abernathy et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2002; Krishnan, 2005), improved credibility 
of financial statements (Klein & Zur, 2009; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Carcello & Neal, 2003), 
and increased demand for quality external auditors (Chen & Zhou, 2007; Ho & 
Kang, 2013; DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
 
Ultimately, audit quality, as reflected by the choice of external auditor and the 
characteristics of the audit committee, is a vital governance mechanism that 
maintains the credibility and integrity of financial statements from manipulation 
that controlling insiders, either management or blockholders, might engage in 
(Cohen et al., 2002). 
5.1.2 Research Context 
There are several motivations behind choosing Saudi Arabia as the context of 
this study. Saudi Arabia is an emerging/developing country that plays an 
important role in the global economy. It is the largest producer of crude oil and 
has the largest proven oil reserves in the world (CIA, 2014). Additionally, Saudi 
Arabia showed high economic and political stability in a time of global economic 
crises and regional turmoil; the credit crunch and the Arab Spring (Viñals & 
Ahmed, 2012; Jones, 2013).  
 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia presents a unique setting, where religious, cultural 
and social factors, that are similar to those of other Arab and Islamic nations, 
play an important role in the day to day lives of the society. Islam is the only legal 
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religion of Saudi Arabia, and Islamic law, referred to as Sharia, serves as its 
constitution (CIA, 2014). 
 
Saudi Arabia is characterized by the wide presence of blockholders, who 
control more than two thirds of Saudi listed companies (Quttainah & 
Paczkowski, 2012; Santos, 2015). In dispersed ownership structures, the main 
agency problem is between shareholders and managers [Principal-Agent or 
simply P-A]. However, in concentrated ownership structures the problem shifts 
between controlling and minority shareholders [Principal-Principal or simply P-
P] (Young et al., 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Consequently, minority 
shareholders bear the risk of expropriation by controlling blockholders [P-P] on 
top of the basic managerial agency problem [P-A].  
 
Expropriation might be achieved through several forms: by direct or indirect 
extraction of physical resources, by misallocation of key organizational positions, 
or by following strategic decisions that advance personal goals at the expense of 
firm performance (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Young et al., 2008). It is argued that 
external governance mechanisms, which are assumed to alleviate the basic 
Principal-Agent problem, such as the takeover market, fail to control Principal-
Principal agency problems due to the strong position blockholders enjoy (Setia-
Atmaja et al., 2009). 
 
Instead, audit quality which improves transparency and reduces the 
information asymmetry between controlling insiders and minority shareholders 
by providing credible checks to the financial reports of the company becomes 
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vital for alleviating Principal-Principal agency problems (Lin & Liu, 2009; Fan & 
Wong, 2005). Studies by Choi and Wong (2007) and Woidtke and Yeh (2013) 
lend further support to this argument with regards to auditor choice and audit 
committees, respectively.  
 
Choi and Wong (2007) finds that large brand-name auditors serve a more 
important governance function in countries with weak legal institutions 
compared with strong ones, from a sample of 39 countries (Choi & Wong, 2007).  
Additionally, Woidtke and Yeh (2013) find that earnings informativeness is 
improved when audit committees in East Asia have more independent and 
accounting expert members. They further argue that the increase in reliability of 
the reports that is caused by better audit committees more than offsets the 
detrimental effects associated with blockholder control (Woidtke & Yeh, 2013). 
 
Due to their strong position of high voting power, blockholders are able to 
directly influence corporate decision making (Djankov et al., 2008), including the 
appointment of the external auditor and audit committee members (Lin & Liu, 
2009; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013; Ho & Kang, 2013). However, in order to maintain 
the information asymmetry between them and the general public, and to 
minimize external monitoring pressure, blockholders might dilute the quality of 
financial reports by avoiding high quality audit structures (Lin & Liu, 2009; Khan 
et al., 2015). 
 
Ultimately, audit quality serves as an invaluable governance mechanism that 
helps in the protection of minority shareholders’ interests in the absence of 
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other external governance mechanisms (Cohen et al., 2002; Fan & Wong, 2005; 
Lin & Liu, 2009). Thus, higher audit quality in weak legal settings is expected to 
serve a more important governance role, and be in the best interest of minority 
shareholders, by substituting for the weak external governance in these 
countries (Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 2005; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013). 
 
Therefore, it is important to investigate the decision on audit quality under the 
presence of different blockholders in the Saudi market. Appointing a Big Four 
auditor and an expert independent audit committee decreases the ability of the 
controlling blockholders from extracting private benefits of control due to the 
increased monitoring and accompanied improvement in financial reporting that 
is associated with audit quality. Thus, blockholders might choose such audit 
quality structures in order to signal to minority shareholders their willingness to 
employ good governance mechanisms rather than an intent to expropriate them 
(Fan & Wong, 2005; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013).  
5.1.3 Research Gap 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between ownership 
structure and audit quality, however, most of these studies failed to differentiate 
between different types of blockholders, rather they combined them in a single 
measure of ownership concentration (Lin & Liu, 2009; Leung & Liu, 2015; Fan & 
Wong, 2005; Farooq & Tabine, 2015; Rainsbury et al., 2008; García-Sánchez et 
al., 2012), with few studies investigating the influence of family blockholders 
(Khan et al., 2015; Ho & Kang, 2013) or government ownership (Wang et al., 
2008; Guedhami et al., 2009) in isolation. 
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Moreover, while audit committee characteristics are generally associated with 
audit quality, no studies have been found that directly investigated the 
relationship between ownership structure and audit committees, where only 
auditor choice and/or audit fees were the ones studied with ownership 
structure. Furthermore, little is known about the relationship between 
ownership structure and audit quality in the Middle East, where institutional 
arrangements and sociocultural aspects differ greatly from the ones investigated 
in the literature.  
 
Therefore, this study will address this literature gap by comprehensively 
analyzing audit quality; namely auditor choice and audit committee 
characteristics, under different types of blockholders; namely family, royal 
family, government, corporate, managerial and multiple blockholders, present in 
the Saudi Arabian context. The aim of this study is to examine the level of 
governance minority shareholder experience under the presence of such 
controlling blockholders. 
 
Accordingly, the study seeks to answer the research question of, to what 
degree do blockholders impact the audit quality of Saudi PLCs? Specifically, the 
objective is to empirically examine the influence of different blockholder types 
on the auditor choice, whether a Big Four auditor is assigned or not, and on audit 
committee characteristics; namely the level of independence of the committee 




The next section provides the theoretical framework of the study. The 
following section reviews the extant literature on the relationship between 
ownership structure and audit quality, as well as developing the hypotheses of 
the study. Afterwards, the research methodology employed will be presented, 
followed by the results and discussion. Finally, concluding remarks will close the 
chapter. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Framework 
Audit quality is a term that reflects the fairness and credibility of the firm’s 
financial statements, which encompasses both the quality of the internal audit 
function as well as the external auditor (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). Therefore, 
audit quality serves a significant governance role that protects the interests of 
minority shareholders from insider expropriation, through increased oversight 
over the reporting process which leads to higher levels of transparency and the 
accompanied reduction in information asymmetry (Cohen et al., 2002).  
 
While it is practical to assess the audit quality ex-post in the case of audit 
failure, it is challenging, however, to measure the audit quality ex-ante (Francis, 
2004). Nevertheless, several measures have been utilized in the literature that 
aim to reflect the expected level of audit quality, such as audit fees (O’Sullivan, 
2000; Ho & Kang, 2013; Khan et al., 2015), auditor size (DeAngelo, 1981; Lennox, 
1999; Mansi et al., 2004), auditor tenure (Francis, 2004), auditor industry 
specialization (Craswella et al., 1995), earnings management (Al-Rassas & 
Kamardin, 2016; Chaney et al., 2011), audit committee independence (Woidtke & 
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Yeh, 2013; Krishnan, 2005; Carcello & Neal, 2003), and audit committee financial 
expertise (Cohen et al., 2002; Malik, 2014; Abernathy et al., 2013). 
 
Out of the different proxies, auditor size, such as Big Four auditors, is the most 
applied in the literature, due to its clear distinction, ease of measurement and 
general consensus over their superior audit quality (Lennox, 1999; Francis, 
2004; DeFond & Zhang, 2014). Moreover, the audit committee serves a vital role 
which links the external auditors, the internal audit function and the board, 
where two characteristics are generally attributed to its effectiveness; namely 
the independence and financial expertise of its members (DeFond & Zhang, 
2014; Carcello & Neal, 2003; Chen & Zhou, 2007).  
 
While audit fees, industry specialization and earnings management might 
reflect audit quality, they do suffer from high measurement errors, due to lack of 
consensus over appropriate measuring proxies (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
Moreover, in Saudi Arabia there is no disclosure of audit fees, and there is no 
industry specialization by auditors, as they audit companies from a wide array of 
industries (Slamen et al., 2014), it is therefore, not possible to examine them as 
audit quality measures. 
 
This study will utilize the choice of the external auditor as well as the audit 
committee characteristics as proxies for audit quality in Saudi Arabia. The 
following section will illustrate the most relevant theoretical foundations behind 
the measurements used, and how they are supposed to serve a governance role 
that protects the interests of minority shareholders. 
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5.2.1 Agency Theory 
With regards to external audit quality, two main factors represent the quality 
of the external auditor, namely; the ability of the external auditor to detect 
misstatements, and their willingness to report them (Lin & Liu, 2009; Fan & 
Wong, 2005). From an agency theoretical perspective, the level of independence 
of the external auditor from the firm reflects the willingness to report 
misstatements and provide objective auditing services (DeAngelo, 1981).  
Correspondingly, the globally renowned Big Four auditors with their long 
standing history reflect such quality as they are more independent, rely less on a 
single client, and have more at stake in the event of reputational damage caused 
by negligence or colluding behavior, when compared to small auditors (Mansi et 
al., 2004; DeAngelo, 1981; Francis, 2004).  
 
These Big Four auditors, who are independent from both the firm 
management and controlling blockholders, are able to increase external 
monitoring pressure and provide objective reports that alleviates concerns from 
insider manipulation of accounting and financial reports (Francis, 2004). 
Consequently, under blockholder control, having a Big Four external auditor is 
expected to improve the overall audit quality which increases the credibility of 
the financial statement to end users, including minority shareholders (Khan et 
al., 2016). 
 
On the other hand, audit committee quality is attributed to the level of 
independence and expertise of its members (Carcello & Neal, 2003; Krishnan, 
2005). Since the audit committee serve at the apex of the audit function, it is 
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important for it to serve its role and responsibility more effectively in assuring 
the credibility of the auditing and reporting process employed (Malik, 2014; 
Krishnan, 2005). Independent audit committees are able to improve audit 
quality by offsetting management's reports by providing an unbiased reporting 
process and by encouraging truth telling in external and internal auditors 
(DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
 
Independent audit committee members, who are independent from both the 
management and controlling blockholders, are able to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders by objectively monitoring the overall audit function of the 
firm (Woidtke & Yeh, 2013). Furthermore, since the appointment of the external 
auditor is highly influenced by the audit committee; where the audit committee 
is responsible for nominating the appointment, dismissal and remuneration of 
the external auditor, it is argued that independent audit committees demand 
higher audit quality, including a Big Four external auditor (DeFond & Zhang, 
2014; Ho & Kang, 2013). 
  
Ultimately, audit quality, which is reflected in higher independence level of the 
external auditor and audit committee, serves an invaluable governance 
mechanism that helps in the protection of minority shareholders’ interests, 
which alleviates both P-A and P-P agency problems (Cohen et al., 2002; Fan & 
Wong, 2005; Lin & Liu, 2009). 
5.2.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory describes the organizational dependence on 
contingencies in the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The theory 
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emphasizes on the importance of gaining access to vital resources for the 
organization’s survival and growth (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Hillman et al., 2009). 
 
With regards to external audit quality, two main factors represent the quality 
of the external auditor, namely; the ability of the external auditor to detect 
misstatements, and their willingness to report them (Lin & Liu, 2009; Fan & 
Wong, 2005). From a resource dependence theoretical perspective, higher levels 
of knowledge and expertise the external auditor enjoy enables them to better 
detect misstatements in the accounting reports of the firm (Al-Rassas & 
Kamardin, 2016). 
 
Large expert auditors with long standing history, such as the Big Four, possess 
advance knowledge and skills that enables them to better monitor the firm and 
achieve a higher level of expertise in performing the auditing task (Lennox, 
1999; Francis, 2004; Mansi et al., 2004).  
 
Similarly, audit committee quality is attributed to the level of independence and 
expertise of its members (Carcello & Neal, 2003; Krishnan, 2005). Knowledge in 
accounting and financial matters is an essential characteristic for an effective 
audit committee (Abernathy et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2002).  
 
Audit committee members who are expert in accounting and financial matters 
are able to better monitor both the internal and external audits of the firm as 
well as employing sound audit processes that leads to improved reporting 
quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2016; Krishnan, 2005). 
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Overall, higher level of expertise of the external auditor and audit committee, 
will in turn, lead to improved accounting transparency, reduced information 
asymmetry, increased external monitoring, and reduced risk of fraud and 
misstatement, which will ultimately be in the best interest of minority 
shareholders (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
 
5.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory presents a shift away from agency theory, which takes a 
narrow perspective that focusses on the sole interests of shareholders, with an 
emphasis on the overriding obligations to the wide organizational stakeholders, 
based on trust and cooperativeness (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Gaur et al., 2015). A 
stakeholder can be defined as any individual or group who is affected by or is 
able to affect the achievement of firm objectives (Freeman & Reed, 1983).  
 
It is argued that blockholders tend to influence decision making to serve their 
interests, even if it was at the expense of other stakeholders (Gaur et al., 2015; 
Khan et al., 2015). While in two tier board structures the interests of a wider 
group of stakeholders is fairly reflected, it is difficult to achieve such influence in 
single tier board structures, such as that present in Saudi Arabia (Bezemer et al., 
2014).  
 
Therefore, it is expected that important stakeholders demand better audit 
quality in order to protect their interests from blockholder control. Researchers 
have found empirical support for this argument as pressure from stakeholder 
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groups have been found to play a role in improving financial disclosure, in the 
form of corporate social responsibility, and the choice of auditor and 
accompanied audit fees in a concentrated ownership context, namely Bangladesh 
(Khan et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2013). 
 
Consequently, in addition to the agency expectation where better audit quality 
serves the best interest of minority shareholders, the stakeholder model is also 
in support of improved audit quality, that is expected to minimize blockholder 
ability to expropriate firm resources and represent the interests of a wider group 
of stakeholders. Improved audit quality, in the form of Big Four auditors and 
independent and expert audit committees is expected to serve the best interest 
of the different stakeholders, including minority shareholders, 
 
Islamic religion, or Sharia, promotes the representation of various 
stakeholders, in which the main objective of the firm isn’t profit maximization, 
rather, continuity and societal welfare are the fundamental objectives of the 
Islamic ethical system (Ali et al., 2017; Rizk, 2014; Bedoui & Mansour, 2015).  
 
However, the Saudi legal system is heavily influenced by the Anglo-American 
system and emphasizes on the protection of shareholders at large without 
providing detailed measures and tools that help various stakeholders as well as 
minority shareholders to protect their interests and convey their voices 
(Almajid, 2008; Fallatah & Dickins, 2012; Piesse et al., 2011). 
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Therefore, although it is plausible to assume that stakeholder model should 
form the basis of analyzing the governance in Saudi Arabia from a religious point 
of view, the actual conduct within Saudi Arabia offers greater support to the self-
serving agency model instead. 
5.2.4 Signaling Theory 
While assigning a Big Four auditor is associated with improved accounting 
reports and increased external monitoring, it does have its drawbacks, as audit 
fees would ultimately be much higher when compared to small auditors (Beattie 
et al., 2001). Therefore, it is expected that firms that assign a Big Four auditor 
demonstrate higher tendency to induce higher costs for the promotion of better 
governance (Titman & Trueman, 1986; Datar et al., 1991). 
 
Furthermore, appointing a Big Four auditor limits the ability of firm insiders, 
including controlling blockholders, to manipulate accounting information, which 
decreases the risk of extracting private benefits of control (Fan & Wong, 2005). 
Similarly, assigning audit committees that are independent, from management 
and controlling shareholders, and expert, in accounting and financial matters, 
reduces the risk of fraud and improves reporting quality (Krishnan, 2005). 
 
Consequently, assigning a quality auditor and an audit committee that is 
independent and professional, might be used by controlling insiders in order to 
signal to minority shareholders their willingness to employ good governance 
structures and not to intend to expropriate firm resources (Fan & Wong, 2005; 
Titman & Trueman, 1986; Feldmann & Schwarzkopf, 2003).  
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Ultimately, improved audit quality, in the form of Big Four auditors and 
independent and expert audit committees, serves as a signal to the market that 
the firm undertook better governance decisions that are in the best interest of 
minority shareholders, and the firm was willing to accommodate the liabilities 
associated with their choice (Datar et al., 1991).  
 
Moreover, the importance of signaling audit quality becomes especially crucial 
under the presence of controlling blockholders, who will face increased 
monitoring and stricter audit checks, which will limit the blockholder’s ability to 
appropriate firm resources and protect the interests of minority shareholders 
(Fan & Wong, 2005; Woidtke & Yeh, 2013).  
 
The next section will review the extant literature on the theoretical 
predictions and empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership 
structure and audit quality and develop the hypotheses of the study for the 




5.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
A typical characteristic of developing countries is the combination of the 
presence of dominant blockholders and a weak institutional setting, where laws 
and regulations regarding the governance of corporations are either absent 
entirely or cannot be effectively enforced (Yoshikawa et al., 2014). Consequently, 
external governance mechanisms, such as the take over market, become weak 
and inactive, and the risk of minority shareholder expropriation by blockholders 
increases (Mishra, 2011; Young et al., 2008).  
 
Instead, audit quality is expected to reduce the information asymmetry 
between controlling insiders and minority shareholders by improving the 
reliability and integrity of the firm’s financial reports (Lin & Liu, 2009; Fan & 
Wong, 2005). Due to their strong position; of high voting power, blockholders 
have been found to be able to directly influence corporate decision making 
(Djankov et al., 2008), including the appointment of an external auditor (Lin & 
Liu, 2009), as well as the audit committee membership (Chau & Leung, 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, in order to maintain the high level of information asymmetry 
between them and the general public, and to minimize objective monitoring 
pressure, blockholders might dilute the quality of financial reports by avoiding 
high quality audit structures (Lin & Liu, 2009; Khan et al., 2015). Consequently, 
audit quality serves an invaluable governance mechanism that helps in the 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests in the absence of other external 
governance mechanisms under blockholder control (Cohen et al., 2002; Fan & 
Wong, 2005; Lin & Liu, 2009). 
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The extant literature emphasized the benefits of appointing a Big Four 
external auditor, who are large expert auditors with long standing international 
history, as these auditors possess advance knowledge and skills, which enables 
them to better monitor the firm and achieve a higher level of expertise in 
performing the auditing task (Lennox, 1999; Francis, 2004; Mansi et al., 2004).  
 
Francis (2004) surveyed the literature on the Big Four auditors and audit 
quality relationship, and found support to the fact that they outperform other 
auditors and charge higher audit fees, which enables them to invest that 
premium in proving superior audit services (Francis, 2004; Mansi et al., 2004; 
Moizer, 1997). 
 
Choi and Wong (2007) present two competing views on the relationship 
between weak legal environments and the choice of auditor: the strong 
governance view, and the weak governance view. The strong governance view 
assumes that auditor quality, reflected by the Big Four, plays a strong bonding 
role and serves a more important signalling function in weak legal environments, 
by minimizing information asymmetry, thus substituting for weak legal 
protection and reduces associated agency costs.  
 
The weak governance view, on the other hand, assumes that in weak legal 
environments auditor quality is not relevant due to the absence of a disciplining 
legal system that holds the auditor accountable, which causes the external 
auditor to collude with the demands of firm insiders instead of building a 
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reputation based on quality auditing (Choi & Wong, 2007). However, their study, 
from a sample of 39 countries, finds support for the strong governance view, as 
their results show that Big Four auditors serve a more important governance 
function in countries with weak legal institutions (Choi & Wong, 2007).  
 
Thus, Big Four auditors in weak legal settings, and under the presence of 
controlling blockholders, are expected to serve a more important governance 
role, and be in the best interest of minority shareholders, by substituting for the 
weak external governance of these countries (Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 
2005).  
 
Equally, in Bahrain, which represents a similar institutional setting to Saudi 
Arabia in terms of culture and religion, Al-Ajmi (2009) conducted a survey with 
300 professionals and reported that Big Four auditors are considered of better 
quality than local audit firms in terms of achieving the required outcomes from 
the audit function. This further supports the assertion that Big Four auditors are 
associated with better audit quality, even in the context of Saudi Arabia (Moizer, 
1997; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007).  
 
Audit committees have gained significant status within the internal audit 
function after the US Sarbanes-Oxley [SOX] act of 2002 gave specific guidelines 
on enhancing the power and responsibility of the audit committee over firm 
reporting process (Naiker & Sharma, 2009; Malik, 2014).  
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In Saudi public listed firms, the audit committee is at the apex of internal audit, 
where all listed firms are required to have an established audit committee (Al-
Twaijry et al., 2004). Audit committees are responsible for supervising the 
internal audit process, nominating the appointment, dismissal and remuneration 
of the external auditor, and reviewing the internal audit reports, interim and 
annual financial statements and the accounting policies employed (CMA, 2010). 
 
Accordingly, the audit committee serves a vital role which links the external 
auditors, the internal audit and the board (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Woidtke & 
Yeh, 2013). Two audit committee characteristics are generally attributed to its 
effectiveness; namely the independence and financial expertise of its members 
(DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Carcello & Neal, 2003; Chen & Zhou, 2007).  
 
Audit committees with higher levels of independence and financial expertise 
are able to serve their required role more effectively, and are found in the 
literature to be associated with improved audit reporting quality (Woidtke & 
Yeh, 2013; Abernathy et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2002; Krishnan, 2005; Al-Rassas 
& Kamardin, 2016), improved credibility of financial statements (Klein & Zur, 
2009; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Carcello & Neal, 2003), and increased demand for quality 
external auditors, such as the Big Four (Chen & Zhou, 2007; Ho & Kang, 2013; 
DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between ownership 
structure and audit quality, as measured by auditor choice and audit committee 
characteristics, however, most of these studies failed to differentiate between 
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different types of blockholders, rather they combined them in a single measure 
of ownership concentration (Lin & Liu, 2009; Leung & Liu, 2015; Fan & Wong, 
2005; Farooq & Tabine, 2015; Rainsbury et al., 2008; García-Sánchez et al., 
2012), with few studies investigating the influence of family blockholders (Khan 
et al., 2015; Ho & Kang, 2013) or government ownership (Wang et al., 2008; 
Guedhami et al., 2009) in isolation.  
 
 
Table 5.1 presents a summary of previous studies on the ownership and 
auditor choice and audit committee characteristics relationship around the 
world. In the following sections, relevant literature and theoretical arguments 
will be reviewed for each blockholder type, in order to develop the hypotheses of 
the study. 
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Table 5.1 Empirical Studies on Ownership Structure and Audit Quality (Auditor Choice and Audit Committee) 













Logit Big 5 
- Voting Rights of Largest 
Blockholder % 
 
- Cash Flow Rights of Largest 
Blockholder % 
- Positive relationship between 
Voting Rights and Big 5 
 
- No relationship between Cash 





Top 10 Auditor (dummy for 
largest 10 Auditors) 
- Ownership Concentration % 
 
 
- Supervisory Board Size 
 
 
- CEO/Chair Duality 
- Negative relationship between 
Ownership Concentration and 
Top 10 Auditor 
- Positive relationship between 
Supervisory Board Size and Top 
10 Auditor 
- Negative relationship between 






Auditor Choice (Big 4 and 
Second Tier Auditors) 
 




- Aggregate Ownership of 2nd to 
5th blockholders % 
 
 
- U shaped relationship between 
Largest shareholder and Big 4 and 
Second Tier 
 
- Positive relationship between 
Other Blockholders and Big 4 only 
 
 
- Positive relationship between 
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- Executive Ownership % 
Executive Ownership and Big 4 













- Ownership Concentration % 
 
 
- Dividend Payout Ratio 
- Positive relationship between 
Ownership Concentration and 
Big 4 
 
- Negative relationship between 




Top 10 Auditors (dummy 
for largest 10 auditors) 
- Local State Ownership (dummy) 
 
- Central State Ownership 
(dummy) 
- Negative relationship between 
Local State Ownership and Top 
10 
 
- Negative Relationship between 







Logit Big 4 
- Government Ownership % 
 
 
- Foreign Ownership % 
- Negative Relationship between 
Government Ownership and Big 
4 
 
- Positive relationship between 











- Auditor Choice (KPMG, 
Big 4 representative, 
and local auditors) 
 
- Audit Fees 
- Family Control (dummy at 20% 
and managerial/board position) 
- Negative relationship between 
Family Control and Auditor 
Choice 
 
- Negative relationship between 
Family Control and Audit Fees 




Procedure and Big 4 after the fall of 
the 5th) 
 
- Audit Fees 
or managerial/board position) 
 
- Excess Voting over Cash Flow 
Rights 
 
- Institutional Ownership 
 
- Managerial Ownership 
 
- Board Independence 
 
- Audit Committee Expertise 
Family Control and Auditor 
Choice and Audit Fees 
 
- Positive relationship between 
Excess Voting Rights and 
Auditor Choice and Audit Fees 
 
- Positive relationship between 
Institutional Ownership and 
Auditor Choice, but Negative for 
Audit Fees 
 
- Negative relationship between 
Managerial Ownership and 
Auditor Choice and Audit Fees 
 
- No relationship between Board 
Independence and Auditor 
Choice and Audit Fees 
 
- Positive relationship between 
Audit Committee Expertise and 







- Audit Committee 
Independence Dummy 
 
- Audit Committee 
Expertise Dummy 
- Managerial Ownership % 
 
- Blockholder Ownership % 
 
- Board Size 
 
- No relationship between 




- Positive relationship between 
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- Board Independence Blockholders and Audit 
Committee Independence 
 
- Negative relationship between 
Blockholders and Audit 
Committee Expertise 
 
- Positive relationship between 
Board Size and Independence 









- Audit Committee 
Independence (% and 
Dummy) 
 
- Audit Committee 
Expertise (% and 
Dummy) 
- Managerial Ownership 
 
- Ownership Concentration % 
 
- Board Size 
 
- Board Independence 
 
- No relationship between 
Managerial Ownership and 
Audit Committee Independence 
and Expertise 
 
- No relationship between 
Ownership concentration and 
Audit Committee Independence 
and Expertise 
 
- Positive relationship between 
Board Size and Audit 
Committee Independence only 
 
- Positive relationship between 
Board Independence and Audit 
Committee Independence and 
Expertise 
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5.3.1 Family Blockholders 
Family blockholders are the most common type of concentrated ownership 
around the world (Singal & Singal, 2011; La Porta et al., 1999). Family control 
represents a distinctive type of blockholder. Family blockholders, generally, hold 
non-diversified portfolios, tend to be long-term oriented, and often hold senior 
managerial positions, thus placing them in a unique position to monitor and 
influence the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
 
It is argued that controlling family members are well informed, maintain close 
attachment to the firm, and have high reputational concerns that results in 
decreased agency problems, and ultimately better performance outcomes 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Several studies have supported these arguments and 
found that family controlled firms outperform their non-family counterpart 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; van Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2014; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
 
Ho & Kang (2013) found that family firms in the USA, from an S&P 1500 
sample, are less likely to assign a Big Four auditor than non-family firms due to 
the lower agency problems that exist under family control. They also found that 
audit fees were generally lower for family firms, than non-family firms, which 
further reflects their lower associated audit risk (Ho & Kang, 2013). 
 
Likewise, in Western Europe, El Ghoul et al. (2015) found that family 
controlled firms are associated with lower demand for Big Four auditors. They 
argue that family control substitutes for the need of a Big Four auditor. 
 222 
Therefore, valuable monitoring by the family reduces the benefit of external 
monitoring that accompanies having a quality auditor (El Ghoul et al., 2015).  
 
Moreover, Lei & Lam (2013) found that family firms in Hong Kong are more 
likely to appoint a Big Four auditor in order to signal their adoption of sound 
governance mechanisms and reducing agency problems to minority 
shareholders. They also found that family firms incur lower audit fees, which 
also reflect the lower perceived audit risk of family firms, therefore, family 
ownership do not present Principal-Principal agency problems in Hong Kong by 
reducing audit quality (Lei & Lam, 2013).  
 
Similarly, Jaggi & Leung (2007) found that the voluntary establishment of an 
audit committee in Hong Kong constrains earnings management. They argue that 
audit committees provide effective monitoring of earnings management even in 
firms that operate in a family dominated economy, such as Hong Kong (Jaggi & 
Leung, 2007). 
 
However, family blockholders might also produce Principal-Principal agency 
problems. Uncontestable entrenched family owners might harm minority 
shareholders through various forms, such as pursuing non-value maximizing 
familial political agendas, expropriating firm resources in the form of tunneling 
or excess perks, or assigning senior positions to under qualified family members 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). With an aim of expropriating 
firm resources, at the expense of minority shareholders, family blockholders 
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might avoid quality auditors to minimize external monitoring pressure and 
dilute the quality of financial reports. 
 
While the studies of Ho & Kang (2013), El Ghoul et al. (2015), Lei & Lam 
(2013), and , Jaggi & Leung (2007) presented that of developed economies, USA, 
Western Europe and Hong Kong, respectively, their results might not be well 
suited to reflect family firms in developing economies where external 
governance and legal systems are much weaker.  
 
Khan et al. (2015) are amongst the first to study the relationship between 
family control and audit quality in a developing context. They found that family 
firms in Bangladesh are less likely to appoint a Big Four auditor than non-family 
firms. However, while a negative relationship represented a substitution effect 
between family control and audit quality in developed economies (El Ghoul et al., 
2015; Ho & Kang, 2013), Khan et al. (2015) argue that the negative relationship 
reflects expropriation motivations that incline family firms to dilute audit quality 
in order to maximize private benefit extraction.  
 
In an early study on audit committees in Saudi Arabia Al-Twaijry et al. (2002) 
found that audit committees lack true independence and expertise and fail to do 
their required tasks with regards to the internal and external audit functions. 
However their study was carried out prior to the introduction of the corporate 
governance code in 2006, which had a great effect on the level of awareness and 
compliance with regards to corporate governance related matters in the Saudi 
market. The culture in Saudi Arabia is characterized by high power distance and 
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secrecy in corporate dealings (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Bukhari, 2014). In such a 
context, family blockholders are expected to avoid improved audit quality in 
order to limit the level of disclosed information and increased monitoring 
associated with improved audit quality (Al-Twaijry et al., 2004). Additionally, 
family blockholders in Saudi Arabia might also be motivated to assign external 
auditors and audit committees that serve their interests, in order to be able to 
expropriate minority shareholders without the fear of being held liable.  
 
In conclusion, family blockholders in Saudi Arabia are expected to avoid 
assigning a Big Four auditor and nominate a less independent and qualified audit 
committee in order to avoid increased monitoring, which in turn might deter any 
appropriative dealings that causes principal principal agency problems. 
Therefore the first hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H1. There is a negative relationship between family ownership and audit quality in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
5.3.2 Royal Family Blockholders 
The Al Saud family have ruled Saudi Arabia for more than 80 years (Long & 
Maisel, 2010). Naturally, members of the Saudi royal family enjoy political and 
relational advantages to other citizens of the country (IISS, 2000). Therefore, 
they can be considered as politically connected individuals similar to politicians 
in other countries (Faccio, 2010). Royal family members do not represent the 
government; rather they represent themselves as individuals with their own set 
of interests and motivations. 
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There are several advantages associated with politically connected firms, such 
as ease of access to finance, lower tax rates and preferential treatment by the 
government in the form of lower regulatory oversight or financial bailout in 
times of distress (Bona-Sánchez, Pérez-Alemán, & Santana-Martín, 2014; 
Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; Faccio, 
2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). These benefits are unique to politically connected 
firms, and thus puts them in a better position when compared to their non-
politically connected counterparts. 
 
Drawing their results from a sample of 28 countries, Guedhami et al. (2014) 
report that firms with political connections are more likely to hire a Big Four 
auditor. They argue that politically connected firms appoint a Big Four auditor to 
improve accounting transparency and signal their intentions of not 
expropriating firm resources (Guedhami et al., 2014). Furthermore, their results 
of positive relationship between political connections and Big Four were 
stronger for firms in countries with less developed governance institutions, and 
that connected firms with Big Four auditors exhibited lower levels of earnings 
management and enjoyed higher valuations, and cheaper equity financing 
(Guedhami et al., 2014). 
 
However, since politically connected firms have easier access to finance and 
bear less regulatory pressures than non-politically connected firms, they might 
be more inclined to appropriate firm resources (Guedhami et al., 2014). Even 
though political connections might add value to all shareholders, they might also 
generate Principal-Principal agency problems between controlling insiders and 
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minority shareholders, especially in weak legal settings (Faccio, 2006; Guedhami 
et al., 2014). 
 
Habib et al. (2017) find that politically connected firms in Indonesia tend to 
avoid the appointment of a Big Four auditor. Their results show that politically 
connected firms dilute firm’s audit quality and accounting transparency, by 
appointing non-Big Four auditors, in order to conceal their appropriative 
behavior and rent seeking activities (Habib et al., 2017). 
 
Likewise, Khan et al. (2016) find that politically connected firms are associated 
with higher agency costs than their non-politically connected counterparts in 
Bangladesh. Representing a developing economy with weak legal setting, 
politically connected managers in Bangladesh abuse their power to expropriate 
minority shareholders (Khan et al., 2016). They further find that audit quality, 
represented by a Big Four auditor, moderates the relationship between political 
connections and agency costs, thus reflecting the importance of audit quality in 
the protection of minority shareholder interests (Khan et al., 2016). 
 
Similarly, Chaney et al. (2011), report that the quality of accounting reports is 
lower in politically connected firms than non-politically connected ones, from a 
sample of 19 countries. They argue that political connected firms might 
intentionally disclose low quality information in order to mislead investors, or 
that the superior protection politically connected firms enjoy allows them to 
devote less efforts to manage discretionary accruals (Chaney et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, they find that lower reporting quality is associated with higher 
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cost of debt in non-politically connected firms only, and that politically 
connected firms face insignificant consequences from their lower reporting 
quality (Chaney et al., 2011). 
 
Consequently, politically connected firms may be reluctant to improve 
accounting transparency by improving audit quality, thus rendering the financial 
statements less informative for outsiders, in order to protect their private benefit 
extraction motives (Guedhami et al., 2014; Bona-Sánchez et al., 2014; Chaney et 
al., 2011). Similarly, Saudi royal family blockholders are expected to reduce audit 
quality, while overlooking the interests of minority shareholders and not bearing 
the risk of punishment for their actions. By assigning non-Big Four auditors and 
less independent and expert audit committees, royal family blockholders cause 
principal principal agency problems. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
H2. There is negative relationship between royal family ownership and audit 
quality in Saudi Arabia. 
 
5.3.3 Government Ownership 
Government ownership is widely present, especially in less developed 
countries, where previously fully government owned organizations that went 
through a privatization process become a public listed company with a majority 
ownership held by the government (Megginson & Netter, 2001; Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000). The government, or the state, normally maintains its ownership in 
previously privatized firms or other listed companies through various 
governmental agencies or institutions (Abdullah et al., 2014).  
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Being a state that represents the highest level of authority in a country, 
governments normally have different objectives from other types of owners, 
such as political, economical or other incentives (Bradford et al., 2013; Gul, 
1999). Firms under governmental ownership are generally regarded as a low 
default risk by financial institutions, thus are able to have easy access to external 
financing, regardless of their internal governance structures and financial 
performance (Gul, 1999; Guedhami et al., 2009; Faccio, 2007). 
 
Albeit limited, few studies on audit quality did consider the influence of 
government ownership, and have reported either a negative impact on audit 
quality or found the relationship to be non-significant. Based on a sample of 176 
privatized firms from 36 countries, Guedhami et al. (2009) report that 
government ownership is found to be negatively associated with assigning a Big 
Four auditor, which reflects the level of accounting transparency. They argue 
that reduced audit quality impedes outsiders from the detection of corporate 
resource expropriation due to political intentions of government ownership 
(Guedhami et al., 2009). 
 
Similarly in China, Wang et al. (2008), find that state owned enterprises are 
more likely to appoint a small auditor than non-state owned ones. They argue 
that the easier access to finance state owned enterprises enjoy, due to their low 
default risk, enables them to avoid sound governance structures, such as lower 
quality auditor choice, while still obtaining cheap loans (Wang et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, Liu et al. (2011) also find support for the preferential treatment 
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state owned enterprises in China enjoy, as they report that government 
ownership increases the probability of receiving a clean audit opinion report 
from the external auditor (Liu et al., 2011). 
 
Additionally, Khan et al. (2015) investigated the influence of different 
stakeholder groups on audit fees and auditor choice in Bangladesh. Their results 
showed no significant relationship between government ownership and both 
audit fees and auditor choice (Khan et al., 2015). Similarly, El Ghoul et al. (2015) 
reported no significant relationship between government ownership and 
assigning a Big Four auditor in Western Europe (El Ghoul et al., 2015). 
 
The Saudi government played an important role in the development of the 
capital market and corporate governance in the past decade (Bukhari, 2014). 
The government of Saudi Arabia aims at improving the corporate governance of 
the market, which is reflected in the recent issuance and revision of the 
corporate governance code (CMA, 2010), as well as its intention to open the 
market to foreign investors (CMA, 2014). It is therefore expected that 
government ownership in Saudi will signal to the market its intentions to 
implement governance best practices by improving audit quality and appoint a 
Big Four external auditor and an independent and expert audit commitee. 
Consequently, the third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3. There is a positive relationship between government ownership and audit 
quality in Saudi Arabia. 
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5.3.4 Corporate Ownership 
Corporations invest in other firms in order to cultivate distinctive capabilities 
and technologies through potential synergies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Thus 
their main goal, in general, is not generating short term profits, as opposed to 
institutional ownership, rather is to develop synergies and/or ensure 
uninterrupted supply of resources (Sur et al., 2013).  
 
Organizations, therefore, attempt to maintain control over vital resources, by 
engaging in power in order to reduce, or manage, environmental dependence 
and uncertainty. By utilizing their control over resources, organizations aim to 
limit the power of others over them and increase their power over others 
(Hillman et al., 2009). 
 
Corporate owners have better understanding of the business environment, 
and are able to directly monitor the management of the acquired firm by 
appointing their executives or other affiliates as representatives on the board 
(Sur et al., 2013; Desender et al., 2013).  
 
Additionally, corporate owners generally have nurtured a unique set of 
knowledge and capabilities that enable them to better govern the acquired firm. 
Ultimately, corporate ownership is expected to positively influence the overall 
governance structure of the firm (Desender et al., 2013), which is also reflected 
in improved audit quality (Lin & Liu, 2009).  
 
 231 
Furthermore, corporate owners might signal to the general public their 
intention not to expropriate minority shareholders, by improving audit quality 
through the appointment of a Big Four external auditor (Fan & Wong, 2005), or 
through the allocation of a better audit committee (Feldmann & Schwarzkopf, 
2003).  
 
As corporate owners are better capable of governing the firm, in addition to 
their intention to signal their just treatment to minority shareholders and firm 
resources, it is expected that corporate blockholders positively influence the 
decision to appoint a Big Four auditor and an independent and expert audit 
committee in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H4. There is a positive relationship between corporate ownership and audit quality 
in Saudi Arabia. 
 
5.3.5 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership is expected to have a different influence on audit 
quality when compared to other types of external blockholders. While the main 
agency problem [P-A] is expected to be alleviated through increased managerial 
ownership, which aligns the interests of managers with that of shareholders as 
they become owners themselves [incentive alignment]. However, at higher levels 
of managerial ownership, where the management power becomes uncontestable, 
managers might be inclined to pursue non value maximization policies, such as 
excessive perks, at the expense of shareholders [entrenchment effect] 
(Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010; Claessens et al., 2002). 
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The so called ‘incentive alignment and entrenchment effects’ of managerial 
ownership was first reported by Morck et al. (1988). They found that in the US 
managerial ‘incentive’ alignment is achieved at low levels of ownership through 
improved firm performance, whereas at higher ownership levels, ‘entrenchment’ 
effects occur in the form of poorer firm performance. Their finding of non-linear 
relationship was further supported by several later studies (De Miguel, Pindado, 
& De La Torre, 2004; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Short & Keasey, 1999; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  
 
Likewise, Lennox (2005) argue that managerial ownership will follow an 
incentive and entrenchment effect towards auditor choice. His results show a 
non-linear relationship between the level of managerial ownership and the 
appointment of a Big Five auditor in the UK. His study finds that when 
managerial ownership falls within low and high levels, the relationship becomes 
significantly negative with appointing a Big Five auditor, which reflects the 
divergence of interest effect. However, when managerial ownership falls within 
intermediate levels, the relationship becomes flatter and slightly positive with 
appointing a Big Five auditor, which reflects the entrenchment effect. He argues 
that audit quality, in the form of large external auditors, play an essential 
governance role for shareholders against managerial expropriation concerns 
(Lennox, 2005). 
 
However, these findings reflect the case of a well developed country, such as 
the US and UK, thus it might not be a proper representation of other developing 
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contexts, such as China or even Saudi Arabia, where minority shareholders face 
difficulty in protecting their interests (Claessens et al., 2002; Djankov et al., 2008; 
La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, et al., 2000).  
 
In such contexts, while low levels of managerial ownership might lead to lower 
need for audit quality due to incentive alignment, high ownership levels of 
entrenched managers might also lead to lower audit quality due to the 
incontestability of the entrenched manager by minority shareholders, to avoid 
quality audit structures (Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; García-Sánchez et al., 2012). 
 
Similarly, in Bangladesh, which represents a developing country, Khan et al. 
(2015) report that managerial ownership is negatively and significantly 
associated with the appointment of a Big Four auditor. Their results are in line 
with the entrenchment argument that managerial ownership experience in less 
developed countries (Khan et al., 2015). However, both García-Sánchez et al. 
(2012) and Rainsbury et al. (2008) find no significant relationship between 
managerial ownership and the level of independence and expertise of the audit 
committee in Spain and New Zealand, respectively. 
 
Lastly, whether it is the incentive effect or the entrenchment effect that 
influences managerial ownership towards audit quality in Saudi Arabia, it is 
expected that the relationship would constantly remain negative. Incentive 
alignment might substitute for the need of a Big Four auditor and an 
independent and expert audit committee at low managerial ownership levels. 
However, entrenched managers at high ownership levels might use their voting 
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power to minimize monitoring pressure and avoid Big Four auditors and 
independent and expert audit committees in order to maximize their private 
benefits of control extraction. Accordingly, the fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H5. There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and audit 
quality in Saudi Arabia. 
 
5.3.6 Multiple Blockholders 
Multiple blockholders refers to firms with more than one blockholder. The 
presence of such case is assumed to serve a governance role, as the second 
blockholder is able to limit the expropriation ability of the largest blockholder 
(Pindado & Requejo, 2015; Attig et al., 2008). Research show that the presence of 
multiple blockholders increases dividend payment (Faccio et al., 2001; Pindado, 
Requejo, & Torre, 2012), is related with significant valuation premium (Attig et 
al., 2008), and is associated with higher corporate risk taking (Mishra, 2011). 
 
Due to their ability and incentive to monitor both the largest blockholder and 
management, multiple blockholders limit minority shareholder expropriation 
concerns (Boubaker et al., 2014). Multiple large shareholders are expected to 
curb the largest blockholder from extracting private benefits of control at the 
expense of minority shareholders (Attig et al., 2009).  
 
Few studies on audit quality investigated the influence of multiple 
blockholders, and have all reported that multiple large shareholders substitute 
for the need of higher quality audits through their improved monitoring of the 
firm (Ali et al., 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2015; Guedhami et al., 2014). Ali et al. (2014) 
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report that firms with more than one blockholder pay lower audit fees in France. 
Which reflects the lower audit effort required by the external auditor due to the 
lower agency costs associated with multiple blockholder’s mutual monitoring 
(Ali et al., 2014). 
 
Furthermore, Guedhami et al. (2014) and El Ghoul et al. (2015) found a 
negative relationship between the presence of multiple blockholders and the 
appointment of a Big Four auditor in a sample from 28 countries and Western 
Europe, respectively. They argue that multiple blockholders play a valuable 
governance role, and that committed internal monitoring by multiple 
blockholders reduces the benefits of external monitoring by a Big Four auditor 
(El Ghoul et al., 2015; Guedhami et al., 2014). 
 
However, multiple large shareholders are also able to collude with each other 
and appropriate firm resources at the expense of minority shareholders, 
especially when a weak legal system exists (Cai et al., 2016). While the negative 
relationship between audit quality and the presence of multiple blockholders 
reported in previous studies was caused by the substitutive role that governance 
mechanisms might play in developed countries, this might not be the case in 
developing countries. A negative relationship between audit quality and multiple 
blockholders might reflect their collusive intentions to expropriate firm 
resources while minimizing external monitoring and disclosure quality.  
 
In Saudi Arabia, the presence of multiple blockholders, of different types in the 
same company, is common, while minority shareholder rights are not reasonably 
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protected (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2012). Furthermore, in Saudi Arabia, family 
ties and relationships play a significant role in the all aspects of life, including 
corporate dealings (Bishara, 2011). In such a context, it would be expected that 
multiple blockholders with relational ties would collude with each other and 
expropriate firm resources at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus the 
presence of multiple blockholders would lead to lower levels of audit quality, by 
avoiding the appointment of a Big Four auditor and a less independent and 
expert audit committee. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H6. There is a negative relationship between the presence of multiple blockholders 
and audit quality in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
After analyzing the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on the 
relationship between different types of blockholders and audit quality in order to 
develop the hypotheses of the study, the next section will present the research 
methodology employed, which will cover the sample selection, variable 
measures and model specification of the study. The empirical investigation will 
help identify the actual role different blockholder types play on audit quality in 




5.4 Research Methodology 
5.4.1 Sample Selection 
The sample of the study comprises all Saudi non-financial public listed 
companies on Tadawul, the Saudi stock exchange, for the six year period from 
2008 to 2013. Tadawul holds 117 traded non-financial listed companies as of 
September 2014 (ZAWYA, 2014). Excluded from the sample are companies that 
the full data set variables were not available. A final sample (N) comprises of 619 
firm year observations. Table 5.2 shows the total final sample size for each year. 
Data on audit quality and firm level variables are manually collected from 
published annual reports, while ownership data is obtained from Reuters 
Thomson One Banker Database.  
 
Table 5.2 Total firm Samples per Year 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
N 89 97 102 105 114 112 619 
 
 
The rationale behind the 2008 start year of the sample is that the disclosure of 
the ‘Board of Directors Report’ in the corporate annual report, which discloses 
the variables required for this study, only became mandatory in 2008 (CMA, 
2010), thus data for previous years was impossible to obtain. Furthermore, 2013 
was the last year of annual reports available when the data was collected for this 
research project. Finally, the exclusion of financial firms is justified by their 
unique business operation and strict legal requirements, as financial companies 
in Saudi Arabia have a separate governance code (CMA, 2010). 
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5.4.2 Variable Measures 
5.4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The main dependent variable to measure audit quality is the presence of a Big 
Four auditor, which is measured as a binary/dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm has one of the Big Four serving as its external auditor, and 0 
otherwise (BIG4). Further tests on audit quality will examine characteristics of 
the audit committee in order to examine the quality level of internal audit 
structures. Two variables that reflect audit committee effectiveness will be 
studied, namely blockholder presence and the presence of a financial expert in 
the audit committee.  
 
Firstly, the presence of a blockholder in the audit committee represents the 
level of control the blockholders enjoy over firm audit decisions, which is 
measured as a binary/dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the audit 
committee has at least one blockholder or blockholder representative, and 0 
otherwise (BHAUCM). This measure reflects the independence of the audit 
committee from blockholder control. Since the audit committee in Saudi Arabia 
is required to be composed fully by non-executive members, it is already 
independent from the management (CMA, 2010). Therefore, it is more 
reasonable to examine the level of true independence the audit committee enjoys 
from blockholder influence rather than measuring its percentage of independent 
members. 
 
Secondly, the presence of a financial expert in the audit committee reflects the 
expertise level of the audit committee in finance related matters, which is 
 239 
measured as a binary/dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the audit 
committee has at least one member with financial background and/or 
qualification, and 0 otherwise (FINEXPRT). Since the audit function requires 
dealing with accounts and numbers, financial experts are expected to perform 
their required task more competently. 
5.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables represent the ownership structure of the firm. 
Several ownership variables are used in order to investigate how different 
blockholders influence audit quality. The minimum disclosure level of ownership 
in Saudi Arabia is 5%. Therefore, blockholders of different types will be 
considered based on the 5% threshold8.  
 
The first ownership variable is family ownership (FMLOWN). Family 
ownership represents the percentage ownership of family or individuals from 
total issued capital. Secondly, royal family ownership will be considered 
(RYLOWN). The percentage ownership of the Saudi ruling family members, Al-
Saud, to total issued capital measures RYLOWN.  
 
The third ownership variable measures the percentage of governmental 
ownership (GOVOWN). The government of Saudi Arabia directly holds shares in 
companies through three wholly-government-owned investment funds, namely, 
Public Investment Fund (PIF), Public Pension Agency (PPA) and General 
                                                        
 
8 Different cutoff points, 5-20%, 20-50%, and >50%, have been examined in 
order to identify the level of ownership required to maintain influence. Which 
showed similar results to our combined findings of >5%.  
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Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI) (ZAWYA, 2014). There are no private 
pension funds in Saudi Arabia thus citizens do not have other choices for 
retirement schemes. Moreover, only the government has the right to decide on 
the management and operation of these funds, therefore, it is more suitable to 
classify them as state ownership rather than institutional investors (Almajid, 
2008). Due to the lack of competition and government appointment of the 
management team, these governmental agencies differ greatly in terms of their 
investment choices and overall governance from traditional institutional 
investors.  
 
Fourthly, corporate ownership measures the percentage ownership held by a 
corporate entity (CRPOWN). While corporate ownership is common in Saudi 
Arabia, these corporations tend to be non-financial in nature. Although some 
corporations are privately held, which might represent a single family or 
individual investor, no data of ownership of these companies can be obtained. 
However, this study overlooked corporate ownership where the corporation’s 
registered name is of a family or individual and combined them with family 
owners instead. 
 
The fifth ownership variable is managerial ownership (EXECOWN). EXECOWN 
represents the percentage ownership of the firm executive management to total 
issued capital. Executive management could be the CEO, CFO, COO or any 
member of the senior management team of the firm.  
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The presence of multiple large shareholders will be the final ownership 
variable (MLS). A binary/dummy variable that measures 1 if more than one 
blockholder is present in a single firm, and 0 otherwise. In the case of multiple 
blockholders from the same family, the study will consider them as a single 
block, rather than multiple blockholders, due to their similar interests and 
kinship relations that forms a familial coalition (Jara-Bertin et al., 2008). In the 
aim of measuring the contestability of other blockholders in preventing the 
controlling blockholders and/or management from expropriating minority 
shareholders, it is more reasonable to differentiate between multiple 
blockholders and clear blockholder coalitions. 
5.4.2.3 Control Variables 
This study will control for factors that are expected to be a determinant of 
audit quality beside the ownership variables presented earlier. Research shows 
that certain firm characteristics might influence auditor choice for different 
reasons. 
 
Firstly, firm characteristics that reflect the level of firm complexity are 
expected to influence the audit quality decisions, as more complex firms require 
experienced auditors (Guedhami et al., 2014; Fan & Wong, 2005; Choi & Wong, 
2007; Lennox, 2005). Firm size is measured using the natural logarithm of total 
assets (FSIZE). The leverage level is measured as total debt divided by total 
assets (LEVERG). Firm performance is measured through the accounting 
performance measure of return on assets (ROA). Diversification is measured as a 
binary/dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has more than one 
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product or international segments, and 0 otherwise (DIVERS). Firm age is 
measured as the number of years since the establishment of the firm (AGE). 
 
Secondly, as this study aims to investigate audit quality under blockholder 
control, it is important to control for other significant governance variables that 
might influence the level of audit quality. Out of the various governance 
variables, the board of directors is considered as the most significant governance 
mechanism (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Fama, 1980; Adams et al., 2010). 
One of the main board characteristics is the independence of its members (Ben-
Amar et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The nomination committee is 
responsible for the recommendation of board membership and its committees, 
including the audit committee. In that regard, the independence level of the 
nomination committee represents a suitable reflection of the overall internal 
governance of the firm. Nomination committee independence is measured as the 
total number of independent members in the nomination committee divided by 
the size of the committee (NOMIND). 
5.4.3 Model Specification 
Due to the unique nature of the audit quality measures, which reflect the main 
dependent variables of the study, special care is required in order to avoid 
potential biases and inconsistent estimates driven by the values of its 
observations. Namely, the measure of audit quality are the decision to appoint a 
Big Four auditor (BIG4), the presence of a blockholder in the audit committee 
(BHADCM), and the presence of a financial expert in the audit committee 
(FINEXPRT), which are constructed as dummy variables that takes the value of 1 
if the value is true, and 0 otherwise.  
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These binary variable are best studied using a binary logistic regression 
(Logit) that takes into account the unique binary nature of the variables (Al-
Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Truong & Heaney, 2007). 
Therefore, models (1), (2) and (3) below are implemented, which represents 
logit regressions for the Big Four auditors (BIG4), blockholder audit committee 
control (BHADCM), and audit committee financial expertise (FINEXPRT), 
respectively: 
 
Pr (BIG4i,t = 1) = Logit [α0 + β1FMLOWNi,t + β2RYLOWNi,t + β3GOVOWNi,t + 
β4CRPOWNi,t + β5EXECOWNi,t + β6MLSi,t + β7FSIZEi,t + β8LEVERGi,t + β9ROAi,t + 
β10DIVERSi,t  + β11AGEi,t + β12NOMINDi,t + ε] 
 
Pr (BHADCMi,t = 1) = Logit [α0 + β1FMLOWNi,t + β2RYLOWNi,t + β3GOVOWNi,t + 
β4CRPOWNi,t + β5EXECOWNi,t + β6MLSi,t + β7FSIZEi,t + β8LEVERGi,t + β9ROAi,t + 
β10DIVERSi,t  + β11AGEi,t + β12NOMINDi,t + ε] 
 
Pr (FINEXPRTi,t = 1) = Logit [α0 + β1FMLOWNi,t + β2RYLOWNi,t + β3GOVOWNi,t + 
β4CRPOWNi,t + β5EXECOWNi,t + β6MLSi,t + β7FSIZEi,t + β8LEVERGi,t + β9ROAi,t + 
β10DIVERSi,t  + β11AGEi,t + β12NOMINDi,t + ε] 
 
where: 
α0:  Intercept    
i:  Firm factor   
t:  Year factor    
β:  Regression coefficient 
ε:  Error term 
 
Table 5.3 presents the operationalization of the variables used in the model. 
The following section provides the results of the econometric models, as well as 






Table 5.3 Operationalization of Variables 
Variable Measure 
Dependent variables 
Big Four Auditor BIG4 
 
External Auditor is one of the Big Four 








The presence of at least one Blockholder or 
Blockholder representative in the Audit Committee 
(value of 1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 
 






The presence of at least one Audit Committee 
member with Financial background/qualification  






The percentage of Family Ownership = Family 




The percentage of Royal Family Ownership = Royal 




The percentage of Government Ownership = 




The percentage of Ownership by other Corporate 





The percentage of Managerial Ownership = 









The presence of more than one Blockholder in a 
single Firm 
(value of 1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 
 
Control variables 



















Product and/or International Diversification  
(value of 1 if yes and 0 otherwise) 
Firm Age AGE 
 






The percentage of Independent Non-executive 
Directors sitting on the Nomination Committee = 




5.5 Results and Discussion 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.4 provides information on the descriptive statistics of variables 
measured. The results show that roughly 65% of the firms in the sample 
appointed a Big Four auditor. This result is similar to that reported by Choi & 
Wong (2007), who found that in weak legal environments the average Big Four 
market share is 61.83%, while it is 80.18% in strong legal environments. 
Furthermore, the results show that around 47% of the audit committees in the 
sample had at least one blockholder or blockholder representative, while 
roughly 72% of the audit committees had at least one expert in financial and 
accounting matters. 
 
The major ownership category is family ownership, where on average they 
hold 17% of the issued equity. Conversely, royal family ownership is the least 
manifested category, with average ownership of about 3%. Both government and 
corporate ownership on average hold about 9% of share capital, while 
managerial ownership is on average only 5%. The presence of multiple 
blockholders is a common theme in Saudi Arabia, where more than one 
blockholder in a single company is found in around two thirds of the sample.  
 
Additionally, the figures in Table 5.4 reflect that the variables are not normally 
distributed across the sample. The skewness of several variables fall beyond 
±1.96, and the kurtosis mostly fall beyond ±2, which reflect the thresholds 
acceptable for normality (Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, utilizing OLS as an 
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estimation method for our model is inappropriate, as it will produce biased 
estimates. Consequently, this study will employ binary logistic (Logit) technique 











Min Max Std. Dev. Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis N 
          
BIG4 
 
0 1 0.475 0.656 1 -0.656 1.432 619 
BHAUCM  0 1 0.499 0.467 0 0.131 1.017 612 
FINEXPRT 
 
0 1 0.447 0.725 1 -1.011 2.021 612 
FMLOWN 
 
0 0.725 0.217 0.172 0.0815 1.168 3.033 619 
RYLOWN 
 
0 0.95 0.117 0.028 0 5.828 41.623 619 
GOVOWN 
 
0 0.836 0.177 0.087 0 2.598 9.415 619 
CRPOWN 
 
0 0.75 0.161 0.089 0.0001 1.983 6.254 619 
EXECOWN 
 
0 0.7 0.133 0.049 0.0001 3.476 14.942 619 
MLS 
 
0 1 0.479 0.645 1 -0.604 1.365 619 
ROA 
 
-0.672 0.494 0.105 0.069 0.06 -0.938 12.938 619 
DIVERS 
 
0 1 0.498 0.546 1 -0.185 1.034 619 
FSIZE 
 
17.795 26.550 1.646 21.531 21.3971 0.566 3.389 619 
LEVERG 
 
0.004 1.527 0.219 0.365 0.3359 0.700 4.136 619 
AGE 
 
2 59 14.339 20.000 20 0.742 2.823 619 
NOMIND 
 







Table 5.5 presents the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables. The results show that the correlation between the variables 
are comparatively low, mostly below 0.5 thus no indication of a multicollinearity 
problem in the model (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
Moderately high correlation is found between Big Four auditor and both firm 
size (FSIZE) and firm leverage (LEVERG) of 0.422 and 0.424, respectively. This 
reflects the fact that more complex firms, in terms of size of total assets and the 
degree of leverage, requires higher levels of expert auditing, in the form of Big 
Four auditors. 
 
Table 5.6 presents the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables, where 
all fall comfortably below the acceptable limit of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004). Thus 
further confirming that a severe multicollinearity problem is not present in our 
sample. 
 






Table 5.6 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Values 
Table 5.5 Pearson Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variables BIG4 BHAUCM FINEXPRT FMLOWN RYLOWN GOVOWN CRPOWN EXECOWN MLS FSIZE LEVERG ROA DIVERS AGE NOMIND 
  
  
            
BIG4 1   
            
BHAUCM 0.233 1              
FINEXPRT -0.088 -0.064 1             
FMLOWN 0.168 0.175 -0.175 1 
           
RYLOWN 0.084 -0.098 -0.167 -0.158 1 
          
GOVOWN 0.142 0.097 0.203 -0.287 -0.056 1 
         
CRPOWN 0.181 0.114 0.090 -0.306 -0.063 -0.094 1 
        
EXECOWN 0.140 0.121 -0.035 0.454 0.035 -0.140 -0.132 1 
       
MLS 0.240 0.223 0.008 -0.025 -0.014 0.292 0.296 -0.092 1 
      
FSIZE 0.422 0.212 -0.015 -0.156 0.115 0.480 0.294 -0.105 0.363 1 
     
LEVERG 0.424 0.170 -0.095 0.114 0.049 -0.004 0.195 0.055 0.122 0.420 1 
    
ROA 0.008 0.116 0.098 0.117 -0.147 0.100 -0.003 0.230 0.119 -0.031 -0.288 1 
   
DIVERS 0.291 0.042 -0.110 0.254 0.117 0.061 -0.159 0.161 0.004 0.328 0.228 0.045 1 
  
AGE -0.361 -0.092 0.098 -0.340 -0.096 0.223 -0.204 -0.204 -0.049 -0.094 -0.354 0.096 -0.149 1 
 
NOMIND -0.221 -0.141 0.011 -0.177 0.112 0.040 -0.205 -0.113 -0.119 -0.144 -0.212 -0.093 -0.189 0.169 1 


















Table 5.7 Logistic Regression of Big Four Auditor on Ownership Structure and Control 
Variables 
 BIG 4 BHAUCM FINEXPRT 
 








































































































































































1. ***, ** and * denote p-value significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  






5.5.2 Discussion of Results 
Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 5.7 report the panel data logistic 
regression (Logit) of auditor choice (BIG4), audit committee independence 
(BHAUCM) and audit committee expertise (FINEXPRT) on ownership structure 
and control variables, respectively. Utilizing a panel data set that combines time 
series and cross sectional observations provides a more informative and robust 
results due to the higher degrees of freedom when compared to either of them 
independently (Gujarati, 2003). Furthermore, applying a logit model that takes 
into consideration the binary nature of the dependent variable is important to 
avoid biased estimates (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Abdelsalam et al., 2008; 
Truong & Heaney, 2007).  
 
Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3, which are the primary models of the study, 
report the independent variables of ownership, for the different types of 
blockholders, along with the firm specific control variables on auditor choice and 
audit committee characteristics. While models 4 and 5 provide additional tests 
for a combined measure of ownership, which will be discussed in the section that 
follows. 
 
The results indicate that family blockholders (FMLOWN) are positively and 
significantly related to assigning a Big Four auditor (BIG4) as well as being 
present in the audit committee (BHAUCM) at the 5% level, however there is no 
significant relationship with audit committee expertise (FINEXPRT). These 
results partly oppose the first hypotheses (H1), which expected family 





independent monitoring by the external auditors and the audit committee, thus 
the hypothesis is rejected.  
 
These results provide evidence that family blockholders in Saudi Arabia do not 
intend to expropriate minority shareholders by avoiding quality external 
auditors, while at the same time, family blockholders remain attached to the firm 
and maintain close relationship with the management and overall governance by 
holding positions in the audit committee (Bukhari, 2014). It is important for 
family blockholders to improve audit quality by appointing a Big Four auditor in 
order to sustain their legitimacy, especially when they have strong presence in 
the firm’s top management that enables them to expropriate resources for 
private benefits. After all family blockholders are the most type of blockholders 
present in the Saudi market, and if they lose trust from the various stakeholders, 
it might have a dramatic effect on the entire market. 
 
This result of improved external auditor choice corroborates the findings of 
Lei & Lam (2013). Lei & Lam (2013) reported that family blockholders in Hong 
Kong are associated with increased appointment of a Big Four auditor in order to 
signal their good intentions to minority shareholders. However, this result is 
opposite to that found in the only study in a developing country on family 
blockholders and auditor choice, namely by Khan et al. (2015) in Bangladesh. 
Khan et al. (2015) found that family blockholders were negatively related to the 
appointment of a Big Four auditor in Bangladesh, which reflects the 






Two explanations could be linked to the positive relationship found in Saudi 
Arabia. On the one hand, under the agency theory explanation, family 
blockholders might view the assignment of a Big Four auditor as a viable 
governance mechanism that disciplines the management (Lennox, 2005; Francis, 
2004). As family investors tend to be under diversified, it is important for them 
to protect their invested wealth from managerial expropriation, and therefore 
improve audit quality (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Fan & Wong, 2005). Improved 
audit quality limits both management and family blockholders from 
appropriating firm resources. Therefore, family blockholders in Saudi Arabia 
tend to solve the classical P-A problem with their incentive and power to better 
govern the firm, instead of introducing P-P agency problems. 
 
On the other hand, under the stakeholder and signaling theories, family 
blockholders might signal to the vious stakeholders, including minority 
shareholders, their intention of not to expropriate firm resources by improving 
external auditor quality (Lei & Lam, 2013; Fan & Wong, 2005). By signaling such 
good commitments, family blockholders aim at gaining investors trust in 
acquiring firm shares (Titman & Trueman, 1986). While the presence of family 
blockholders is negatively related to audit committee independence, it is not 
being used to appropriate firm resources, rather to maintain close control over 
decision making and firm management, which is reflected in the increased 
auditor quality choices that audit committees have a strong influence on. The 
culture in Saudi Arabia is characterized by high power distance and secrecy in 





reflect the motivation behind family blockholders’ control over the board and its 
subcommittees. 
 
Accordingly, under the agency, stakeholder and signaling explanations, the 
results of increased audit quality, by appointing Big Four auditors, show that 
family blockholders tend not to create expropriation concerns for minority 
shareholders and the various stakeholders in the Saudi Arabian context. These 
results might reflect the role that Islamic teachings play in shaping the behavior 
of family blockholders within the Saudi capital market, where fair treatment and 
just dealing represent core Islamic values (Muneeza & Hassan, 2014; Lewis, 
2005; Rizk, 2008a).  
 
Moreover, royal family blockholders (RYLOWN) are found to be negatively 
and significantly related to the financial expertise of the audit committee 
(FINEXPRT) at the 1% level, while the relationship with auditor choice (BIG4) 
and their presence in the audit committee (BHAUCM) is found to be insignificant, 
therefore partly supporting the second hypothesis (H2) of expected negative 
relationship with audit quality. The negative relationship expected that royal 
family blockholders may be reluctant to improve accounting transparency, thus 
rendering the financial statements less informative for outsiders, in order to 
protect their private benefit extraction motives (Guedhami et al., 2014; Bona-
Sánchez et al., 2014; Habib et al., 2017). 
 
By reducing the presence of financial experts in audit committees, royal family 





effectively, thus hindering the quality of the firm’s financial statements. Similarly, 
Chaney et al. (2011), found that the quality of accounting reports is lower in 
politically connected firms than non-politically connected ones, from a sample of 
19 countries. However, these findings differ from that reported by Guedhami et 
al. (2014), who find that firms with political connections are more likely to hire a 
Big Four auditor from a sample of 28 countries. They argue that politically 
connected firms appoint a Big Four auditor to improve accounting transparency 
and signal their intentions of not expropriating firm resources (Guedhami et al., 
2014).  
 
These results might reflect that the level of audit quality is not important for 
royal family blockholders in Saudi Arabia, as they are able to extract private 
benefits of control under any circumstances due to their powerful status in the 
country. However, while royal family blockholders are associated with lower 
audit committee expertise, they do not negatively influence external monitoring 
by a Big Four auditor, nor they reduce the independence of the audit committee 
to control its function.  
 
Therefore, it is possible that royal family blockholders just dedicate less effort 
to improve corporate governance due to their favorable position without facing 
negative consequences from their associated lower audit quality, instead of 
having the intention to expropriate firm resources (Chaney et al., 2011). 
Consequently, royal family blockholders in Saudi Arabia do not improve nor 
hinder audit quality of the firms they invest in, as they devote less effort in trying 






Furthermore, government ownership (GOVOWN) shows a positive and 
significant relationship with audit quality (BIG4) and audit committee expertise 
(FINEXPRT), at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, while the relationship with 
audit committee independence (BHAUCM) is insignificant. This finding supports 
the third hypothesis (H3), which expects that government ownership would 
signal to the market its intentions to implement governance best practices by 
improving audit quality, thus the hypothesis is accepted. These results contradict 
previously reported ones in the few studies on audit quality and government 
ownership around the world, which reported either a negative impact on audit 
quality or found the relationship to be non-significant.  
 
Based on a sample from 36 countries, Guedhami et al. (2009) report that 
government ownership is negatively associated with assigning a Big Four 
auditor. Similarly in China, Wang et al. (2008), find that state owned enterprises 
are more likely to appoint a small auditor than non-state owned ones. 
Additionally, Khan et al. (2015) and El Ghoul et al. (2015) report no significant 
relationship between government ownership and assigning a Big Four auditor in 
Bangladesh and Western Europe, respectively. It is argued that the easier access 
to finance state owned enterprises enjoy, due to their low default risk, enables 
them to avoid sound governance structures, such as lower quality auditor choice, 
while still obtaining cheap loans (Wang et al., 2008; Attig et al., 2009). 
 
The result of positive relationship between government ownership and audit 





audit committees, reflects the drive of the government of Saudi Arabia at 
improving the corporate governance of the stock market (Bukhari, 2014). 
 
Being the custodian of the two Holy Mosques, the Saudi government is also 
inclined to engage in Islamic driven ethical dealings, which prohibits the misuse 
of asset and the expropriation of minorities, in order to sustain its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the Muslim people (Niblock, 2006). 
 
Thus, government ownership in Saudi Arabia tend to signal to the market and 
the various stakeholders its implementation of sound corporate governance 
practices by improving audit quality in order to encourage the market in 
implementing the proposed governance best practice, maintain its religious 
legitimacy, increase investor confidence in acquiring firm shares, or to increase 
external monitoring by the audit firm to reduce managerial agency problems. 
 
Additionally, corporate ownership (CRPOWN) is found to be insignificantly 
related to auditor choice (BIG4), audit committee independence (BHAUCM) and 
audit committee expertise (FINEXPRT). These findings do not support the fourth 
hypothesis (H4), which expected that corporate ownership would lead to higher 
audit quality as a signal to the general public of their intention not to expropriate 
minority shareholders, thus the hypothesis is rejected. This result shows that 
corporate blockholders do not influence the decision to hire a Big Four external 






The non-significant relationship between corporate ownership and all audit 
quality measures studied, could imply that corporate ownership and audit 
quality act as complimentary governance mechanisms. As corporate owners are 
better capable of governing the firm, through their developed knowledge and 
expertise, they are well suited to act as a complimentary governance mechanism 
to external monitoring by a Big Four auditor and the audit committee, therefore 
a non significant relationship is found. 
 
Moreover, managerial ownership (EXECOWN) is found to be negatively and 
significantly related to the financial expertise of the audit committee (FINEXPRT) 
at the 1% level, while the relationship with auditor choice (BIG4) and audit 
committee independence (BHAUCM) is found to be insignificant, thus partly 
supporting the proposed negative relationship of hypothesis (H5), which reflects 
both the incentive and entrenchment effects.  
 
The negative relationship between managerial ownership and audit 
committee expertise might reflect the intention of entrenched managers at 
deterring expert monitoring to the audit process of the firm, in order to 
maximize their capacity to appropriate firm resources. However, managerial 
ownership is only associated with lower audit committee expertise, as they do 
not negatively influence external monitoring by a Big Four auditor, nor they 
reduce the independence of the audit committee to control its function. 
 
Likewise, the finding of negative relationship with audit committee expertise 





in contexts such as the UK (Lennox, 2005) and Bangladesh (Khan et al., 2015), 
where a non-linear relationship and negative relationship with auditor choice 
were reported, respectively. Furthermore, these results, of mostly insignificant 
relationship, support the findings of Raisbury et al. (2008) and García-Saánchez 
et al. (2012), were a non significant relationship was reported between 
managerial ownership and audit committee characteristics in New Zealand and 
Spain, respectively. 
 
This mostly non-significant relationship finding could reflect the prevalence of 
power that external blockholders in Saudi Arabia enjoy when compared to 
internal/managerial owners. Accordingly, managers in Saudi Arabia might be 
encouraged by external blockholders through means of increasing their level of 
ownership, in order to align their interests with that of shareholders, without 
giving them full control over key governance decisions.  
 
Therefore, due to the dominant power external blockholders possess in the 
Saudi context, increased managerial ownership would still not allow for their 
interests to be fully reflected in decision making, such as the appointment of a 
Big Four auditor and the independence of the audit committee. This also 
supports the notion that the agency problem in countries with concentrated 
ownership, such as Saudi Arabia, is the one between controlling and minority 
shareholders [P-P], rather than the classical problem between management and 






Furthermore, the presence of multiple blockholders (MLS) is found to be 
insignificantly related to auditor choice (BIG4) audit committee independence 
(BHAUCM) and audit committee expertise (FINEXPRT). This finding does not 
support the last hypothesis (H6), which assumes that multiple blockholders 
would collude to expropriate minority shareholders by reducing audit quality, in 
order to maximize their private benefits of control, thus the hypothesis is 
rejected. This result of no relationship differs from that reported in the 
literature, where multiple blockholders were found to substitute for the need of 
a Big Four external auditor through their improved monitoring of the firm in 
different countries (Ali et al., 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2015; Guedhami et al., 2014). 
 
Moreover, the finding of non-significant relationship between the presence of 
multiple blockholders and audit quality could be explained by two competing 
arguments. On the one hand, the non-significant relationship could imply that 
both multiple blockholders and audit quality act as complimentary governance 
mechanisms, in which both protect the interests of minority shareholders 
through increased monitoring of the firm. Multiple blockholders have the power 
and incentive to closely monitor the firm and deter appropriative behavior of 
insiders, and might therefore complement audit quality without having a direct 
effect on it (Attig et al., 2009). 
 
On the other hand, the non-significant relationship could also reflect that 
multiple blockholders in Saudi Arabia are not able to contest the demands of the 
controlling shareholders, even on audit quality decisions, and thus multiple 





emphasis on relational ties and the strong power distance the people of Saudi 
Arabia, and Arabs in general, occupy could reflect such behavior, thus multiple 
blockholders might not challenge the authority of the largest shareholder 
(Chahine & Tohmé, 2009). 
 
While it is difficult to identify which of the two arguments holds in Saudi 
Arabia, it is fair to assume that the presence of multiple blockholders does not 
reduce the governance of the firm by lowering audit quality, therefore multiple 
blockholders do not collude to expropriate firm resources and enjoy private 
benefits of control, at the expense of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Several control variables show significant relationship with the studied audit 
quality measures. In support to the firm complexity argument, which assumes 
the need for larger and more experienced audit firms, both firm size (FSIZE) and 
firm diversification (DIVERS) show a positive and significant relationship with 
assigning a Big Four auditor (BIG4) at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Firms 
that are more diversified and firms that are larger are considered as more 
complex firms, thus require more diverse skills and monitoring efforts, which is 
expected to be provided by Big Four external auditors (Beattie et al., 2001; Fan & 
Wong, 2005; Lennox, 2005).  
 
Additionally, with regards to audit committee characteristics, firm size 
(FSIZE) is found, strangely, to be negatively related to audit quality, were the 
relationship is found to be positive and significant with the presence of a 





and significantly related to the expertise of the audit committee (FINEXPRT) at 
the 10% level. This might reflect the motivation of blockholders to maintain 
close control over the audit committee in large firms by occupying its 
membership, due to the sensitivity of the role the audit committee plays in such 
significant firms. 
 
Moreover, in support of the governance argument of the firm, the level of 
independence of the nomination committee (NOMIND) is found to be positively 
related to the audit quality in terms of audit committee structure. The 
relationship between nomination committee independence and the presence of a 
blockholder in the audit committee (BHAUCM) is negative and significant at the 
1 % level, while it is found to be positive and significant with the expertise of the 
audit committee (FINEXPRT) at the 5% level. The higher the level of 
independence the nomination committee enjoys, the higher the quality of the 
audit committee characteristic is in terms of reflecting minority shareholder 
interests. 
 
Finally, firm age (AGE) is found to be negatively and significantly related to the 
appointment of a Big Four auditor (BIG4) at the 1% level. This finding might 
reflect the need for newly established firms to assure investors about their 
sound audit structure. New firms have high levels of information asymmetry and 
therefore are encouraged to improve audit quality to reduce the risk for 
potential investors (Titman & Trueman, 1986; Copley & Douthett Jr., 2002; Datar 
et al., 1991). On the other hand, mature firms that have long standing history of 





outside investors in the form of Big Four auditor. These firms have gained 
experience in improving their audit structures and have established confidence 







5.5.3 Robustness Checks 
In order to further examine the robustness of the results, several models have 
been employed. Models 4 and 5 in Table 5.7 examine the role of ownership 
concentration on the audit quality measure of auditor choice regardless of the 
type of blockholder. Model 4 measures the entire combined ownership 
concentration of over 5% (OWNCNCTR), whereas Model 5 divides the level of 
concentration into three groups; comprising a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the total ownership concentration in a firm falls under each threshold of 5% to 
20% (OWN5TO20), 20% to 50% (OWN20TO50) and over 50% (OWNABV50), 
and 0 otherwise. The motivation behind this measurement is to examine 
whether blockholders of different levels of ownership influence audit quality 
differently or not. Different results for different levels of ownership could signal 
the incentive and entrenchment effects previously documented in the literature 
(De Miguel et al., 2004; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Short & 
Keasey, 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). 
 
The results of Model 4 demonstrate that ownership concentration 
(OWNCNCTR) is positively and significantly associated with the appointment of 
a Big Four auditor (BIG4) at the 1% level. This result further supports the 
previous findings, where all blockholder types in Saudi Arabia with a significant 
relationship to auditor choice are found to be positive; namely family and 
government blockholders. Therefore, blockholders in the Saudi context, of any 
type, do not tend to expropriate minority shareholders; rather they positively 






Additionally, Model 5 reveals that the blockholder positive influence on audit 
quality differs at different concentration thresholds. Where ownership 
thresholds of 5% to 20% (OWN5TO20) and 20% to 50% (OWN20TO50) are 
found to be non-significant with auditor choice (BIG4), and only ownership over 
50% (OWNABV50) is found to be positively and significantly related to the 
appointment of Big Four auditor (BIG4) at the 1% level.  
 
These results might reflect the severity of the agency problem when a 
blockholder owns more than 50% of the firm (OWNABV50), consequently the 
majority controlling blockholder becomes inclined to assign a quality Big Four 
auditor to assure minority shareholders his good intentions not to expropriate 
firm resources due to his uncontestable position. This could also reflect that in 
Saudi Arabia moderate levels of ownership acts as a complementary governance 
mechanism to the appointment of a Big Four auditor. 
 
Finally, in both Model 4 and Model 5, the results show similar findings with the 
separated ownership and auditor choice for all the control variables. Thus 
lending further support to our findings, as the results did not differ by 
differentiating between owner types, or combining them into a single measure. 
 
The following section provides the concluding remarks of this chapter, which 








This chapter investigated the role of blockholders on the level of audit quality 
in Saudi public listed companies. High quality audits, proxied by a Big Four 
auditor and an independent and expert audit committee, reduces the 
information asymmetry between controlling insiders and minority shareholders 
by providing credible checks to the financial reports and improving the overall 
auditing function of the firm. The level of audit quality under different types of 
controlling blockholders indicates the degree of minority shareholder 
expropriation concerns, as lower quality audits facilitate the manipulation of the 
accounts by controlling insiders to conceal any appropriative dealings.  
 
Panel data logistic (logit) regression models were used to test the relationship 
between different blockholder types, namely family, royal family, government, 
corporate and managerial ownership, and different audit quality measures, 
namely auditor choice (BIG4), audit committee independence (BHAUCM) and 
audit committee financial expertise (FINEXPRT). After controlling for 
conventional determinants of audit quality, the results for 117 non-financial 
listed companies in Saudi Arabia from 2008-2013 show that minority 
shareholder interests are mostly protected under control by all types of 
blockholders.  
 
The findings of the study reveal that blockholders do not reduce audit quality 
in order to maximize private benefit extraction in Saudi Arabia as shown in Table 





influence audit quality, while other types of blockholders do not have significant 
influence on audit quality negatively.  
 


















Family - - - + + no 
Royal Family - - - no no - 
Government + + + + no + 
Corporate + + + no no no 
Managerial - - - no no - 
MLS - - - no no no 
 
 
These results might reflect the role that Islamic teachings play in shaping the 
behavior of blockholders within the Saudi capital market, where fair treatment 
and just dealing represent core Islamic values (Muneeza & Hassan, 2014; Lewis, 
2005). The strong influence of the Islamic religion on Saudi Arabia is far 
reaching, and might well demonstrate the favorable conduct of blockholders, 
who protect the interests of minority shareholders, as well as other stakeholders, 
by improving audit quality of the firm, which decreases the level of information 






The results might further reflect the institutional legitimacy of minority 
shareholder protection that controlling blockholders are pressured to cope with 
in order to gain the trust of the general public to invest in the firm’s stocks. The 
highly concentrated ownership of the Saudi capital market, as well as the 
powerful position controlling families and the government enjoy, creates a 
situation where the expropriation of minority shareholders remain a huge 
concern, and therefore it becomes crucial for blockholders to signal their 
intentions of protecting minority shareholders and serve the best interest of the 
firm instead by improving audit quality, for example (Ho & Kang, 2013; Edmans, 
2014). 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the findings of the study indicate that 
blockholders of different types in Saudi Arabia tend to reduce the agency 
problem inherent in public listed companies under their presence and act in the 
best interest of other stakeholders, including minority shareholders by 
improving audit quality. These findings might offer assurance to different 
stakeholders that blockholder presence in Saudi Arabia is not detrimental to the 
firm, and that the interests of current and potential shareholders are protected. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, this study 
provides one of the earliest empirical investigations on the blockholder and 
audit quality relationship in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia reflects a unique 
institutional setting that differs greatly from that of the US (Ho & Kang, 2013), 
European (Lennox, 2005; El Ghoul et al., 2015; García-Sánchez et al., 2012), New 





Wang et al., 2008), Bangladesh (Khan et al., 2015) or even East Asian contexts 
(Fan & Wong, 2005), which have been investigated in the literature. 
 
Secondly, this study combines all the types of blockholders present in the 
Saudi market, which includes a unique type of royal family members, which are 
similar to politically connected owners. Studies on the ownership and auditor 
choice generally fail to differentiate between different types of blockholders, 
rather they combine them in a single measure of ownership concentration (Lin & 
Liu, 2009; Leung & Liu, 2015; Fan & Wong, 2005; Farooq & Tabine, 2015), or 
only focus on a single blockholder type, such as family (Khan et al., 2015; Ho & 
Kang, 2013), or government (Wang et al., 2008; Guedhami et al., 2009). 
Therefore, this study is one of the few papers that combine the simultaneous 
influence of all the different blockholder types on audit quality. 
 
 Finally, this study increases our understanding of the dynamics of the Saudi 
capital market, which is largely understudied, by examining the principal 
principal agency problem [P-P] between controlling and minority shareholders. 
This is achieved by studying the audit quality and ownership structure 
relationship, which reflects the level of expropriation concerns minority 
shareholders encounter under the presence of controlling blockholders. By 
increasing the information asymmetry between them and minority shareholders, 
blockholders are able to maximize the private benefit extraction through 











This thesis investigates the role of blockholders in the governance of Saudi 
public listed companies. Public listed companies play a vital role in the global 
economy, as the invention of public listed companies “has provided vast 
employment, fuelled huge economic growth and created untold wealth” (Tricker, 
1993, p.2). The Saudi stock market, Tadawul, is the largest and most liquid in the 
Middle East and North Africa region (Tadawul, 2014; Koldertsova, 2010). 
Tadawul had a total market capitalization of over 500 Billion USD as of October 
2014 (ZAWYA, 2014).  
 
Saudi Arabia presents a unique setting, where religious, cultural and social 
factors, that are similar to those of other Arab and Islamic nations, play an 
important role in the day to day lives of the society. Furthermore, Islam is the 
only legal religion in Saudi Arabia, and Islamic law, referred to as Sharia, serves 
as its constitution (CIA, 2014). Blockholders are widely present in the Saudi 
stock market; where government and family blockholders control more than two 
thirds of the companies listed in Tadawul (Di Benedetta & Berg, 2009; Quttainah 
& Paczkowski, 2012). Given the prevalence of blockholder presence in Saudi 
Arabia, it is vital to understand the role they might play in the governance of 







In order to examine the level of influence blockholders have on corporate 
governance, the preceding three chapters focused on three key governance 
measures, namely the board of directors, dividends and audit quality, 
respectively. In doing so, the aim of the thesis is to answer the question of: ‘How 
do blockholders influence the governance of Saudi public listed corporations?’ 
 
Each study examined the influence of the different blockholder types present 
in the Saudi market, namely family, royal family, government, corporate and 
managerial ownership, while controlling for various factors that are known to 
have an impact on the governance measures in question. The studies examined 
data from 117 non-financial listed companies in Saudi Arabia from 2008-2013, 
with a final sample (N) of 619 firm year observations. 
  
The choice of these mechanisms is motivated by several factors. Firstly, the 
board of directors is regarded as the most significant governance mechanism 
(Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). Similarly, Fama (1980, p.294) views the board 
of directors as the “ultimate internal monitor”. The board of directors has the 
power to hire, fire, and compensate top executives (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Furthermore, Anderson and Reeb (2004) argue that in closely controlled firms 
minority shareholders heavily rely on the board of directors to mitigate 
blockholder expropriation, where board effectiveness is reflected in its level of 
independence.  
 
Secondly, dividend is considered as a mechanism that reduces the free cash 





out by the firm in the form of dividends reduces the cash available under 
managerial or blockholder discretion (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Jensen, 1986; 
La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). 
Moreover, dividend payment is a financial commitment that places the 
management under external scrutiny when needing to raise external funding 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Easterbrook, 1984).  
 
Thirdly, improving audit quality, such as appointing a Big Four auditor, 
decreases the ability of the blockholder to extract private benefits of control 
through increased oversight over the reporting process which leads to higher 
levels of transparency. Thus, it might be used by blockholders themselves in 
order to signal to minority shareholders their willingness to employ good 
governance mechanisms and not to intend to expropriate them (Fan & Wong, 
2005).  
 
As such, the board of directors, dividends and audit quality can all be 
considered as mechanisms to control for both P-A and P-P agency problems 
(Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Given the central role of the board, dividend and audit 
quality in the protection of minority shareholders, this study investigated the 
respective role of these governance mechanisms under the presence of different 
types of blockholders in the context of Saudi public listed companies. 
 
While each chapter represents a stand alone research paper with its own 
findings and discussion, the combined results of the three studies provide 





public listed companies. Accordingly, this concluding chapter will summarize the 
findings of the entire thesis, discuss possible causes, significance and 
implications of these findings, and suggest fruitful areas for future research. 
 
6.2 Findings and Discussion 
The first empirical study, chapter 3, examined the role of blockholders on the 
structure of the board of Saudi public listed companies. The level of board 
independence is assumed to reflect the degree of minority shareholder 
representation in the decision making and overall governance of the firm. 
Random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) models were used to test the 
relationship between different blockholder types and board independence. After 
controlling for conventional determinants of board structure, the results show 
that that minority shareholder interests are not well represented through higher 
level of board independence under control by all types of blockholders.  
 
The findings of chapter 3 reveal the possible existing P-P agency problem 
between all types of blockholders and minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia, as 
the former is associated with less independent board representation. Family 
ownership, government ownership, corporate ownership and multiple 
blockholders have all been found to be significantly associated with less 
independent boards. It is possible that controlling blockholders maintain control 
over the board in order to better monitor the firm and act as stewards in the best 
interest of all, or to deter external monitoring by independent directors in order 






The second study, chapter 4, investigated the role of blockholders on the 
dividend policy of Saudi public listed companies. The level of dividend payout 
under different types of blockholders reflects the degree of minority 
shareholders’ concern regarding the expropriation of firm resources by 
controlling blockholders. Lower dividend payments indicate higher propensity 
for private benefit extraction by blockholders due to the increased free cash flow 
available for appropriation. A Logit and Tobit models were used to test the 
relationship between different blockholder types and both dividend decisions 
and dividend ratio, respectively.  
 
The findings of chapter 4 reveal that blockholders do not reduce dividends in 
order to maximize the resources available for private benefit extraction in Saudi 
Arabia. Rather family, royal family, government, corporate and multiple 
blockholders, all positively influence dividend policy, either to signal their fair 
treatment to minority shareholders and stakeholders at large, or to utilize 
dividends as a governance mechanism that reduces the free cash flow available 
under managerial discretion. 
 
The third empirical study, chapter 5, investigated the role of blockholders on 
the level of audit quality in Saudi public listed companies. High quality audits, 
proxied by a Big Four auditor and an independent and expert audit committee, 
reduce the information asymmetry between controlling insiders and other 
stakeholders by providing credible checks to the financial reports and improving 





types of controlling blockholders indicates the degree of minority shareholder 
expropriation concerns, as lower quality audits facilitate the manipulation of the 
accounts by controlling insiders to conceal any appropriative dealings. Panel 
data logistic regression (Logit) models were employed to test the relationship 
between different blockholder types and auditor choice, audit committee 
independence and audit committee expertise.  
 
The findings of chapter 5 further reveal that the presence of blockholders in 
Saudi Arabia is not associated with reduced audit quality. Rather family and 
government ownership positively and significantly influence audit quality, by 
assigning a Big Four external auditor and improving audit committee 
independence and expertise, while other types of blockholders do not have any 
significant influence on the overall audit quality of the firm. Ultimately, 
blockholders in Saudi Arabia do not hinder audit quality and act in the best 
interest of the different stakeholders. 
 
Overall, the results show that the rights and interests of minority shareholder 
and other stakeholders are fairly protected under blockholder control in Saudi 
public listed companies. The initial results, in chapter 3, indicate that 
blockholders maintain control over board representation, which enables them to 
expropriate firm resources and exacerbate the agency problem. The exclusion of 
outside independent directors might reflect the dominance of the Arabian 
culture in Saudi Arabia, which is characterized by high power distance and 
strong levels of secrecy in business dealings (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Bukhari, 





blockholders become obligated to expose information they otherwise regard as 
private to outsiders. 
 
However, further analyses, in chapters 4 and 5, reveal that blockholders 
actually act in the best interest of the firm and curb managerial self serving 
behavior by positively influencing the corporate governance, through improved 
dividend policy and audit quality under their control. These results might reflect 
the role that Islamic teachings play in shaping the behavior of blockholders 
within the Saudi capital market, where fair treatment and just dealing represent 
core Islamic values (Muneeza & Hassan, 2014; Lewis, 2005). The Islamic ethical 
system promotes the protection of the rights of the various stakeholders and 
urges humans to act as stewards entrusted in achieving continuity and societal 
welfare (Ali et al., 2017; Rizk, 2014; Bedoui & Mansour, 2015). 
 
The strong influence of the Islamic religion on Saudi Arabia is far reaching, and 
might well demonstrate the favorable conduct of blockholders (Bukhari, 2014), 
who act as stewards and are found to protect the interests of other stakeholders 
by positively influencing the dividend policy and audit quality of the firm while 
maintaining control over the board. The stewardship rationalization can best 
symbolize the Islamic principle of vicegerency, which is expected to have an 
influence on blockholders in Saudi Arabia, who should act in the best interest of 
all stakeholders. 
 
The results might further reflect the institutional legitimacy controlling 





protection in order to gain the trust of the general public to invest in the firm’s 
stocks. The highly concentrated ownership of the Saudi capital market, as well as 
the powerful position controlling families and the government enjoy, creates a 
situation where the expropriation of firm resources remain a huge concern, and 
therefore it becomes crucial for blockholders to signal their intentions of 
protecting minority shareholders and serve the best interest of the firm instead 
(Pindado et al., 2012; Edmans, 2014).  
 
Ultimately, the institutional setting in Saudi Arabia, which is characterized by 
weak protection of minority shareholders in addition to the wide presence of 
blockholders, enables controlling blockholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders and enjoy private benefits of control. However, the results of this 
thesis show that blockholders in Saudi Arabia engage in direct monitoring and 
are associated with improved governance of public listed firms. 
 
Over the past two decades, the focus of Islamic corporate governance 
development has mainly been directed towards Islamic financial institutions 
(IFI). In the context of IFIs a unique Islamic governance system that differs from 
the Anglo-American or European models of corporate governance has evolved 
over time with its distinctive set of features, such as the establishment of a Sharia 
supervisory board (Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Mansour & Bhatti, 2018). However, 
there has not been strong development in the field of corporate governance for 
non-financial Islamic corporations. Therefore, Islamic countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia tend to adopt systems that have been developed in non-Islamic contexts, 






While the governance system in Saudi Arabia is mostly based on an Anglo-
American shareholder model, due to the underdevelopment of a solid Islamic 
corporate governance framework (Mansour & Bhatti, 2018), the results of this 
thesis indicate that the market operates more towards a stakeholder model. The 
results of this unique environment reflect the potential moderating role of the 
Arabian culture, of secrecy and high power distance, and the Islamic ethical 
system, that promotes societal welfare, in shaping the relationship between 
blockholders and minority shareholders that shifts away from the classical 
expectations of the Anglo-American agency expectations (Murphy & Smolarski, 
2018). 
 
6.3 Contributions and Implications 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, this study 
contributes to the P-P relationship and the private benefits of control associated 
with large shareholders by investigating the influence of blockholders on the 
governance of PLCs in a newly investigated setting, namely Saudi Arabia. This 
study provides a primary empirical investigation on the blockholder and 
governance relationship in Saudi Arabia while taking into consideration different 
types of blockholders and their respective level of ownership. Saudi Arabia 
reflects a unique institutional setting, where religious, cultural and social factors 
play an important role in the day to day lives of the society, that differs greatly 
from what have been generally investigated in the corporate governance 





influence of blockholders on corporate governance and the protection of 
minority shareholders.  
 
Secondly, this study combines all types of blockholders present in the Saudi 
market. Studies on ownership and corporate governance generally fail to 
differentiate between different types of blockholders, rather they combine them 
in a single measure of ownership concentration or study a particular type in 
isolation. This study contributes to the literature on the role of multiple 
blockholders in corporate governance, by examining their relationship with key 
governance mechanisms, as the presence of competing blockholders might have 
different effects on the governance of the firm (Maury & Pajuste, 2005; Attig et 
al., 2008; Attig et al., 2009; Edmans & Manso, 2009). Moreover, this study 
contributes to the political connections literature by analyzing the governance 
influence of blockholders from the Saudi royal family, who possess financial, 
legal and social advantages over other types of owners in the country (Bona-
Sánchez, Pérez-Alemán, & Santana-Martín, 2014; Faccio, 2010; Fan, Wong, & 
Zhang, 2007; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). 
 
Finally, this study contributes to the Islamic business ethics literature by 
studying the corporate governance structures under blockholder control from a 
majority Islamic country, namely Saudi Arabia, where the results reveal that 
blockholders tend not to impair the governance of public listed companies under 
their control. Furthermore, the results of this thesis increase our understanding 
of the dynamics of the Saudi capital market by examining the behavior of 






The results of this study reflect the state of governance that public listed firms 
in a developing Arab and Islamic country from the Middle East encounter under 
the control of blockholders. These results are of interest to academics, 
practitioners and policy makers in developing countries in general, and the 
Middle East and Saudi Arabia in particular. Scholars can build on the findings of 
this thesis to better understand the governance structures in an Arab and Islamic 
context. Local and international investors become more aware of the 
environment of the Saudi market when prompted to make investment decisions.  
 
Policy makers also recognize the severity of the agency problem that minority 
shareholders face under blockholder control, and thus be informed about the 
functioning of the market in order to make appropriate legislation. As discussed 
in 2.6.2, the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations are highly influenced by 
Western codes and does not reflect the factors that are unique to Saudi Arabia, 
such as the Islamic religion and local culture. The results of this study indicate 
that institutional factors play an important role in shaping the behavior of 
individuals, therefore, the Saudi CMA should consider developing a corporate 
governance code that is tailored for the Saudi market specifically, which 
encompasses Islamic aspects that is best suited for this context. 
 
6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
This study is subject to limitations that need to be taken into account. Firstly, 





the generalizability of the results. While the country is assumed to be a 
representative of Arab countries in general and the Middle East in particular, in 
terms of market development, religion and culture, a multi-country analysis 
might provide richer insights that provide more generalizable results. A 
comparative study that includes several developing and developed economies 
will also provide a greater understanding of the role blockholders play under 
different institutional settings. 
 
Secondly, this study only covered a period of six years, due to limitation in data 
availability and time constrains, as there are no databases that contain corporate 
governance data of Saudi public listed companies, which is required to be hand 
collected from corporate annual reports. Therefore, future longitudinal studies 
might benefit from a large sample that spans over a larger period of time, which 
could provide results that are more robust and reliable. Furthermore, as the 
Saudi market starts to develop further, and the level of disclosure increases, 
future studies can examine and control for additional factors that might have an 
effect on the role of blockholders in the governance of public listed companies. 
 
Thirdly, while this study focused on the influence of blockholders on different 
governance mechanisms in order to reflect the level of minority shareholder 
expropriation concerns, however the financial outcomes of these decisions has 
not been considered. Future research might measure the effect of such decisions 
on the future performance of the firm or the share price reaction to changes in 







Fourthly, while this study emphasized on the possible influence of Islamic 
religion on the behavior of blockholders and the corporate governance structure 
in Saudi Arabia, it failed to incorporate and quantify such variables in the 
empirical process employed in the three empirical chapters. Endogenising 
Islamic aspects into the empirical model might be a fruitful area for future 
research in Saudi Arabia specifically, and other Islamic contexts, in order to 
measure the level of influence Islam as a religion has on organizational 
structures and outcomes.  
 
Finally, this study only employed quantitative analyses on different variables 
that measure ownership structure and corporate governance, while the results 
should inform us about potential relationships; it fails to uncover the underlying 
processes and motivations behind these relationships (McNulty et al., 2013). 
Future studies could employ a qualitative enquiry, in the form of interviews with 
blockholders, senior executives and other stakeholder groups in Saudi Arabia in 
order to open the black box of blockholder influence over the governance of 
public listed companies and further advance the findings of this study. Such 
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Appendix A – Saudi Corporate Governance 
Regulations (CGR) 
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